NSDA 2022 – Finals – NEG

This resource contains all my documents and flows as they were read in the final round – email me if you have any questions: easton.logback@gmail.com

NC

<u>Overview</u>

I negate Resolved: Radicalism is preferable to incrementalism to achieve social justice

Definitions

The American Radicalism Collection defines "radicalism" as:

(American Radicalism Collection; Michigan State University Library special collection that documents the history of radical groups in America. "The American Radicalism Collection: An Overview: What is Radicalism?" https://libguides.lib.msu.edu/radicalism/definition No Date) // ELog

We recognize that defining the term "radicalism," and distinguishing radical movements from activist ones, is difficult and dependent on interpretation, perspective, and context. Nevertheless, to help with the purposes of collection and scope, the following definition of radicalism serves as a general guide for our collection: <mark>Radicalism: the beliefs or</mark> ==actions of== <mark>individuals,</mark> ==groups==<mark>, or organizations</mark> ==who advocate== <mark>for</mark> ==thorough or complete== <mark>social and/or political</mark> ==reform== <mark>to achieve an alternative vision of American society</mark> This collection aims to document the ideologies, goals, and tactics of individuals, groups, parties, and other organizations who strive to enact complete societal overhaul, often through revolutionary means. Sometimes, these revolutionary means include violent and/or illegal tactics. However, we also collect material on groups and movements that aim to alter or improve existing political and social systems, rather than replace them altogether, and do so primarily through legal and nonviolent means - what some would consider to be more along the lines of "activism." This flexible collecting scope allows us to preserve a more complete record of historical and current efforts to enact political, economic, or social change, and of alternative visions to American society.

This means radicalism is a method of complete change – prefer it:

a. **Intent to Define** – it's the definition given as a guide for history of radicalism

b. **Methods** – my definition creates a method vs method debate – prefer it to radicalism as an idea – key to clash and education – at worst ideas can't achieve anything so vote NEG

The Free Dictionary defines "preferable" as:

(The Free Dictionary. "preferable" https://www.thefreedictionary.com/preferable No Date) // ELog

pref·er·a·ble (prĕf′ər-ə-bəl, prĕf′rə-) adj. ==More desirable== or worthy ==than another==; preferred: Coffee is preferable to tea, I think.

This means the Affirmative must prove radicalism is better than incrementalism, so proving that the two are equal successfully negates

Value/Value Criterion

The value is progress – defined by Dictionary.com as "movement toward a goal"
(https://www.dictionary.com/browse/progress)

You should prefer progress as the value - social justice is not something we do or can perfectly have, so the key is to make change in the right direction

The value criterion, or how to achieve the value, is consequentialism - defined by Oxford Languages as "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences."
(https://www.google.com/search?q=consequentialism+definition&oq=consequntialism+defi&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0i13l6j0i22i30l3.5320j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

You should prefer consequentialism as the criterion – intent to progress is irrelevant, only the results tell us if we made progress

Minimizing oppression = oppression olympics

Contention: Sustainability

Incrementalism is best – it limits opportunity and scope of mistakes while enabling us to bypass modern political gridlock

Adam et al. '21 (Christian Adam; professor of comparative politics at Zeppelin University with a B.A. in politics and public management from University of Konstanz, M.A. in international affairs and governance from University of St. Gallen, and D.S.S. from University of Konstanz. Steffen Hurka; researcher at Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science with a B.S. in political science and administration from University of Konstanz, M.S. in political science and administration from University of Konstanz, and Ph.D. from University of Konstanz. Christoph Knill; professor of political science at Ludwig-Maximilians-University. Yves Steinebach; professor of political science at Ludwig-Maximilians-University. "On democratic intelligence and failure: The vice and virtue of incrementalism under political fragmentation and policy accumulation" https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12595 1 April 2021) // ELog

2 INCREMENTALISM: THE CLASSIC CONTROVERSY The main downside of incrementalism is well understood: where a drastic departure from the policy status quo is necessary to solve a problem, we will fail to solve the problem as effectively as we could when restricting the range of conceivable policy responses to a small subset of only gradual adjustments. After all, "what could be more reasonable" (Bendor, 2015, p. 196) than to start by clearly defining a policy objective, identifying all alternatives for reaching this objective, and to choose the best of these alternatives? In theory, only such a strategy of rational, systematic comparisons between all options allows for a synoptic assessment of optimal policy solutions. Failing to pursue this approach inevitably leads to policy failure at worst, or to sub-optimal policy solutions at the very best (Allan, 2019). And yet, more than 60 years ago, Charles E. Lindblom—in a series of influential contributions (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1958; Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1965; Lindblom, 1979)—rejected the viability and, in fact, the need for this highly demanding "root method" of decision-making that considers redesigning public policy "from the ground up" for every problem-solving attempt (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81). Instead, building on the concepts of bounded rationality and satisficing that Herbert Simon (1955) had set out in his studies of administrative behavior, Lindblom argued that the ability to rely on a "branch method" of decision-making, which continually builds solutions "out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees", was "far superior" to more synoptic, rational, and comprehensive policymaking attempts (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81; 86). Thereby, Lindblom provided the intellectual underpinnings for the normative promotion of incrementalism. To use a sports analogy: if politics were a game of golf, Lindblom recommended democracies to mainly use the putter—even for long distances. In Lindblom's view, such incremental adjustments are the superior strategy to mitigate three essential problems in policymaking situations: cognitive limitations, diverging interests, and changing objectives. Decision makers suffer from cognitive limitations that make it extremely difficult to anticipate—even through systematic modeling—the impact of decisions on complex issues where results are affected by a series of interdependent factors. Mistakes will be inevitable in such a situation. Since "non-incremental policy proposals are […] typically […] unpredictable in their consequences" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 85), a satisficing-based process of trial and error learning helps decision makers to limit "the potential for large mistakes" (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 83). Intelligent decision makers are aware of their limitations and take the necessary steps to mitigate the risks that result from these limitations, namely the adoption of policies with substantial unintended consequences that are difficult to reverse. Hence, "a wise policymaker" expects that policies only partly meet previous hopes and also create unanticipated effects (Lindblom, 1959, p. 86). Incrementalism enables policymakers to benefit from their experience with similar previous policies in anticipating probable consequences and allow them to better understand the impacts of policy changes due to their incremental nature. To some extent, this helps mitigating different kinds of problems of causally attributing societal changes to policy interventions (Adam et al., 2018). As a result of this incremental strategy, effective policy measures can be identified and extended, while policy errors can be quickly corrected. While Lindblom emphasizes this aspect of incrementalism to highlight its advantages, it also caters to policymakers' inherent bias toward trying to avoid large, visible mistakes. Moreover, incrementalism acknowledges that decision-making processes can fail to bring forward any kind of decision as a result of diverging interests. Therefore, agreeing on small policy adjustments is often superior to insisting on large reforms that

cannot find a majority. This notion is an important part of Lindblom's argument as he considers "a good policy is one that is agreed upon" (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 83). While we might typically assume that decision makers first need to find agreement over key principles and criteria of a "good" policy on an abstract level in order to actually derive such a specific policy, Lindblom argues that in most decision situations opponents with different values and ideologies will hardly find it possible to agree on these principles and yet be able to agree on specific policies (Lindblom, 1959, p. 83). One and the same policy might very well be supported by decision makers with vastly different interests for vastly different reasons. The attempt to first agree on values or "some abstract standard or criteria" is what "Lindblom argued was the (unattainable) goal of rational models" (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 83). This aspect of incrementalism is not only the reason why Lindblom considers this strategy to be intelligent. It is also the reason for which Lindblom thinks incrementalism is the dominant decision-making approach in politics. It is simply "easier to continue the existing pattern of distribution rather than try to negotiate the redistribution that would almost certainly arise under radically new policy proposals" (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 84). After all, the policy status quo reflects a long history of conflict and bargaining. While this history is usually known to policy actors, the effects of radically new arrangements are not. Therefore, major reforms and encompassing overhauls of the status quo are usually so much more difficult to adopt than smaller changes (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 84). Finally, incrementalism takes into account that policy goals are often disputed and can hardly be brought into a consistent ranking order. As a result, decision makers lack relevant criteria on which they can base their choices. Incremental adjustment, by contrast, avoids these problems by focusing on marginal alternatives to already existing policies, directing the attention of decision makers toward "marginal or incremental values" (Migone & Howlett, 2015, p. 82; Lindblom, 1959). Incrementalist decision-making is thus "a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 86). In a time when many emphasized the theoretical potential of comprehensive rational planning (Tinbergen, 1956), Lindblom thus legitimized a policymaking approach that closely resembled the empirical reality of policymaking. Incrementalism promised to "maximize security in uncertain decision situations" (Dror, 1964, p. 154) and to allow for "coping with complex problems—problems that are too difficult to solve in the face of disagreement over preferred outcomes and a dearth of powerful social theory" (Lustick, 1980, p. 343). Due to these characteristics,

"successive limited comparison is, then, indeed a method or a system; it is not a failure of method" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 87). Lindblom's propositions inspired an intense academic debate and were met with a lot of criticism, which essentially came in three different forms: normative, empirical, and analytical. Particularly early criticism was of a normative nature. While Arrow, for example, accepted some of Lindblom's diagnoses regarding limited cognition and rationality, he rejected Lindblom's prescription since Arrow was unwilling to commit to what he felt was an all too "complacent acceptance of our imperfections" (Arrow, 1964, p. 588). Moreover, Lindblom's theory was read as an attempt to legitimize and reinforce a conservative bias in policymaking that favors elites over marginalized groups (Etzioni, 1967, p. 35; Hayes, 2001). These critics argued that instead of hailing overly restrictive incrementalism, one should rather prescribe a third way (Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1967), or in fact multiple third ways (Bendor, 2015), that combine elements of the branch method of limited successive comparison with more ambitious efforts of optimization. A second line of criticism was based on empirical evidence that called into question whether incrementalism was indeed so overwhelmingly prevalent as proposed by Lindblom. For instance, Schulman (1975) argued that some policies were inherently non-incremental, such as Kennedy's decision to put a man on the moon in the 1960s. More influentially, Hall (1993, p. 820) and Sabatier (1988) also showed that policy change need not always follow a merely incremental pattern, in which only policy instruments or instrument settings are adjusted, but can sometimes also be more fundamental and entail a departure from well-established policy paradigms. This co-existence of very frequent incrementalism and very rare radical reform is a crucial part of institutionalist accounts of policy change, which emphasize the predominance of path-dependent and gradual adjustments that are only very rarely interrupted at "critical junctures" that give rise to more profound departures from the status quo (Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2004). Yet, these empirical insights rather confirm than contradict Lindblom's basic assessment that incrementalism dominates democratic decision-making. While critics of Lindblom highlight that under specific conditions the routine mode of incrementalism might be disrupted by more radical changes, they also underline that incrementalism constitutes the dominant pattern of policymaking and that even larger paradigmatic changes result rather from crises and external shocks than any other form of rational comprehensive, synoptic decision-making. This is particularly prominent within PET (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), which has turned into the most powerful approach to capture the co-existence of incremental decision-making within stable policy subsystems and drastic policy change when these subsystems lose their monopoly on an issue to other actors and venues that bring in new interests, arguments, and reform options. As a result, Lindblom seems to be "alive and well (...) living in Punctuated Equilibrium Land" (Howlett & Migone, 2011). A third line of criticism is best described as analytical. One of the most important issues raised by such analytical concerns is that the prevalence and normative value of incrementalism will not be universal, but contingent upon characteristics of the decision-making situation (Bendor, 1995; Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1967; Lustick, 1980; Pal, 2011). In particular, incrementalism has been considered as appropriate only in constellations, in which the nature of the problem and required tools to address the problem do not change fundamentally (Dror, 1964). Moreover, Bendor (1995, p. 820) formally demonstrated that incrementalism is most suitable in decision situations with relatively harmonious groups, yet "fares much worse than had conjectured" under majority inconsistency; for example, when there is conflict over goals and means between policymakers. While Lindblom readily admitted that the incremental "method is unquestionably one of less than universal usefulness" (Lindblom, 1964, p. 157), asking about the scope of these conditions becomes key when assessing the vices and virtues of incrementalism. While extant scholarship has identified some of these conditions, the static nature of this debate is striking. Essentially, the debate reflects a (potentially implicit) focus on varying levels of virtue of incrementalism in several parallel decision-making situations. However, some problems might be of a rather constant nature, while other problems evolve quickly. Therefore, the virtue of incrementalism might be inherently different for decisions addressing these two different kinds of problems (Dror, 1964). Accordingly, the debate over incrementalism lacks a perspective on how the vices and virtues of incrementalism change dynamically for the same issue or problem. Adopting such a longitudinal perspective is the endeavor of this article. By discussing how two important macro-political trends affect the vices and virtues of incrementalism, we assess the validity of Lindblom's arguments 60 years later. While the understanding of incrementalism evolved over time, the core of Lindblom's argument and of "neo-incrementalist efforts" (Weiss & Woodhouse, 1992; Woodhouse & Collingridge, 1993), is the proposition that the method is able to effectively "deal with uncertainty and disagreement in policymaking processes" (Migone & Howlett, 2015). This ability is why incrementalism is seen not only as empirically omnipresent but also thought to hold normative value. Essentially, Lindblom (1959) proposes that incrementalism is valuable and valued when: Interests and ideologies are heterogenous and conflictive, which not only makes policy objectives the subject of contestation and change, but also makes it more difficult to organize consensus on more radical, large-scale deviations from the status quo. Policy effects are difficult to anticipate and the likely emergence of unintended consequences makes it important to

be able to attribute emerging problems to specific policy-choices and reverse these choices accordingly. If these two factors emphasized by Lindblom indeed make incrementalist decision-making politically attractive, then the side-effects of two major political macro-trends within Western democracies are even enhancing the political attractiveness of incrementalism. First, the general trend toward increasing levels of political fragmentation as a result of political de-alignment and re-alignment makes policy objectives more contested and compromise more difficult to organize. Second, the general trend of continuous policy accumulation and rule growth has turned policy-mixes themselves into a source of complexity that creates additional attribution problems and promotes the emergence of unanticipated consequences. 3 PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE AND POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION "Politics is the Art of the Possible", is one of the more famous quotes attributed to Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire from 1871 to 1890. Yet also in more democratic contexts than Bismarck's era, it is rather clear that it is more difficult to agree on radical than on marginal deviations from the status quo. After all, this status quo is the result of long decision processes involving intense conflict, bargaining, and reflects long grown power structures in which actors from all sides of the political spectrum are invested to some extent. This is why incrementalism is so prevalent in democratic decision-making and politically so attractive: it enables policy decisions despite controversy over goals and means with the potential to affect long-grown power structures. Political fragmentation and polarization jointly affect the need and difficulty to strike political compromise in policymaking as well as the difficulty of forming stable political coalitions (Thürk et al., 2020). Therefore, the fact that the level of political fragmentation and party system polarization has increased substantially in many Western democracies over the past decades (de Vries & Hobolt, 2020; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Huebscher et al., 2020; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008) further adds to the political attractiveness and necessity of incrementalism. Greater political fragmentation and polarization manifest themselves in several ways. One manifestation of fragmentation is the declining vote share of mainstream parties. In Germany, the combined vote share of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats fell from 81% in 1987 to 76% in the 1998 federal election to just 53% in the 2017 federal election.[1] In Spain, the two mainstream parties—the conservative People's Party and the left PSOE—in 2015 attracted the lowest combined vote share since 1977 (51%).[2] And even in the United Kingdom, Conservatives and Labour had jointly collected between 88% an 98% of the vote in general elections between 1945 and 1970,[3] but this joint vote share has since substantially decreased. To some extent, this decline of mainstream parties is reflective of a declining electoral success of mainstream Social Democratic parties across Europe since at least the 1990s (Benedetto et al., 2020; Loxbo et al., 2019). For example, the vote share of the

Spanish PSOE has declined from 35% (1998) to 23% (2018), of the Dutch Labor Party from 29% (1998) to 6% (2018), of the Parti Socialist in France from 24% (1998) to 7% (2018), of the German Social Democrats from 41% (1998) to 21% (2017) or Social Democrats in Sweden from 36% to 28%.4 However, this trend has also affected struggling mainstream parties on the right (Bräuninger et al., 2019; Rama & Santana, 2019). Moreover, fragmentation results from a rise of new "challenger parties" or populist parties on the political right and left (de Vries & Hobolt, 2020; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Kriesi, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008). For example, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has fragmented the right political spectrum in Germany, Podemos has emerged as a new party on the political left in Spain, and the Movimento Cinque Stelle has transformed Italian politics. In combination, the decline of many mainstream parties and the subsequent rise of challenger parties on the right and left side of the political spectrum has translated into a rising effective number of parties represented in parliaments across many Western democracies (Huebscher et al., 2020). Therefore, government formation today often requires negotiations between a higher number of parties able to form only very slim majorities, or even just minority governments. This has visibly complicated the formation of stable and functioning governments, especially in parliamentary systems (see: Bräuninger et al., 2019; Rama & Santana, 2019; Simón, 2016). As political fragmentation creates larger government coalitions, coalitions with more heterogenous policy preferences, and minority governments, adopting far-reaching policy changes becomes increasingly challenging. According to Lindblom, incrementalism should thrive under these conditions. ==After all, political inaction is hardly an attractive strategy==. As democratic governments draw their legitimacy from acting on behalf of the people, they are constantly under pressure to live up to voters' expectations. Due to the enhanced level of political competition caused by political fragmentation and realigning voters, the pressure to live up to campaign pledges and voter demands has increased rather than decreased. Political non-decision, inaction and a visible inability to legislate can substantially hurt party-voter relationships (Flynn & Harbridge, 2016) as well as general trust in democratic political institutions (Harbridge & Malhotra, 2011; Ramirez, 2009) and can make governing coalitions unstable. In consequence, political fragmentation—as a major political macro trend—promotes rather than demotes the proliferation of incrementalist tendencies within policymaking. While this promotion might be less pronounced within majoritarian electoral systems that tend to suppress political fragmentation more strongly than systems of proportional representation, we should generally expect incrementalism to proliferate where political decision arenas become increasingly fragmented.

Radicalism is unstable – it reinvigorates radicalism on the other side which, absent incremental change, culminates in civil war

Applebaum '20 (Anne Applebaum; staff writer for the Atlantic and Pulitzer-prize winning historian. "The Answer to Extremism Isn't More Extremism" https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/left-and-right-are-radicalizing-each-other/616914/ 30 October 2020) // ELog

As one of the ugliest and most divisive American presidential campaigns in our history coasts to its finish, President Donald Trump's defenders are making their closing arguments. Some of them assert that they like Trump's policies; his ethical violations or his abuses of his office for personal gain don't bother them. These views come from deep conviction, and at this point, they can't be changed. But another argument that appears over and over again in these closing statements demands a response. It is often made by educated conservatives, people who know that the Trump administration and its incompetence have allowed the coronavirus to devastate America. They also know that Trump has left America weaker and less influential around the world. They even dislike Trump's vulgarity and his cruelty; they just wish he would stop tweeting. Nevertheless, they will vote for him because the alternative—the left, the Democrats, the socialists, the "woke warriors," whatever epithet you want to use—is so much worse. There isn't time, in the few days left in the campaign, to argue about whether these conservatives' beliefs about the left are correct. The Democrats' choice of Joe Biden as their candidate seems to me solid proof that the party's most active supporters—the people who vote in its primaries—wanted a moderate leader. Nothing in Biden's decades-long record as a public servant indicates that he is a communist, a radical, or anything other than a small-l liberal. The same is true of the people around him. The big changes that he does want—including taxes on the very wealthy, universal health care, and major action on climate change—do not seem remotely extreme to me either, but that's an argument for another time. For at this stage, no one can convince the educated conservatives that any of this is the case. Instead, I'd rather acknowledge that some of the things they fear are real. Yes, it is true: We do live ==in a moment of rising political hysteria==. Far-left groups do knock down statues, not just of Confederate leaders but of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. Some self-styled "antifa" activists do seem more interested in smashing shop windows than in peaceful protest. Dangerous intellectual fashions are sweeping through some American universities—the humanities departments of the elite ones in particular. Some radical students and professors do try to restrict what others can teach, think, and say. Left-wing Twitter mobs do attack people who have deviated from their party line, trying not just to silence them but to get them fired. A few months ago, I signed a group letter deploring the growing censoriousness in our culture: "an intolerance of opposing views, a vogue for public shaming and ostracism, and the tendency to dissolve complex policy issues in a blinding moral certainty." A part of the left—admittedly the part most addicted to social media—reacted to this letter with what can only be described as censoriousness, intolerance, and a determination to dissolve complex policy issues in a blinding moral certainty. But anyone who is truly worried by these tendencies should fear the consequences of a second Trump administration even more. Anyone who actually cares about academic freedom, or the future of objective reporting, or the ideas behind the statues built to honor American democrats in the country's public squares, must hope that Trump loses. If he wins a second term, extremism on the left will not be stopped. It will not grow quieter. Instead, extremism will spread, mutate into new forms, and gradually become entrenched in more areas of American life. ==Radicalism== of all kinds ==will spread, on the right as well as the left==, because America will find

itself deeply enmeshed in the same kind of death spiral that the country experienced in the 1850s, a form of negative politics that the British political scientist Roger Eatwell has called "cumulative extremism." Eatwell described this phenomenon in an article about northern England in 2001, a moment when groups of radicalized white British men physically clashed with groups of radicalized British Muslims. At that time, there were deep economic, religious, and sociological sources for the violence. People in the far right felt themselves to be outside of politics, alienated from the Labour Party that most had once supported. The neighborhoods where both groups lived were poor and getting poorer. But the mutual anger also acquired its own logic and its own momentum. The perception of anti-Muslim prejudice pushed some Muslims toward radical preachers. The radical preachers provoked an anti-Muslim backlash. Extreme language on one side led to extreme language on the other. Organized violence on one side led to organized violence on the other. Both would blame the other for accelerating the dynamic, but in fact the process of radicalization was mutually reinforcing. Milder, more moderate members of both communities began to choose sides. Being a bystander got harder; remaining neutral became impossible. Nor was this remotely unusual. "People tend to become violent, or to sympathize with violence, if they feel an existential threat," Eatwell told me recently. They also become more extreme, he said, when they feel their political opponents are not just wrong, but evil—"almost the devil." Cumulative extremism often occurs in places where physical space is contested—for example, when more than one community claims a particular neighborhood. In the 1960s and '70s, the cycle of radicalism in Northern Ireland accelerated in part because of Catholic marches into Protestant "territory" and Protestant marches that offended Catholics. Clashes led to violence, and then violence normalized more violence. Cumulative extremism was also fueled by imitation. The two sides copied each other's tactics, use of language, and use of media. Bad policing was also part of the story because it led many people to lose faith in the neutrality of the British state. That loss of faith then led, in turn, to a greater acceptance of violence and eventually to the same phenomenon that Eatwell observed. People who had been only slightly interested in politics were drawn in. The numbers of centrists shrank. In both communities, terrorists found safe harbor among ordinary working people who, in the past, had never considered themselves radical. Modern America doesn't have many physical contests for space. Americans, with a few exceptions, generally have enough land to enjoy the luxury of distance from people we really don't like. There are some exceptions: A self-described member of Rose City Antifa, based in Portland, Oregon—he was wearing a mask when interviewed—told a journalist last summer that "when fascists come to our cities to attack people, we are going to put our bodies between fascists and the people they want to attack." This sentiment could easily have come from the Irish Republican Army. A vigilante videographer in Idaho, who had read internet rumors that antifa groups were coming to his town, sounded much the same: "If you guys are thinking of coming to Coeur D'Alene, to riot or loot, you'd better think again. Because we ain't having it in our town." But as it turns out, symbolic struggles can be just as polarizing as physical ones. All of the angst at American universities over "platforming," over who is and is not allowed to speak from a lectern, comes from a very similar kind of dispute. The gangs of students who have shouted down speakers or sought to prevent them from appearing on their campuses are behaving in a ritualized manner that would be familiar to the inhabitants of Belfast. They are acting out the street fights that erupt in other cities, with petitions or social-media campaigns and organized hissing and booing taking the place of physical contests—though sometimes they turn into physical contests as well. In the online spaces as well as the broadcast ether where American political contests take place, Trump has entered into these symbolic battles like a gang leader striding onto enemy turf. Like Reverend Ian Paisley, who happily played the role of Northern Irish Protestant bigot for decades, Trump embraces a cartoon version of the right—one that repulses centrists, including the center right, and pushes the left to even greater extremes. If you were already inclined to believe that American history is a story of oppression and racial hatred, then the ascent of the birtherist-in-chief, a man who advocates cruelty toward immigrant children, is only going to reinforce your views. If you were already inclined to believe that street violence is required to affect public opinion, then the political dominance of a man who nods and winks at far-right militias is going to solidify your beliefs. As the writer Cathy Young has argued, "when the President of the United States is practically a woke caricature of the evil white male—an entitled bully, who endorses police brutality, bashes minorities and flaunts his lack of human empathy—it pushes large numbers of people farther and farther to the left, lending credibility to the woke idea that America is a racist patriarchy." Trump has squeezed moderates out of his party. If he wins reelection, the result will be to squeeze moderates out of American politics altogether. I hope that educated conservatives think hard about what will happen if Biden's moderate-left campaign fails: It is extremely unlikely that its adherents and spokespeople will shrug their shoulders and decide that, yes, Trump is right after all. They are much more likely to move further to the extremes. Americans will witness the radicalization of the Democratic Party, as well as the radicalization of the powerful and influential intellectual, academic, and cultural left, in a manner that we have never before seen. A parallel process will take place on the other side of the political spectrum—one that has started already—as right-wing militias, white supremacists, and QAnon cultists are reenergized by the reelection of someone whom they have long considered to be their defender. Unfortunately, history offers very few happy endings to that kind of story. In the past, cumulative extremism has usually subsided in one of two ways. It can culminate in a full-scale civil war that one side or the other wins— which is what happened in the U.S. in the 1860s. Alternatively, it can end thanks to the emergence of moderate forces on both sides, often with the aid of outsiders, who take the political momentum away from the extremists. That's a part of what happened in Northern Ireland, and in the British towns Eatwell described. Americans don't have outsiders who will help us get out of this death spiral. All we have is the power to vote.

Even if they're right that radical change is needed, incremental change is the best way to accomplish it

Gopel '16 (Maja Gopel; former secretary-general on the German Advisory Council on Global Change, director of research at the New Institute, and director of the Berlin Office of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, and Energy with a Ph.D. in political economy from University of Kassel. "The Great Mindshift: How a New Economic Paradigm and Sustainability Transformations go Hand in Hand" http://greatmindshift.org/key-concepts/radical-incrementalism/ 12 September 2016) // ELog

In the middle of the twentieth century, we saw our planet from space for the first time. Historians may eventually find that this vision had a greater impact on thought than did the Copernican revolution of the sixteenth century, which upset the human self-image by revealing that the Earth is not the centre of the universe. From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its activities into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized—and managed. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987: 11). Throughout the ages, people have said that the world is in the midst of big change. But the level and degree of global change that we face today is far more profound than at any other period in my adult lifetime. I call this period the Great Transition. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, speech, Stanford University (2013). We still aspire to fit humanity's activities into Earth's patterns. Most of the reports on our progress in achieving sustainable development are devastating. In preparation for the 2012 Rio+20 summit, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UNDESA) concluded that The political deal that emerged from the Earth Summit in 1992 has, for various reasons, never been fulfilled. Neither the expected outcomes—elimination of poverty, reduction in disparities in standards of living, patterns of consumption and production that are compatible with the carrying capacity of ecosystems, sustainable management of renewable resources—nor the agreed means to achieve them, have materialized (UNDESA 2012: iii). After nearly three decades of aspiration it is not surprising that the language that describes what it would take to turn the wheel and reach this deal has become more radical. The terms 'Great Transition' or 'Transformation' have become common in recent years. In September 2015, the heads of UN states adopted The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Transforming our World (UN 2015: 2). It contains 17 newly agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that map where this transformation is supposed to lead. These cover the topics of the earlier Millennium Development Goals like ending poverty and hunger, improving education and health, but also encompass goals and targets for improved work situations, income distribution, more sustainable growth patterns and city developments as well as resource efficiency, clean energy and the protection of marine and land ecosystems. Two of the goals also provide targets for governance improvements and the quality of institutions and partnerships, which should help the implementation process (UN 2015). Some critics may lament that these goals are pipe dreams, too ambitious and sometimes contradictory, given that the socioeconomic pledges can only be realized if the targets for environmental protection are missed. I think that this will certainly be the case if the spirit of transformation and radical change that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed in his 2014 preparatory report on reaching the SDGs is lost. Ki-moon wrote, "Transformation is our watchword. At this moment in time, we are called to lead and act with courage. We are called to embrace change. Change in our societies. Change in the management of our economies. Change in our relationship with our one and only planet" (UN 2014: 3). It is this spirit of transformation that I want to support with this book. To me it holds a renewed window of opportunity for the radical changes that in essence the sustainable development agenda always held. And I want to show that radicalness in purpose should not be conflated with a call for instant revolution, tearing down the system or hostility to dissenting ideas. Radicalness in purpose is equivalent to holding a vision or belief in what could be possible if X, Y or Z was to change, an imaginary that stirs up energy, commitment—and persistence in taking the many incremental steps required to get there. Sociologists use the term 'imaginary' to capture more than ideas: it includes a set of values, institutions, laws and symbols with which people imagine their social whole. Without this combination of radical imaginary and persistent progress toward it, not much transformation will happen, at least not in the direction of sustainable development. The path dependencies that shape humanity's activities and development dynamics today are pushing and pulling in a decidedly non-sustainable direction. This is why I also want to make the case that we should not simply stick the label 'transformation' on any amendment to the status quo, or call each technological efficiency gain an 'innovation.' If the benchmark for the changes to which we aspire is not radically different to the one that has guided development solutions so far, humanity will not escape those strong path dependencies. At the same time, dismissing the role that incremental steps play in getting there means ignoring the insights that complex system research offers about patterns of change. So juxtaposing the two approaches as entirely separate strategies—a practice often used to discredit someone else's proposals—does not help. What helps is to keep each other challenged with respect to both the radicalness of the imagined outcomes (what do we deem possible) and the amount of change in this direction that the next, often little, steps could bring (what do we do to make it happen). This book speaks to this combination under the tagline of radical incremental transformation strategies. The purpose that these strategies should serve here is long-term sustainable development as defined in the Rio Declaration of 1992 and now the SDGs. For an analytical approach it is important to make this explicit and not conflate process-design with desired outcome. One is descriptive and the other one normative: transformation is a qualitative degree of change that might happen in a system, and research seeks to describe typical patterns of such change processes so that they can be understood or at best guided. Sustainable development, on the other hand, is one possible quality of the outcome of a transformation process, and research supporting this normative goal seeks to identify and describe typical design principles that characterize sustainable systems. Today's analysis reveals that the world is undergoing massive transformations and that we need to change their qualities to achieve sustainable development. It also shows that very skillfully managed transformation processes can lead to very unsustainable outcomes and very well-designed sustainability solutions can cause resistance or even turmoil in a system that is not ready for this change. Since this is the thorny challenge that confronts every change agent for sustainable development, the overarching goal of this book is to contribute to both Transformation Science (understanding how transformation processes happen) and Transformative Science (developing approaches for a furthering of transformation processes) alike (WBGU 2011a: 342). These related and yet somewhat divergent contributions shape the structure of the chapters: Chapters 2 and 3 provide the backbone to a reflexive political economy understanding of transformations toward sustainable development, Chap. 4 presents case studies of pioneering practices that fit the remit of the suggested Great Mindshift, and Chap. 5 offers a summarizing framework for individual 'transformative literacy' for those seeking to support it as well. 1.1 It's the Economy, Stupid! As one can hardly hope to capture or work on all aspects of sustainability transformations at once, I have zoomed in on what could be a key leverage point in different projects and change initiatives surrounding this purpose. The idea was to follow the dictum of Richard Rumelt, one of The Economist's "management gurus" and an expert on "Good Strategy/Bad Strategy" (2011). He says that a good diagnosis, "simplifies the often overwhelming complexity of reality by identifying certain aspects of the situation as critical" (Rumelt 2011, quoted from his blog). My diagnosis is that the most critical aspect for turning the wheel toward fulfilling the SDGs is changing the economic paradigm. Hence the title of the book. But why economic thought above all? Because it informed the creation of the practices, norms, laws, rules, business and market structures, and technologies that delivered unsustainable development in the first place. Because governments, ministries, international organizations, corporations and banks that move big money around and design the rules of our markets use economic models and expertise in their decision-making and justification of it. Economic calculations of, for example, productivity or competitiveness have also become the most important frames when disputing the trade-offs behind political decisions or when justifying business strategies. The economic paradigm is thus massively influential in what is deemed possible and legitimate for hypothetical future development paths. Eric Beinhocker, director of the Institute for New Economic Thinking's (INET) research program in Oxford, explains: "Just as abstract scientific theories are made real in our lives through the airplanes we fly in, the medicines we take, and the computers we use, economic ideas are made real in our lives through the organizations that employ us, the goods and services we consume, and the policies of our governments" (Beinhocker 2006: xi–xii). Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel laureate and one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century, went as far as to say: "I don't care who writes a nation's laws— or crafts its advanced treatises—if I can write its economics textbooks" (Weinstein 2009 citing Samuelson). His textbook Economics was a bestseller for nearly 30 years and translated into 20 languages. Similarly, popular economist John Maynard Keynes shared Samuelson's opinion: "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else" (Keynes 2007: 383–384). He continued to reflect on the effects that this power of ideas has on societies and commented on his own overturning of firm beliefs: "The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds" (ibid: preface). It is this stickiness that most of the book seeks to highlight and understand. Because after all, some of the most powerful current economic ideas—like 'gain' being the prime human motivation, 'utility' a good measure for well-being and 'capital' a useful container term for everything that might be needed in production processes—were once radically new and far from common sense. They were integral components of the massive paradigm shift that has been called the Enlightenment movement. Dirk Messner, leading German transformation researcher and president of the German Development Institute (DIE) has described its effect as a change in the social, cultural and cognitive 'software' of the agrarian societies: it changed the reservoir of ideas, norms, values and principles which actors drew on when creating technologies, institutions, laws, business models and individual identities (Messner 2015: 263). Today, 250 years later, these powerful ideas and economic concepts have become the basis of a new normal, of a civilization and development model that is unsustainable in a world with nine times as many people as there were when these concepts were invented. Applying them means that leaders claim progress even when the patterns of the clouds, the oceans, the forests and the very soil are destroyed to a degree that threatens to tip our fragile planet out of balance. In addition, while this development model has created much material wealth, it has not generated the maximum happiness for the maximum number of people as its progenitors and promoters believed it would. Meanwhile, the market system that hosts this type of civilization has become one of global reach and highly complex feedback loops that are very difficult to change without risking collapses in wide parts of the global economy. Thus, a transformational 2030 sustainable development agenda needs new 'software' that opens up the imaginary and thus political space for radically different development solutions and systems. And I feel we might be at a turning point: the first 40 years of sustainable development agenda left the economic paradigm widely unchallenged. Instead of integrating economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development—as mandated by the Brundtland Report defining sustainable development—social and environmental concerns have been inserted into an economic way of seeing and therefore governing the world. As a result, quantification and marketization in the service of endless 'growth' has become the dominant mode of organizing ever more areas of life. Diversified governance solutions have been homogenized to fit in with this paradigm. But since the consequences of accelerating natural exploitation and social inequality have become more tangible in rich countries, an awareness of the pitfalls of this shift is coming to the fore. Moreover, since the 2007 financial crisis hit the 'developed world'

hard, even the deeply 'economic' institutions like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have begun to question some of Samuelson's ideas and their own established models. The World Economic Forum (WEF) has launched a sustainability-adjusted competitiveness index and lists global inequality as well as job-loss in rich countries through digitalized industrialization 4.0 as top topics of conversation. Former Wall Street heroes linked to George Soros put $200 million into the Institute for New Economic Thinking and the OECD hosted a Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress chaired by Nobel laureate economists Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, which has just started its second round of work. Of course this does not mean that the people in powerful positions now know better than the thinkers who have been challenging the mainstream economic paradigm for decades or centuries. Nor does it imply they do better than the practitioners who have worked incredibly hard to achieve sustainable niche solutions within a system that's pushing in the opposite direction. It does mean, however, that the hegemony of the mainstream economic paradigm is broken. The credibility of the trickle-down and green growth narratives that it informed is lost. In the decades to come, the old and alternative paradigms will be struggling to fit the shape taken by what could become the Second Enlightenment. Our task is to fill the reservoir of social and cultural inventions with ideas, norms, principles and values that support a de-commodified view of human needs, nature and money, based on twenty-first century natural and social sciences that include many non-quantifiable variables. They provide alternative meaning, legitimacy and practice options for everyone engaging in the highly political struggles over transformations for sustainable development. This is what The Great Mindshift stands for. 1.2 Structure of the Book To support and explore the claims made in this introduction the book goes back and forth between transformation research and the discussion of changing economic paradigms in theory and practice. It introduces four analytical concepts and two heuristics in order to provide some answers to the following overarching questions: 1. If the changes envisioned by the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda are supposed to be transformational in quality, how do we work toward this quality? 2. If the transformations envisioned are supposed to support sustainable development, what are the key leverage points to unlock unsustainable path dependencies? The second chapter, on transformation research in the context of sustainable development, provides the conceptual background to my call for radical incremental transformation strategies. Based on an overview of major strands of system transformation research, I develop three analytical concepts to make the case: Materialization of ideas: Transformation research literature describes the transformational quality as manifesting itself in "co-evolutionary changes in technologies, markets, institutional frameworks, cultural meanings and everyday life practices" (Geels et al. 2015: 2) and often uses the concept 'system innovation' to capture it. The 2015 OECD System Innovation report defines these as "radical— insofar as they alter existing system dynamics—innovations in socio-technical systems that fulfill societal functions, entailing changes in both the components and the architecture of the systems" (OECD 2015: 6). While these definitions provide a helpful description by which to distinguish transformational change from normal, adaptive change, they do not say much about how the reconfiguration of these system elements is taking place. In the literature one finds catchy terms like "innovation cascades," "knock-on effects," "diffusion of new technologies" or "(re)alignments between multiple elements and interactions between multiple actors," all of which "changes cultural discourse and behaviour" (Geels et al. 2015: 6). But who are the agents behind all these descriptive nouns? In this book system innovations are understood to be driven by humans: purposefully acting individuals who see what could be possible beyond the status quo and make it happen. Bringing individuals and their mind-sets into systems is an important step toward understanding where change originates and who promotes it with what effects. I introduce the concept 'materialization of ideas' to discuss this structurational interplay between ideas, human behavior, collective action and institutional design. It highlights both how the resulting systems shape reality and freedom of agents in the future and also how the agents' freedom to think, feel, reason and act differently fuels the transformational phenomena that characterize system innovations. Repurposing systems: Most of the literature (Geels et al. 2015; Messner 2015; WBGU 2011a: 342) states that transformation cannot be planned nor will it unfold according to plan. It can primarily be diagnosed when looking back from the future. Yet, if the sustainable development community understands that the degree of change necessary to reach its goals cannot fall short of being transformational, science should help the community to get a grip on which change strategies and initiatives seem promising. If transformational change is defined as radical because a system's dynamics, components and architecture have been changed, two questions arise: how can a radical degree of reconfiguration be intentionally pursued? And how can the system dynamics be altered to this degree without causing collapse or rejection? In order to answer these questions it is crucial to once again link back to purposefully acting individuals who engage with one another and nature to produce the goods and services they deem necessary or beneficial to their well-being. Such engagement involves the creation of facilitating institutions and technologies that amount to what transition research calls socio-technical systems (STS's). Hence, each of the systems is designed to fulfill a particular purpose, so understanding this purpose will shed light on where to find core drivers of its current dynamics. This also means that when the goals and ends of the system are in question, innovation strategies should first focus on defining a new purpose, and then coordinating updates of technologies and institutions with that purpose (Leadbeater and Mulgan 2013: 46). The sustainable development agenda called the outcomes of the old economic growth path into question, but most of its strategies have fallen short of defining a new guiding purpose: they kept economic growth and tried to quickly provide yet more of it—just with less environmental damage. Current statistics show that simply driving the system to do more is not enough if a real change is needed, as the following quote from UNDESA's 2012 Back to Our Common Future report highlights: "Even if we succeeded in pushing our technological capabilities to the utmost, without doing something else, in a few decades we are likely to end up in a world that would offer reduced opportunities for our children and grandchildren to flourish" (UNDESA 2012: iii). In the "doing something else" we find the benchmark for a transformational agenda. It has to start with what is captured by the heuristic 'repurposing a system'—e.g., properly replacing the pole star of economic growth with that of sustainable development. To do so one should, I argue here, check if the prevailing mind-sets or paradigms and the models and measures they inform can guide repurposing strategies—or also need to be shifted. Radical incremental transformation: However, declaring a radically different purpose and even clearly seeing which flawed assumptions and unhelpful path dependencies stand in its way will of course not magically transform them. This requires intense work of an often highly political character and the acceptance that it takes time. Seeking to change a system too swiftly or too drastically is likely to create self-defensive or destabilizing reactions. The art of system innovation therefore entails finding the right steps and measures at the right time, and also being prepared to deal with unexpected results. This is why I reject the juxtaposition of radical versus incremental change and propose the conceptual framework of 'radical incremental transformation.' The radically new purpose informs which multiple and diversified incremental interventions are necessary to unlock the path dependencies that keep the system in the old dynamic. Often it is easier to focus energy on discontinuing a few strong drivers or root causes and observing how this creates new dynamics that allow parts of the system to start reorganizing. Yet, some agreement about the direction of purposeful reorganization has to prevail for collective strategic action to take place.

NC – General Principle Framing

Top level framing issue – winning one instance of good radicalism doesn't affirm the resolution – the team who best defends their side true as a general principle wins

     a. <u>**Fairness**</u> **– anything else means teams cherry pick obscure instances so the other side can't negate – creates a race-to-the-bottom and destroys clash**

     b. <u>**Jurisdiction**</u> **– NSDA guidelines check one instance framing – their topic and tournament which means judges are contractually obligated to oblige**

As the NSDA wrote in 2021 [2021-22 Lincoln-Douglas Ballot, https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Sample-Lincoln-Douglas-Debate-Ballot-Blank.pdf // JB]

Each **debater** has the burden to **prove** their **side** of the resolution **more valid** as a **general principle**. It is **unrealistic** to expect a debater to prove **complete validity or invalidity** of the resolution. The **better debater** is the one who, on the whole, proves their side of the resolution **more valid** as a general principle.

NC – AT: Slavery

Radicalism that led to abolition was secession of the South

NC – AT: Civil Rights

Vote NEG – the Civil Rights Movement was incremental – the struggle for Civil Rights was not all at once, but multiple small policies over time

As Robert Longley wrote in 2020, (Robert Longley; writer and former municipal government and urban planner with a B.S. in landscape architecture from Texas A&M University. "What is Incrementalism in Government? Definition and Examples" https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-incrementalism-in-government-5082043 14 October 2020) // ELog

Whether recognized as such or not, incrementalism has resulted in many memorable changes in public policy and society. Civil Rights and Racial Equality Though the end of the Civil War in 1865 officially abolished the enslavement of Black people, the struggle of Black Americans for civil rights and equality would span the next 120 years. In 1868, the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaranteed Black people equal protection under the law, and in 1875, the 15th Amendment granted Black men the right to vote. However, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Jim Crow laws in the South and de facto segregation in the North spurred Black Americans, along with many Whites, to demand further change. Seeing it as a way for the government to appease Black people without actually ending racial segregation in America, Civil Rights Movement leader Martin Luther King, Jr. opposed incrementalism. In his famed I Have a Dream speech on August 28, 1963, he stated, "This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy." On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson took the first steps to fulfilling King's dream by signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, outlawing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The landmark law also banned discrimination in voter registration and racial segregation in schools, employment, and public accommodations. A year later, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 banned the use of literacy tests as a requirement to vote, and in 1968, the Fair Housing Act ensured equal housing opportunity regardless of race, religion, or national origin.

NC – AT: Climate

Turn – incrementalism is preferable to address climate change – 2 warrants:

1. <u>Smokescreen</u> – climate is a hot-button partisan issue – political deadlock prevents sweeping climate action, but obscured incremental reforms like subsidizing electric cars pass with bipartisan support – it's slow action or no action

2. <u>Electability</u> – Radical climate action spikes energy prices which increases backlash and decreases electoral prospect

As Jamie Dettner wrote in 2021, (Jamie Dettner; opinion editor and writer for Politico and former global affairs correspondent for VOA. "Energy Price Crisis Risks Fueling Backlash Against Climate Action" https://www.voanews.com/a/energy-price-crisis-risks-fueling-backlash-against-climate-action/6253199.html 1 October 2021) // ELog

"It's easy to be green," Boris Johnson said at the United Nations General Assembly last week. He and other European leaders equally committed to net-zero carbon emissions, however, may discover turning green is not so simple, and there may be a high electoral price to pay, analysts say. The energy crisis buffeting the continent has placed Johnson and other European leaders in the difficult position of decrying fossil fuels while urgently prioritizing affordable access to them to avoid a political backlash by voters and businesses furious at the spiking costs of heating homes and running factories. Energy prices have hit a seven-year high and stockpiles of gas and coal are dwindling. Russia has not increased its natural gas exports. Natural gas price jumps are largely due to a surge in Asian demand and low supplies in Europe, which has seen a 250% to 280% rise in wholesale gas prices this year. Electricity prices are also soaring because natural gas is used across the continent to generate a large percentage of electricity. Spiking prices are coming at a delicate time for governments as they plan to speed a net-zero transition to post-fossil energy generation, which they say will eventually see cheaper prices. Consumers and voters, though, won't see the benefits of cheaper post-fossil energy for some time — now they are just seeing higher costs caused by the energy squeeze compounded in some cases by carbon and green taxes. Some advocates fear the energy-price crisis will be seen by voters as a harbinger of things to come and prompt a backlash against net-zero policies. From Britain to Germany, Europe's mainstream party leaders have been scrambling to respond to the surge in support for Green parties and carbon-neutral policies as their voters grow increasingly anxious about the impact of climate change. Many governments have announced ambitious carbon-reduction targets to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. In June 2019, Britain, which will host the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference, known as COP26, later this year, became the first G7 country to enshrine in law a commitment to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Delivering on radical climate action will be complicated and harder than governments are letting on, though, some analysts and politicians, both advocates for radical climate action and their opponents, warn. The energy-price crisis is due to be discussed by EU national leaders when they meet in Brussels for a summit later this month, say EU officials. Last month, Spain warned the European Commission that emission reduction measures "may not stand a sustained period of abusive electricity prices." Even before the energy crunch, some government ministers and think tanks had been warning that it was not clear Europeans are ready to make the sacrifices necessary for a carbon-free future and might become more reluctant as the transition from fossil fuels plays havoc with living standards and lifestyles. Earlier this year Britain's Tony Blair Institute for Global Change warned, "Meeting our future targets will have direct impacts on the lives and livelihoods of people across the country." In its study Polls Apart? Mapping the Politics of Net Zero, the London-based institute founded by Britain's former prime minister said, "While climate change has moved up the political agenda, and all the major parties are committed to delivering net zero, we are still in the early stages of understanding how the politics of climate change will evolve — and, crucially, how a political coalition can be built and maintained." The institute said an examination of British voter attitudes and values suggested "politicians can be confident there is a strong and sustained desire for climate action," but also cautioned that "the development of a long-term political coalition to support the action needed for net zero is under threat." Similar conclusions have been reached by other think tank studies about the likely political struggles ahead to implement the European Commission's net-zero proposal to cut pollution by at least 55% from 1990 levels by 2030. In a paper for the London School of Economics, Patrick Bayer, a lecturer in the School of Government and Public Policy at Scotland's University of Strathclyde, and Federica Genovese, an environmental policy expert at England's University of Essex, warned of the need to get buy-in from the general public as the proposals "will make it more expensive to run appliances, drive cars, and heat homes." They questioned whether proposed EU compensation plans for the most vulnerable and the poorest "will be enough to hedge the economic resentment and social anxiety that tend to spark upheavals across the continent." The LSE paper was written before the energy price crisis started to unfold across Europe last month. Some opponents of radical climate action plans have seized on the current crisis. "If consumers come to believe that net zero exposes them to punitive cost or insecurity of supply, they will

rightly reject it," Charles Moore, former editor of The Daily Telegraph, warned last month. Craig Mackinlay, a British Conservative lawmaker and member of a group in the House of Commons critical of net-zero plans, challenged Johnson in Parliament last month about the costs of implementing the government's carbon-emission targets and has warned "extravagant plans for a greener country will provide cold comfort for ordinary people." Mackinlay has warned that British government projections on how much it will cost to turn Britain green are seriously flawed and underestimate the true costs. The British government formally accepts the cost projections of a Climate Change Committee, which estimates the country will have to spend over $67 billion a year until 2050 to shift Britain away from fossil fuels. That is around 1% of the country's gross domestic product. Internal government documents recently showed, however, that Britain's own Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy suspects the projection is flawed and estimates costs to be 40% higher. Some independent experts have been even more scornful and have pointed out that New Zealand's government, which is also thinking about adopting a 2050 net-zero benchmark, believes it could cost advanced economies as much as 16% of their GDPs to rid themselves within three decades of fossil fuels. The costs to strip out gas boilers, switch from gas and diesel cars to electric or hydrogen-powered vehicles and to move households and businesses to renewable energy sources as industrial processes are reimagined will have to be shared among governments, homeowners, producers and consumers. That will have political and electoral repercussions, according to analysts, who point to how carbon taxes and higher fuel costs roiled France in 2018 and 2019 with the Yellow Vests protests. Electorates seem hesitant already about embracing climate action — or at least worried about prohibitions and costs. Germany's Green Party, the strongest in Europe, saw its share of the vote increase in last month's federal elections but was disappointed not to get a much bigger jump. "The election result makes one thing clear," Volker Wissing, general secretary of the pro-business Free Democrats told broadcaster ARD Monday. "People don't want climate protection at the expense of prosperity, and people also don't want prosperity at the expense of nature and environment. That's why we need to bring these things together and work out a solution as to how we can reconcile climate protection and prosperity."

NC – AT: Support

a. **This concedes incrementalism is the method of change for radical ideas – vote NEG**

b. **The radical flank effect is wrong – their studies are flawed – violence is worse for non-violent movements**

Peace Science Digest '16 (Peace Science Digest; publication to increase awareness of and access to peace science. "How Do 'Violent Flanks' Affect the Outcomes of Nonviolent Campaigns?" https://peacesciencedigest.org/violent-flanks-affect-outcomes-nonviolent-campaigns/ 4 April 2016) // ELog

This analysis summarizes and reflects on the following research: Chenoweth, E. & Schock, K. (2015). Do contemporary armed challenges affect the outcomes of mass nonviolent campaigns? Mobilization: An International Quarterly 2(4), 427-451. Talking Points There is no significant statistical relationship between the presence of violent flanks and either nonviolent campaign success or failure, the result of violent flanks having both negative and positive effects that cancel each other out when taken together. Violent flanks that emerge from within otherwise nonviolent campaigns appear to decrease these campaigns' likelihood of success. Mass participation is the strongest determinant of nonviolent campaign success, and violent flanks have a negative effect on participation levels, suggesting that violent flanks can indirectly contribute to campaign failure. In case studies, armed movements were consistently shown not to protect nonviolent activists but rather to put them at greater risk, as authorities used the presence of armed actors to justify widespread repression against all resistance movements, violent and nonviolent alike. Research shows that, "on average, maximalist nonviolent campaigns often succeed despite violent flanks—rarely because of them." Summary It is a common belief: however "nice" the use of nonviolence may be, in the real world violence is necessary—and ultimately more effective, the thinking goes—for challenging a brutal regime, fighting injustice, or defending against an armed opponent. But what are the actual effects of adding violence to a movement's repertoire of resistance strategies? Previous scholarship has been inconclusive on this question of so-called "radical flank effects," as studies tend to focus on individual cases and also reflect collective confusion over what is meant by "radical"—does it, for instance, refer to the means used or the ends sought? Focusing, therefore, on violent—as opposed to "radical"—flanks, the authors set out to bring clarity and systematic analysis to bear on the question of positive versus negative violent flank effects. Examining the full universe of nonviolent campaigns with radical ("maximalist") goals ("removal of an incumbent national government, self-determination, secession, or the expulsion of foreign occupation") from 1900 until 2006, they ask: how does the presence of armed resistance at the same time as nonviolent resistance affect the success of nonviolent campaigns? The authors generate three hypotheses, as follows: Nonviolent campaigns with violent flanks are more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns without violent flanks. Nonviolent campaigns without violent flanks are more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns with violent flanks. Violent flanks have no impact on the success rates of nonviolent campaigns. The authors use both quantitative and qualitative research methods to answer their question. To test their primary hypotheses, they search for any significant statistical relationships that might exist between the presence of violent flanks and the success/failure of nonviolent campaigns. They find none, thus providing no support for either Hypothesis 1 or 2. As the authors note, this could mean either that the presence of violent flanks has no discernible effect on outcomes or that it has mixed positive and negative effects that cancel each other out when taken together. When they compare the effects of violent flanks that emerge from inside a nonviolent movement to those of violent flanks that develop parallel to a nonviolent movement, they find that the former are associated with failure, suggesting that negative violent flank effects are more pronounced when a nonviolent campaign cannot distance itself from its armed counterpart. Moreover, they find that mass participation is the strongest determinant of nonviolent campaign success and that the presence of violent flanks has a negative effect on participation levels, suggesting that violent flanks may indirectly decrease the likelihood of success. To flesh out how violent flanks operate within individual cases, the authors examine four cases where violent flanks were present: Burma 1988, Philippines 1983-1986, South Africa 1952-1961, and South Africa 1983-1994. Two campaigns were successful (Philippines and South Africa 1983-1994), and two were not (Burma and South Africa 1952-1961); two had violent flanks outside of the nonviolent movement (Burma and Philippines), and two had violent flanks associated with the nonviolent movement (the two South Africa cases). After examining the histories of these nonviolent campaigns—and the ways they interacted with armed resistance—the authors found mixed results. Violent flanks had negative effects in the two unsuccessful cases, no net impact in one of the successful cases (the Philippines), and a weak

positive effect in the other (the later South African case). <u>Overall</u> <mark>there was greater evidence for negative</mark> violent <mark>flank effect mechanisms than</mark> for <mark>positive ones</mark>. In the one case where a violent flank had a weak positive effect (South Africa 1983-1994), that effect was mostly symbolic—energizing activists around the revolutionary mystique of violent resistance—rather than instrumental to gaining power over the apartheid regime. However, in the two cases where violent flanks had negative effects, these effects were seriously detrimental: the presence of an armed movement diminished "chances of success for otherwise nonviolent campaigns by legitimating repression, demobilizing participants, shifting to violent strategies where the state [wa]s superior, and discrediting regime opponents." Notably, the armed movements were consistently shown not to protect nonviolent activists but rather to put them at greater risk, as authorities used the presence of armed actors to justify widespread repression against all resistance movements, violent and nonviolent alike. The case studies show that violent flanks do actually influence the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns, despite the earlier quantitative findings suggesting otherwise. Negative and positive effects simply appear to cancel each other out when taken together over a large number of cases, with negative violent flank effects being somewhat more prominent than positive ones. The authors argue, therefore, that "on average, maximalist nonviolent campaigns often succeed despite violent flanks—rarely because of them." Contemporary Relevance Despite recent scholarship demonstrating the greater effectiveness of nonviolent resistance (see Chenoweth & Stephan 2011), assumptions about the effectiveness of violence—along with its supposedly radical and/or revolutionary nature—stubbornly persist. When faced with a brutal or blatantly unjust opponent, many people are inclined to believe that only violence will bring about needed change or be able to protect/defend one's community or fellow activists. We have seen this recent thinking everywhere from Syria to Venezuela, but for those of us in the U.S. struggling against the Trump administration and the white supremacist forces it has unleashed, we need look no further than the presence of Antifa (anti-fascist groups who do not rule out engaging in violent confrontations) in our own protests to see this same logic at work—as well as its counterproductive effects. Such groups see themselves as a necessary counterpart to white supremacist or neo-Nazi groups who come armed to demonstrations, ready to engage in street battles with left-wing activists. Although this logic of needing to use violence to defend against violence is so widespread and deeply ingrained as to be almost intuitive, the problem is that such moves feed into and reinforce narratives on the Right that inspire—and provide cover for—their own claims to self-defense. Just as the presence of a violent flank in an anti-regime nonviolent movement can provide necessary and/or further justification for government security forces to fire on protesters, so too can it create a similar dynamic among non-state groups, including neo-Nazis and white supremacists, mobilizing more recruits and ultimately increasing the vulnerability of anti-racist/anti-fascist activists and the marginalized/targeted communities whom they wish to defend. Practical Implications This research highlights an area where collaboration between academic and activist communities is urgently needed: the dissemination and discussion of research that directly contradicts persistent assumptions about the necessity of violence to achieve movement goals. In the wake of recent events in Charlottesville, outrage has rightly focused on the neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups who came armed and even killed one of the counter-protesters. Their goals of racial supremacy and purity, fueled by hate and fear, have no place in a country that values equality, pluralism, and human dignity, and their ascendency now is nothing short of terrifying. But, for the sake of effectively challenging these groups and their repulsive vision, we must also engage in critical reflection inward, especially with regards to the strategic implications of the presence of Antifa affiliates who also came to Charlottesville armed, among otherwise nonviolent counter-protesters. Although their work to expose and tirelessly organize against fascism is admirable and necessary, those who identify with Antifa and its full range of tactics appear to endorse at least two flawed assumptions: 1) that truly radical action to effectively challenge fascism must include violence—often termed "physical confrontation"—and that nonviolence equals "dialogue" or "normal politics" and therefore implies acquiescence, submission, or cooptation, and 2) that violence/"physical confrontation" is also necessary to protect activists and targeted communities. But, in fact, here is what we know from recent social scientific research: Nonviolent resistance is twice as effective as violent resistance when used for radical goals such as the removal of an authoritarian regime or national liberation, cases with no shortage of brutal, unreasonable opponents (see Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Furthermore, nonviolent resistance strategy is all about analyzing and dismantling an opponent's sources of power, including through direct action. Finally, as noted above, instead of protecting nonviolent activists, the presence of a violent flank creates justification for further repression against them, making them more vulnerable to violence. Therefore, it is time that we un-tether violence from its "radical" and "protective/defensive" associations. Not doing so—hanging on, as Antifa does, to these tired old assertions that violence is a necessary response—is, quite simply, poor strategy. It gives white supremacists and neo-Nazis exactly what they want, reinforcing their "we're embattled" narratives and thereby strengthening their movement. It muddies the waters by giving commentators on the Right something to point to when they try to create (ludicrous) moral equivalencies between white supremacists/neo-Nazis and anti-fascist activists. And, in doing so, it does nothing to diminish the strength of white supremacism. Furthermore, the continued presence of armed elements like Antifa has negative effects within the resistance: it makes many fellow activists feel more vulnerable to violence and therefore less likely to show up to demonstrations, especially with children in tow, diminishing mass participation in the resistance and thereby decreasing its power and effectiveness. For all these reasons, if Antifa activists care—as they no doubt do—about effectively challenging fascist, white supremacist forces, they must think more strategically, considering the short- and long-term effects of their actions. And fellow activists must engage in discussions with them about the strategic value and radical credentials of completely nonviolent resistance, together strategizing about those actions that will best diminish the power of the opponent to realize its fascist agenda and raising the following points: Despite common-sense associations of armed/violent action with defense and protection, nonviolent discipline has a better chance of keeping activists safe than armed resistance does, even—counter-intuitively—in the face of a violent adversary. There is no guarantee of complete safety with either type of resistance, but armed resistance is much more likely to elicit further—not less—violence from the other side. There is a strategic logic to nonviolent resistance of which Antifa seems unaware. Far from being synonymous with "dialogue" or "debate," nonviolent resistance involves the dismantling of an opponent's sources of power through a range of methods, including various forms of disruption and direct action, and is twice as effective as violent resistance in achieving radical goals (see Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Contrary to mainstream belief, there is a historical record of successful nonviolent resistance against fascism in countries under Nazi control (e.g., women saving their Jewish husbands in Berlin's Rosenstrasse demonstrations, Denmark's rescue of a sizable number of its Jewish

community, etc.). Only by maintaining nonviolent discipline can the resistance dramatize and capitalize on the clear contrast between its activists and the white supremacists or neo-Nazis they confront. Finally, far from embodying a radical challenge to fascism, Antifa affiliates are doing exactly what neo-Nazis and white supremacists are hoping they will do—this is precisely the reaction that will energize the very fascists they are hoping to shut down. Only by disassociating one's radical credentials from participation in violence will we ultimately move away from these knee-jerk responses to racist violence that do nothing to minimize the draw and strength of white supremacy—and instead move towards more strategic, effective action that actually has a chance of advancing the cause of a diverse, affirming, just society.

c. **<u>Spectacle Turn</u> – arguing that violence against protesters is good because it generates sympathy is problematic – letting the oppressed bleed so that white moderates can see it objectifies marginalized groups which leads to net more violence**

<u>NR</u>

NR – Overview

[OVERVIEW]

You're voting NEG for 3 reasons in today's debate

1. Incrementalism is the only method that can achieve change
2. Radicalism is net worse for social justice
3. The AFF is behind on all of their possible voting issues

Definitions

Concede

V/VC

Concede

NR – Compromise

The first reason you're voting Negative today is because incrementalism is the only method to achieve change – this is because of compromise, as per my Adam evidence. Changing people's overarching values is unrealistic and leads to endless gridlock, but people are able to agree on specific policy interventions – for example, there are queer feminists, black feminists, Marxist feminists, etc, who despite having fundamentally different worldviews, can all get behind protecting Roe vs Wade. The need for compromise is further exacerbated by modern political polarization, which means the options are slow action or no action. You're voting on this argument for 2 reasons:

    a. The resolution asks what best achieves social justice – no matter how good their ideals of radicalism are, this argument proves the only way we can actually see real world changes needed to achieve social justice is with incrementalism

    b. Incrementalism best meets the criterion – it accomplishes reducing oppression because that requires structures actually being changed, which is done through incremental policy, not sentiments alone

The only answer here is implicit that comp extended slavery

    a. One instance

    b. No – multiple comp – 1820, KSNE, 1850

NR – Backlash

The second reason you're voting Negative today is because radicalism is net worse for social justice – this is because of backlash, as per my Gopel evidence. Radical movements demand sweeping change, but the people in power aren't just going to sit there and take it. Governments respond to radicalism with oppressive policy or military force – there's tons of examples – abolition of slavery led to segregation, gender non-conformity has led to a new wave of transphobic bills, and the military was sent in against the Black Panthers and Zapatistas – this means their attempt at radicalism result in violence, repression, or both. You're voting on this argument for 2 reasons:

    a. It proves radicalism is unable to achieve social justice, because their movements are always shut down before they can make long-lasting changes

    b. Radicalism doesn't meet the value – it does the opposite of reducing oppression because the policies and police intervention it generates are new instances of structural violence

FLOW

FLOW