**National Speech & Debate Association**

*Policy Debate – 2014-2015 – Update – 9/28/14*

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its non-military exploration and/or development of the Earth’s oceans.

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**\*\*\*ICEBREAKERS AFFIRMATIVE\*\*\***

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (1/12)**

**Lack of icebreaking in the Arctic destroys signal of US resolve --- the Russians are ready to pounce**

**Treadwell 11** - lieutenant governor of the State of Alaska (Mead Treadwell, “House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Hearing,” Insurance News Net, http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?id=306708)

We've said it before - in my appearance before this Subcommittee in 2006 and in Governor Sean Parnell's Senate testimony in 2009, n1 and we'll say it again, because not much has changed: it is time for the nation to **act** - and act **now** - to add new polar class icebreakers to the United States Coast Guard's fleet. With so much happening in the North today, the need is more urgent and apparent than ever. We would like to ask this Committee, and by extension Congress and the Executive Branch, to look with us at the bigger picture - the historic changes happening in the Arctic and what they portend for world commerce and Alaska's shores - and recognize three imminent needs: First, the United States must commission new heavy icebreakers to operate in the Arctic. Second, we need legal measures in addition to icebreakers to protect our shores from the dangers of unregulated itinerant vessels carrying hazardous cargoes near our coasts. And third, Congress and the Administration must fulfill the legal mandates that are already in place regarding icebreakers. These mandates reflect needs in commerce, science, and protection of Americans' sovereignty, safety, and security. The State of Alaska is responding to opportunities and risks associated with the historic changes in global shipping patterns resulting from changes in the Arctic Ocean. We are eager to continue in cooperation with the nation. I. Congress needs to act now on icebreakers. A. Other nations have already seen the big picture. The purchase of Alaska in 1867 made America an Arctic nation, yet after 150 years, the myth of Seward's Folly still lingers. It's time to quit arguing whether investment in the North is worth it and recognize the valuable people, resources and location we gained as a nation. Arctic resources include globally significant quantities of commercial fisheries, minerals, renewable energy sources, and world-class amounts of oil and gas. A 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimates 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, and 23% of undiscovered gas lies in the Arctic. Six of the Arctic nations are already pursuing oil and gas development offshore, and energy may soon be the primary cargo transiting the Bering Strait. America is one of only eight Arctic nations, and one of two with territory adjoining the Bering Strait - really a "Bering Gate," the only route from the Pacific to the Arctic. Changes in the Arctic are creating opportunities in a once remote and harsh region. Ice cover is at historic minimums, and multi-year ice is decreasing. Icebreaking technology has advanced, bringing significant new efficiencies. Northern sea routes, sought by explorers for hundreds of years, are opening up. Several sources report that international shipping of crude oil, refined products, and other potentially hazardous cargoes through the Bering Strait is growing rapidly as European and Asian shippers see the advantages of the Arctic route. Other Arctic - and even non-Arctic - nations have seen the potential, but America is **missing the boat**. Most traffic occurs under arrangements for icebreaker escort by vessels working with Russia'sNorthern Sea Route Administration. We understand that last year, for the first time, Norway'sTschudi Shipping Company worked a partnership with Russian maritime authorities to bring 41,000 tons of iron ore from Kirkenes, Norway to China. Again this year, Russian ships, and ships of other nations escorted by Russia'sNorthern Sea Route Administration, are coming in force. Hazardous cargoes are making the backhaul as well - at least one tanker bringing gas condensate to Asia this year is reported to have returned to Europe with aviation fuel. In August of this year, Norway's MV Nordic Barents was the first non-Russian bulk cargo ship to transit the Northern Sea Route in Russian waters. Other records are being set along the Northern Sea Route, from the STI Heritage's fastest-ever voyage from Murmansk to Thailand, transiting in just eight days, to the Perseverance's latest-ever northern voyage, which ended just two weeks ago on November 18. Altogether, the Northern Sea Route saw nine tankers carrying 600,000 tons of gas condensate pass by this year. I joined an Arctic conference in Arkhangelsk, Russia in September, where Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the Russian Geographical Society that his country sees the opportunities in the Arctic, and they are **ready to pounce**. Speaking of the Northern Sea Route at the Russian Geographical Society conference, Putin told us, "We are planning to turn it into a key commercial route of global importance. ... We see its future as an international transport artery capable of competing with traditional sea routes in cost of services, safety, and quality. n2 "President Medvedev, dedicating a new northern rail project in Yakutsk - headed for the Bering Strait - indicated as much last month.

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (2/12)**

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Russia intends to make the Northern Sea Route as important to global shipping and commerce as the Suez Canal. And Russia is putting its money where its mouth is, building nine new icebreakers in the next decade, and discounting tariffs on icebreaker escorts to make sure that shippers find the Northern Sea Route for distance savings of up to 40 percent. Russia's claim to new extended continental shelf resources in the Arctic Ocean under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea could give Russia greater control of Arctic shipping. Cargo moving through the Bering Strait this year - from Russian and American sources - is worth well over $1 billion. Add to that a Bering Sea fishery owned by both nations worth billions each year and the situation is clear: in monetary terms, there's billions to be made and billions to protect. At the same Arkhangelsk conference, Russia's Academy of Sciences Vice President Nikolai Laverov showed a slide of Alaska's declining throughput in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (or TAPS) and Russia's competitive success in attracting Arctic investment. All Arctic energy production depends on access, and Russia has it. Russia is now in the lead in Arctic oil production - and they're keen to stay there. Meanwhile, other Arctic and circumpolar nations are investing in fleets of icebreakers. The report of exactly how many ships are being operated by other countries varies (some count polar, medium and light icebreakers, as well as ice 'strengthened' or 'capable' vessels), but all the tallies make one thing clear: other nations have seen the writing on the wall and are investing in infrastructure. Sweden has at least four vessels; Finland, at least six; and Russia over two dozen (and counting). Canada has about eight, and even the European Union is constructing an icebreaker - a heavy, polar class icebreaker. n3 Our Arctic neighbors are leaps and bounds ahead of our position, and non-Arctic nations are in hot pursuit. A Chinese researcher, Mr. Li Zhenfu of Dalian Maritime University, writes that, "Whoever has control of the Arctic route will **control** the new passage of **world economics** and **international strategies**." n4 The prospect of commercial and strategic opportunities presented by receding sea ice cover and accessibility of Arctic resources has moved the Chinese government to allocate more resources for Arctic research, and they have asked to join the Arctic Council as an observer. China's Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo has asserted that no nation has sovereignty over the Arctic, and said that China must plan to have an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as they have one-fifth of the world's population. n5 Japan has stepped up its research in global environment, climate and marine science in the Arctic. And with China and Korea, Japan has applied for permanent observer status on the Arctic Council. Polar air routes have characterized the jet age since the late 1950s, and Arctic air transport is now key to air cargo bound between North America or Europe and Asia. Governments and industries in Russia, Europe and Asia see the same potential for shipping. Why don't we? B. Our national mandates are not being met. The irony of America's present situation is painful: a staggering national debt weighs on the future of our children, while the contributions of a promising and abundant region go largely unnoticed. When we ask you for icebreakers, it's for safety, security, and American jobs. It's to serve American shipping, American exports. It's to help lower costs for Americans in regions like Western Alaska, which has a higher cost of living than anyplace in the nation. Americans lack jobs, our industries struggle with the cost of doing business, and rural Alaskans suffer the staggering cost of energy, while huge amounts of foreign energy are beginning to pass by our front door in tankers, taking advantage of game-changing shipping opportunities. The United States is **falling behind** in maintaining an Arctic presence and in helping to set best practices as this region sees increasing international resource development and shipping. But more importantly, we are failing in our own national mandates, goals and policy. In 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 7521, directing the Coast Guard, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury and with the cooperation of the Secretaries of War (Army), the Navy, and Commerce, to keep channels and harbors open to navigation by means of icebreaking operations. That order has never been implemented in the Arctic. The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 recognized that the United States was lagging behind other circumpolar nations even then, and it directs the Office of Management and Budget to "seek to facilitate planning for the design, procurement, maintenance, deployment and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a platform for Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support icebreaking operations, except for recurring incremental costs associated with specific projects, to the Coast Guard." Last year's Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, section 307, implements the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), mandating that the Coast Guard "shall promote safe maritime navigation by means of icebreaking where necessary, feasible, and effective..." That makes President Roosevelt's order the law of the land for the entire nation. We welcome this mandate as Alaska has half the nation's coastline, and likely over half of America's ice. That act also required that a report on the comparative cost-benefit analyses of icebreaker renovation or construction be delivered no later than October 15 of this year to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. It moreover required a report from the Commandant of the Coast Guard on the High-Latitude Study assessing the polar icebreaking requirements for Coast Guard missions, including search and rescue, marine pollution response and prevention, fisheries enforcement, and maritime commerce. We understand that full report is embargoed still by President Obama's administration. This

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (3/12)**

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past spring, the President updated the United States military's Unified Command Plan to give U.S. Northern Command advocacy responsibility for Arctic capabilities. Accompanying shifts of UCP geographic boundaries mark the military's awareness of the vital and ever-growing importance of the Arctic. Then Commander of the Northern Command, U.S. Navy Admiral James Winnefeld, Jr., recognized the implications of the changing Arctic, and noted the gaps faced by the military, including infrastructure and mobility, and search and rescue capabilities. n6 General Charles Jacoby, his successor, formerly ran the U.S. Army in Alaska. He, too, knows our challenges. Around the same time as this spring's announcement, a report by the National Research Council on the implications of climate change on national security cited major gaps in U.S. naval forces' ability to perform their missions in the Arctic. n7 That report advised that the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard take action to ready themselves for Arctic conditions. The protection of our domestic security is the fundamental mandate of the U.S. Armed Forces, and it is threatened if we remain unprepared. This year, in response to the recommendations of AMSA, the eight Arctic Council nations signed a binding Search and Rescue Agreement. Alaska supported this, and sent experts to the first multinational exercise conducted under this agreement in October in Whitehorse, Yukon Territory. **Without icebreakers** and other Arctic USCG assets, major deficiencies in the region's life safety response capabilities exist - and our promise to provide search and rescue in our sector of the Arctic is **compromised**.

**Expanding US icebreaking operations in the Arctic oceans resolves this issue --- it reverses a signal of weakness and is critical to avert Arctic War**

**Dowd 11** – MA from Indiana University, Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute

Alan, “The Big Chill: Energy Needs Fueling Tensions in the Arctic,” https://www.fraserinstitute.org/research-news/news/display.aspx?id=2147483979

One reason a military presence will be necessary is the possibility of accidents caused by drilling and shipping. In addition, competition for Arctic resources could lead to **confrontation**. Adm. James Stavridis, who serves as NATO’s military commander, concedes that the Arctic could become “a zone of conflict” (UPI). To brace for that possibility and thwart Russia’s Arctic fait accompli, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway—all NATO members and Arctic nations—should follow the Cold War playbook: build up the assets needed to defend their interests, use those assets to deter aggression, and deal with Moscow from a **posture of strength** and unity. The challenge is to remain open to cooperation while bracing for worst-case scenarios. After all, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Even as Putin and his puppets make mischief, Moscow is open to making deals. Russia and Norway, for instance, recently resolved a long-running boundary dispute, paving the way for development in 67,000 square-miles of the Arctic. Moreover, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway have agreed on Arctic search-and-rescue responsibilities (Cummins). In a world of increasingly integrated markets, we know there is much to gain from Arctic cooperation and much to lose from protracted military standoff. But we also know that dealing naively with Moscow carries a heavy cost—and that integration is a two-way street. “Russian leaders today yearn not for integration,” the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan concludes, “but for a return to a special Russian greatness.” In short, Russia is more interested in recreating the autarky of some bygone era than in the shared benefits of globalization. Framework for Partnership Dealing with Russia is about **power**. As Churchill once said of his Russian counterparts, “There is nothing they admire so much as **strength**, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for **weakness**.” When the message is clear—or “hard and consistent,” to use Putin’s language—Russia will take a **cooperative** posture. When the message is unclear, Russia will take what it can get. Just consider Russia’s contrasting treatment of its neighbors: Moscow blusters about Poland and the Baltic states but keeps its hands off, largely because they are protected by the U.S.-NATO umbrella. Conversely, Russia bullies Ukraine, garrisons its troops—uninvited—in Moldova, and occupies Georgian territory. The common denominator

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (4/12)**

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of these unfortunate countries: They have no U.S. security guarantee. Russia should be given an opportunity to participate as a responsible partner in Arctic development. But if Russia continues to take Putin’s hard line, the U.S. and its allies are left with few other options than standing together or allowing Russia to divide and conquer. To avoid that, the allies may need to agree among themselves on lines of demarcation, transit routes and exploration rights—and then pool their resources to protect their shared interests. This will **require investment** in Arctic capabilities. For instance, the U.S. has only three polar **icebreakers**, two of which have exceeded their projected 30-year lifespan (O’Rourke). Russia can deploy 20 icebreakers. “We have extremely limited Arctic response capabilities,” explains Adm. Robert Papp, USCG commandant. Noting that the **Coast Guard** has “the lead role in ensuring Arctic maritime safety, security and stewardship,” Papp urges Congress “to start building infrastructure up there” (Joling and Papp). Washington’s defense cuts will only exacerbate these gaps, especially as Russia’s oil-aided boom enables it to retool its armed forces. Investing just 1.1 percent of its GDP on defense, Canada faces even greater challenges in defending its Arctic interests. But if the allies can combine their Arctic capabilities—each filling a niche role—and agree on a common approach to Arctic security, the framework to put those capabilities into practice is arguably already in place. Jointly operated by the U.S. and Canada, NORAD could serve as the model for an Arctic security partnership. Just as NORAD defends North American airspace, an allied maritime arrangement under the NORAD rubric could provide for security in Arctic waters. It’s worth noting that maritime surveillance was added to NORAD’s responsibilities in 2006. And in 2011, the Pentagon shifted responsibility for most Arctic operations to Northern Command (NORTHCOM), headed up by the same person who commands NORAD (Elliot). Preparing Bracing for military eventualities in the Arctic is **not** armchair alarmism. In fact, Gen. Gene Renuart, former NORTHCOM commander, reported in 2008 that U.S. officials were beginning to explore ways to “posture NORAD…to provide the right kind of search and rescue, military response, if need be, and certainly security for whatever activities occur in the Arctic.” “In order to ensure a peaceful opening of the Arctic,” adds Adm. James Winnefeld, current NORTHCOM commander, “DOD must anticipate today the Arctic operations that will be expected of it tomorrow.” In other words, the goal in preparing for worst-case scenarios and shoring up allied resolve in the Arctic is not to trigger a military confrontation, but to **prevent one**.

**The best models demonstrate the high likelihood for Arctic conflict to occur --- prefer our robust methodological evidence of the propensity for conflict breakout over their defense**

**Murray 12** – Professor of Political Science @ Alberta

Robert, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences,” The Polar Journal, 2.1

It is no overstatement to say that the end of the Cold War was one of the most important events in recent world history. Scholars from many areas of study have used the fall of the Soviet Union as a starting point to explain shifts in security, globalization, humanitarianism and institutional integration, all of which played important roles in world affairs in the immediate post-Cold War era. Since 1991, explanatory models for international and global politics have **broadened their scope** to include variables such as individual preferences, capitalist oppression, ideational construction, environmentalism, gender and sexual politics, and discursive power to levels **previously unforeseen** throughout the Cold War years. As such, we now see the world as a far more complex and nefarious arena in which power and dominance are exercised each day. At the systemic level, the fall of the Soviet Union equated to nothing short of a monumental shift in the way states would make foreign and defence strategy. For 50 years, the bipolar system was dominated by two superpowers constantly competing and building arms in an effort to balance one another. The end of the Cold War signalled a major shift in systemic arrangement, as the system went from being bipolar to the world entering what was often referred to as the “unipolar moment.”1 The era of unipolarity and American hegemony in the international system has been marked by stability in an interstate sense, and the realignment of various spheres of influence in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise.

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (5/12)**

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Far from being just a theoretical notion, the unipolar moment has also provided states with an environment in which to pursue their national self-interest where the likelihood of conflict is **decreased** and great power security competition has been **minimized**.2 As such, new areas of foreign affairs and defence strategy have become far more important than they could have been throughout the bipolar con- strained Cold War years. One of the most notable examples in this regard has been the increased desire for territorial protection and extension in the Arctic region. In an era of state preoccupation with humanitarianism, terrorism and economic reces- sion, it is being suggested by some observers that the Arctic has become the **primary stage** through which states, both great and minor in power, can pursue their self-interest in a way that combines soft power cooperation through bodies of gov- ernance with hard power and military build-up. As things presently stand, there are a variety of nations and institutions all seek- ing to claim governing authority over different parts of the circumpolar region. Nations making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council.3 To date, no clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases the situation is on the verge of becoming far more **competitive** as nations such as Russia have resorted to asserting possible military solutions to contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations. It is important to note the increased levels of interest over Arctic relations between states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over this situation. If the unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and tensions in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally emerges in the near future? Since 2005, the status of the United States as systemic hegemon has been in decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on American power capabilities throughout the Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the economic recession starting in 2008 and the nation’s inability to stabilize its markets. As such, the predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar moment is about to end.4 New great powers are ris- ing, the United States is no longer able to prevent these nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As the multipolar era becomes increasingly likely, one must ponder the effects this shift might have on state foreign and defence strategy- making, especially towards the Arctic region. To date, though its relative power position has declined significantly in recent years, the United States **remains the hegemon** of the international system, but it is contended here that such status is **soon to evaporate**. In this context, this article argues that the emergence of a multipolar systemic arrangement is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the Arctic will be at the **epicentre** of such conflict. To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to multipolarity will be made, as will an account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a stark warning that without some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard power and forceful means. The system is unipolar ... for now In order to evaluate the polarity of the international system in a given historical period, one must identify the hierarchy of power in terms of the number of super or great powers dominating international outcomes. Counting great or super powers can be somewhat difficult in contemporary international relations, as scholars have begun to expand the notions of power and capabilities, but the clearest guideline for being able to identify great powers is through determining capabilities. The rea- son it is essential to understand the great powers in international relations is that they, above all other states, institutions, non-state actors and ideational forces, are responsible for the daily conduct of behaviour in the international system, and they have been historically accountable for substantial alterations to power distribution since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Measuring capabilities allows observers to explain which states are most likely to affect the behaviour of other states, to use force or violence; also, the number of great powers in a given era determines how stable or unstable the international system will be. Identifying great powers is literally done by evaluating each state’s capabilities in essential areas of political life that can maximize security or extend one’s power. When discussing the distribution of power across states, there is a clear hierarchy of capabilities among states that leads observers to classify these utility maximizing, rational actors as super, great, major, middle or minor powers in the international system. In terms of actual measurement, Kenneth Waltz argues: “Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”5 Once these various factors are taken into account, one can clearly determine the given polarity of the system at a given moment in history. Why is polarity important? According to structural realist theory, the number of great powers in the system determines how conflictual, violent or stable interna- tional politics will be.

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (6/12)**

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While the overall structure of the system remains anarchic, meaning a clear absence of a governing authority above states that can control their actions, there can be consequential variations within the anarchic structure that can impact how states will evaluate their foreign and defence policy strategies and affect their overall behaviour. Waltz claims that “ ‘consequential’ variations in number are changes of number that lead to different expectations about the effect of structure on units.”6 There are three types of structure within the system that have been determined throughout the history of the modern state system – unipolarity, bipolar- ity and multipolarity. The consequential variations described by Waltz take place when great powers either rise or fall, and induce shifts from one type of polarity to another. The rise and fall of great powers is perhaps the most important explanatory aspect of international politics because it is these states that “inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.”7 Though the primary motivation for all states is secu- rity maximization, great powers become the most important actors because while they are capable of defending themselves, they also have the ability to extend their sphere of influence in offensive posturing. It is in this context that the polarity of the system becomes even more vital, in that the more great powers there are, the greater likelihood of violence and conflict there is. In each systemic arrangement, the abilities of great powers to pursue their ultimate goal, which is hegemony, dic- tates whether foreign and defence policy strategies will be overtly defensive or potentially offensive. All states are like-units, in that they all strive for survival by making rational calculations about how to best pursue their interests in an anarchic system. Of course, strategies of states will differ greatly based on the distribution of power, meaning that great powers are able to pursue their goals more freely than minor powers because they can operate without allies or institutions in achieving their goals. Lesser powers, however, typically try to increase their power position in world affairs through various alliance blocs and institutional binding. In doing so, it is hoped that middle and minor powers are able to guarantee their survival by align- ing themselves with powers larger than themselves. Given the arrangement of the system, the number of alliances or blocs of power will differ, which also contributes to just how stable or violent the system will be. Conflict, or the possibility of it, is a constant problem in international relations due to the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy, by its definition, denotes a lack of overarching authority and thus states, especially the most powerful states, are able to behave as they would like, without any external body capable of controlling their actions. Robert Art and Robert Jervis aptly define anarchy by argu- ing: “States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.”8 In anarchy, just as in the state of nature or war prior to the establishment of civilized human society, there is no harmony and actors are left to their own inclinations to pursue their self-interest. The key elements of anarchy that precipitate conflict are the con- stant distrust of others’ motives, the assumption that other actors may not be as rational as oneself, and, as Waltz notes, “a state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.”9 The constant tensions between states, and the ability of great powers to more freely pursue their national interests, contributes to a system where security and survival are at a premium, and the polarity of the system matters to all states. By definition, bipolar systems are the most stable. According to Mearsheimer, this assumption is made based on three criteria: First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Sec- ond, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of rela- tive power and opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely.10 By contrast, multipolar systems have a far greater probability of conflict, tension and distrust among states. War is far more likely in multipolar systems because major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential for conflict. Conflict could also erupt across dyads involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers could also lead to war [...]. Wars in a multipolar world involving just minor powers or only one major power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict between two major powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that a small war will trigger a general conflict.11 While bipolarity is considered to be the most stable arrangement, and multipolarity the least stable, there is also the rare time when the system is unipolar in character. Put simply, unipolarity occurs when there is such a preponderance of power by one state that others are incapable of balancing against it. According to William Wohl- forth, unipolarity is also a stable and peaceful arrangement: unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states.12 The status of the hegemonic power in a unipolar system allows for the expansion of its normative agenda, but also allows it to pacify international affairs because it lacks both a hegemonic rival and the effects of balance of power politics.13 As such, unipolar systems can be stable, depending on whom the hegemon is and what its vision for dominance might be. Since the end of World War II, only two types of polarity have been seen. Between 1945 and 1991, the system was bipolar, in that there were only two super- powers dominating the affairs of international politics. This bipolar arrangement was surprisingly stable and though smaller proxy wars erupted throughout the years of the Cold War, the relations between the two dominant powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, never came to a head. There are various explanations for why this was the case, but John Mearsheimer provides perhaps the most concise and accurate explanations as he contends that the absence of war in Europe and beyond throughout the Cold War can be attributed to three specific factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the [European] Continent; the rough mili- tary

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equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.14 At the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a clear and major shift in the distribution of power in the system, which translated into the unipolar moment. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States retained its superpower status and held a preponderance of power in virtually all areas of capabilities measurement. Christopher Layne contends that American hegemony is contingent upon two factors: First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both military and eco- nomic power. Second, since the Soviet Union’s disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge US preponderance. In this sense, US hegemony is the result of objective material conditions.15 Throughout the Clinton and early years of the Bush administrations, the role of the United States as systemic hegemon was virtually unquestioned, and it seemed as if American hegemony could last for a very long time. It was not until the latter years of the Bush administration that the waning of American hegemony began to become apparent. One of the key reasons the system remains unipolar is that there has yet to be a state that can balance against US power in either the hard or soft power senses. That said, the main reason for the decline in American hegemony has been a costly set of irrational and ill-advised foreign policy decisions, combined with years of economic overvaluation that eroded the hegemonic position of the world’s lone superpower.16 Both the intervention into Iraq, starting in 2003, and the fallout of the 2008 recession have served to substantially weaken the United States in both the hard and soft power contexts, and thus it is clear that a multipolar system is on the horizon. As Layne notes, “although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in bal- ancing against the United States – including hard balancing.”17 The emerging great powers, especially China and Russia, will have a profound impact on the conduct of international relations in the years to come. Perhaps the most important area of security competition that has gone under- scrutinized from a systemic standpoint is the increased level of interest in the **Arctic**. Currently, the competing claims for the circumpolar region are mostly peaceful and focusing on diplomatic and legal battles, but recent trends suggest that non-violent strategy may not continue. As the era of American hegemony comes to an end, and a multipolar system begins to emerge, the impact on the Arctic region is likely to be **profound** due to the militaristic nature of state security strategies, unpredictability and a potential **retreat from cooperation** normally seen in multipolar structures. The Arctic in the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of America’s unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the interna- tional system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the United States. The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is **best explained** by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemon’s ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that especially powerful states (“hegemons”) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and lar- ger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierar- chy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentra- tion of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power con- flict – hegemonic rivalry – will be missing.19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era – first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States’ time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integra- tion, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in

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the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused.21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerg- ing hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance. The start of America’s hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for America’s decline are relatively unsurprising – military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter dis- trust by most states, including close American allies, of the United States’ political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the pre- ponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states’ perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respec- tive economic and natural resource capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a poten- tial area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while – China, Russia, Japan, and Germany – are in the opposite position. They can- not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even interna- tional politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America’s north- ern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of America’s interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the direc- tives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include suchmatters as missile defense and early warning; deployment ofsea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.28 The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situa- tion where tensions are at an all time high, and that

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legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve **anything** amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than lead- ing states of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting mag- nanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hege- monic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal pro- cesses being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presi- dential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of America’s closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canada’s continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33 In the international relations canon, most observers point to either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players – similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century – will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.34 Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic affairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than **Russia**. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia’s Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sovereign very clear. The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy **cannot be understated**. According to Russia’s 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre of Russia’s military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are defined as follows: (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development – the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia’s needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other types of strate- gic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation – the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturing and the inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor powers have begun to use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada’s national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada’s capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canada’s realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper’s 2005–06 campaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as

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many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada’s national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada’s northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of promises to consider- ably expand Canada’s northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unsta- ble, and history has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic consid- erations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their even- tual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons: First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capabil- ity to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America’s influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the United States’ inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, **miscalculation** is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of cli- mate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficult. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (11/12)**

**Even a limited conflict would still escalate to extinction --- US Russia conflict outweighs other conflict scenarios**

**Corcoran 9** – PhD, Senior Fellow @ Global Security

Ed, Ph.D., serves as a Senior Fellow on national security issues at GlobalSecurity.org., Frmr. Strategic Analyst at the US Army War College where he chaired studies for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Operations and member of the National Advisory Board for the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues, we win the qualification game, April 21, http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/090421301-strategic-nuclear-targets.htm

That brings us to Russia, our former main adversary, now a competitive partner and still a potential future adversary, particularly as relations have gradually soured in recent years. Russia is the only other nation with a formidable arsenal of some three thousand strategic weapons. Our opposing arsenals were built up in the period when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the underlying strategic concept -- each side deterred from striking the other by the prospect of assured retaliatory destruction. The situation became even madder as both sides worked to develop a capability to destroy the other's strike force with a crippling first strike. This resulted in further large increases in the sizes of the arsenals, as well as early warning systems and **hair-trigger** **launch-on-warning** alert procedures. The final result was an overall system in which each side could destroy the other in a matter of minutes. And it also raised another chilling specter, **Nuclear Winter**, in which the atmospheric dust raised from a major nuclear exchange would block sunlight for an **extended period** and essentially **destroy** human civilization globally. The collapse of the Soviet Union collapsed this threat, but did not eliminate it. US and Russian nuclear forces remained frozen in adversarial positions. The May 2002 Moscow Treaty began to address this legacy and is leading to a reduction in strategic nuclear forces down to levels of about two thousand on each side by 2012. These levels are still sufficient to destroy not only both nations but also **human civilization**. It is hard to even construct scenarios where the use of even a few strategic nuclear weapons does not risk a total escalation. Strikes on Russian warning facilities or strike forces would almost certainly bring a wave of retaliatory strikes. Strikes on hardened command centers would be of questionable effectiveness and also risk **total escalation**. In addition, successful elimination of Russian leaders could greatly complicate any efforts to stop escalation short of a **total nuclear exchange**.

**1AC – Arctic War Adv (12/12)**

**Don’t buy into their defense --- Russians are deliberately hiding their aggressiveness under the guise of “cooperation” to encourage complacency in the US**

**Huebert 10** – PhD, Professor of Political Science @ U of Calgary

Rob, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf

It should be clear that the Russians have been according a growing importance to the Arctic region . They continually issue statements affirming their commitment to peaceful cooperation in the Arctic, which show up in the form of public statements by their leaders and in their primary documents. These same leaders are also very quick to condemn the actions of the other Arctic states as being aggressive and a threat to international peace and security in the region whenever they engage in any form of military related activity. It is clear, however, that the Russians have embarked on a much more **assertive use** of military force in the region by taking various action – the missile test launches near the pole, the sudden and substantial resumption of the long-range bomber patrols, and the voyages of their surface units into the disputed zones – which exceeds that of **any of the other** Arctic states. Furthermore, the Russians’ proposed rearmament plans **greatly exceed** the plans of any other Arctic state. Thus, the Russians have excelled at **portraying themselves** as cooperative while taking increasingly **assertive action**. The question remains as to why? Are they merely reasserting themselves as a global power, or, does this new action point to an increasingly assertive Russia? This is not known.

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (1/7)**

**Methane drilling in the Arctic is coming now --- recent tests are driving momentum forward**

**Llanos 12 (**Miguel Llanos, “US claims 'unprecedented' success in test for new fuel source,” http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/\_news/2012/05/05/11522433-us-claims-unprecedented-success-in-test-for-new-fuel-source?lite)

Could the future of cleaner fossil fuel really be frozen crystals now trapped in ocean sediments and under permafrost? Backed by an oil industry giant, the Obama administration recently tested a drilling technique in Alaska's Arctic that it says might eventually unlock "a vast, entirely untapped resource that holds enormous potential for U.S. economic and energy security." Some experts believe the reserves could provide domestic fuel for hundreds of years to come. U.S. Geological Survey Natural gas is released from methane hydrates. Those crystals, known as methane hydrates, contain natural gas but so far releasing that fuel has been an expensive proposition. The drilling has its environmental critics, but there’s also a climate bonus: The technique requires injecting carbon dioxide into the ground, thereby creating a new way to remove the warming gas from the atmosphere. Advertise | AdChoices "You're storing the CO2, and also liberating the natural gas," Christopher Smith, the Energy Department's oil and natural gas deputy assistant secretary, told msnbc.com. "It's kind of a two-for-one." The Energy Department, in a statement last week, trumpeted it as "a successful, unprecedented test" and vowed to pump at least $6 million more into future testing. "While this is just the beginning, this research could potentially yield significant new supplies of natural gas," Energy Secretary Steven Chu announced. ConocoPhillips, the oil company that worked on the test at its oil facility in Alaska's North Slope, was hopeful the technique could become economically feasible for producing natural gas, a fuel that's much cleaner than petroleum. "Many experts believe that methane hydrates hold significant potential to supply the world with clean fossil fuel," spokesman Davy Kong told msnbc.com. "The completion of this successful test of technology is an important step in developing production technology to access this potential resource while sequestering carbon dioxide."

**Increasing icebreaking in the Arctic oceans is the onlyw ay to enforce environmental regulations --- the plan is key to solve Arctic environmental accidents**

**Jones et al 7** – Professor @ UVA, Ph.D. in computer science from Carnegie-Mellon University, member of the Defense Science Board, the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Corporation, the National Research Council Advisory Council for Policy and Global Affairs, and the MIT Corporation

Anita, First author for the Polar Research Board in the National Research Council, “POLAR ICEBREAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD,” Google Book

The U.S. Coast Guard seeks to protect the nation’s natural resources by eliminating environmental damage and the degradation of natural resources associated with maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational boating. Closely tied to the U.S. Coast Guard’s safety prevention efforts, avoidance of accidents is a key component of protecting the U.S. marine environment. The U.S. Coast Guard enforces regulations and laws protecting sensitive marine habitats, marine mammals, and endangered marine species, as well as laws preventing discharge of oil and other hazardous materials. A wide range of activities addresses environmental objectives in offshore lightering zone regulation, domestic fisheries enforcement, and foreign vessel inspection. U.S. Coast Guard units are often the first on scene when a pollution incident is reported, and the Coast Guard is typically the lead agency for a pollution response effort. Under the National Contingency Plan, U.S. Coast Guard captains of the port are the designated federal on-scene coordinators (FOSCs) for oil and hazardous substance incidents in all coastal and some inland areas. The FOSC is responsible for forging a coordinated and effective response effort with a complex group of government and commercial entities, often in dangerous and emotion-laden situations. Protecting the Arctic marine

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (2/7)**

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environment begins with ensuring the safety of vessels operating in these challenging conditions, including the availability of icebreaking assistance and comprehensive monitoring of vessel movements. Prevention might also include a regulatory regime, limiting vessels to geographic areas and seasonal periods appropriate to their ice capabilities. The Canadian Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) would serve as an obvious example. Increases in traffic, especially from Russian or Canadian waters, may create U.S. interest in establishing regulations; enforcement and deterrence would necessitate an on-scene presence capable of operating in ice. The U.S. Coast Guard would clearly have regulatory responsibility for this type of waterways management. Responding to a major oil spill in the Arctic is challenging, as cleanup activities for an onshore spill near Prudhoe Bay in early 2006 attest. Oil cleanup offshore would be even more difficult due to the dearth of infrastructure and the possibility of ice. Where depth of water permits access, an icebreaker could offer command-and-control capabilities, communications, berthing, helicopters, boats, cargo space, heavyweight handling gear, tankage, and support services to smaller craft, all of which would be of great benefit to cleanup operations. Direct oil recovery could also be included as an icebreaker capability: POLAR SEA successfully tested a boom-mounted skimming system known as the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) (as well as other capabilities) while participating in an oil spill exercise off Sakhalin Island in 1998. The U.S. Coast Guard’s new fleet of coastal buoy tenders is equipped with VOSS, and thought should be given to the need for new polar icebreakers to be equipped with the latest technology for oil spill response.

**The US is key --- our safe practices are modeled on a global scale**

**Sullivan 12** (Dan Sullivan, former Alaska Attorney General and commissioner of Alaska’s Dept. of Natural Resources, July 20, 2012, “It’s Time to Our Develop Arctic Resources”, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/opinion/sullivan-arctic-drilling/index.html)

However, the United States is lagging behind its Arctic neighbors in developing these resources. This is unfortunate, because we have some of the highest environmental standards in the world and we should be setting the bar for Arctic development**.** Developing our Arctic resources will promote our nation's interests in many ways: securing a politically stable, long-term supply of domestic energy; boosting U.S. economic growth and jobs; reducing the federal trade deficit; and strengthening our global leadership on energy issues. Leading academic researchers and economists in Alaska have estimated that oil production from Alaska's outer continental shelf will bring federal revenues of approximately $167 billion over 50 years, and create 55,000 jobs throughout the country. Developing U.S. resources in the Arctic has the added benefit of enhancing global environmental protection. One of the arguments used by Arctic drilling opponents is that "we aren't ready," but it is obvious that no matter what preparations are made, they will argue that it isn't enough. Shell, for example, has spent billions to prepare for drilling in the Arctic this summer, incorporating the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, state-of-the-art equipment and extensive scientific research. Recently, the Obama administration has publically expressed its confidence in the company's drilling plans. The U.S. has created some of the highest standards in the world for environmental protection. When we delay or disallow responsible resource development, the end result is not to protect the environment, but to drive hydrocarbon investment and production to countries with much lower environmental standards and enforcement capacity.

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (3/7)**

**Effective regulaiton is critical to prevent accidental methane release**

**Schneider 12** (Advocacy Director, Clean Air Task Force

Conrad Schneider, “Curb Methane Emissions,” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall)

With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (4/7)**

**That leads to extinction**

**WWF 10**

World Wildlife Fund, Drilling for Oil in the Arctic: Too Soon, Too Risky, http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/wherewework/arctic/WWFBinaryitem18711.pdf

The Arctic and the subarctic regions surrounding it are important for many reasons. One is their enormous biological diversity: a kaleidoscopic array of land and seascapes supporting millions of migrating birds and charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals and sea otters. Economics is another: Alaskan fisheries are among the richest in the world. Their $2.2 billion in annual catch fills the frozen food sections and seafood counters of supermarkets across the nation. However, there is another reason why the Arctic is not just important, but among the most important places on the face of the Earth. A keystone species is generally defined as one whose removal from an ecosystem triggers a cascade of changes affecting other species in that ecosystem. The same can be said of the Arctic in relation to the rest of the world. With feedback mechanisms that affect ocean currents and influence climate patterns, the Arctic functions like a global thermostat. Heat balance, ocean circulation patterns and the carbon cycle are all related to its regulatory and carbon storage functions. Disrupt these functions and we effect far-reaching changes in the conditions under which life has existed on Earth for thousands of years. In the context of climate change, the Arctic is a keystone ecosystem for the entire planet. Unfortunately, some of these disruptions are happening already as climate change melts sea ice and thaws the Arctic tundra. The Arctic’s sea ice cover reflects sunlight and therefore heat. As the ice melts, that heat is absorbed by the salt water, whose temperature, salinity and density all begin to change in ways that impact global ocean circulation patterns. On land, beneath the Arctic tundra, are immense pools of frozen methane—a greenhouse gas far more potent than carbon dioxide. As the tundra thaws, the risk of this methane escaping increases. 4 Were this to happen, the consequences would be dire and global in scope. As we continue not just to spill but to burn the fossil fuels that cause climate change, we are nudging the Arctic toward a meltdown that will make sea levels and temperatures rise even faster, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth—no matter where one lives it. For the sake of the planet, losing the Arctic is not an option. Mitigating the impact of climate change there ultimately depends upon our getting serious about replacing fossil fuels with non-carbon-based renewable energies. Until we demonstrate the will and good sense to do that, however, the Arctic needs to be protected from other environmental threats that, compounded by the stress of climate change, undermine its resiliency and hasten its demise. Chief among those threats is offshore drilling—especially in the absence of any credible and tested means of responding effectively to a major spill.

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (5/7)**

**Accidental methane release is quantitatively a larger impact than nuclear war --- the advantage outweighs**

**Ryskin 3** – Ph.D. Chemical Engineering California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA Engineer-Physicist St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia Fluid dynamics; statistical physics; geophysics Associate Professor of Chemical and Biological Engineering

Gregory, Department of Chemical Engineering, Northwestern University, “Methane-driven oceanic eruptions and mass extinctions,” Geology, 31(9), September 2003, http://pangea.stanford.edu/research/Oceans/GES205/methaneGeology.pdf

The consequences of a methane-driven oceanic eruption for marine and terrestrial life are likely to be catastrophic. Figuratively speaking, the erupting region ‘‘boils over,’’ ejecting a large amount of methane and other gases (e.g., CO2 , H2 S) into the atmosphere, and ﬂooding large areas of land. Whereas pure methane is lighter than air, methane loaded with water droplets is much heavier, and thus spreads over the land, mixing with air in the process (and losing water as rain). The airmethane mixture is explosive at methane concentrations between 5% and 15%; as such mixtures form in different locations near the ground and are ignited by lightning, explosions 2 and conﬂagrations destroy most of the terrestrial life, and also produce great amounts of smoke and of carbon dioxide. Firestorms carry smoke and dust into the upper atmosphere, where they may remain for several years (Turco et al., 1991); the resulting darkness and global cooling may provide an additional kill mechanism. Conversely, carbon dioxide and the remaining methane create the greenhouse effect, which may lead to global warming. The outcome of the competition between the cooling and the warming tendencies is difﬁcult to predict (Turco et al., 1991; Pierrehumbert, 2002). Upon release of a signiﬁcant portion of the dissolved methane, the ocean settles down, and the entire sequence of events (i.e., development of anoxia, accumulation of dissolved methane, the metastable state, eruption) begins anew. No external cause is required to bring about a methane-driven eruption—its mechanism is self-contained, and implies that eruptions are likely to occur repeatedly at the same location. Because methane is isotopically light, its fast release must result in a negative carbon isotope excursion in the geological record. Knowing the magnitude of the excursion, one can estimate the amount of methane that could have produced it. Such calculations (prompted by the methane-hydrate-dissociation model, but equally applicable here) have been performed for several global events in the geological record; the results range from ;10 18 to 10 19 g of released methane (e.g., Katz et al., 1999; Kennedy et al., 2001; de Wit et al., 2002). These are very large amounts: the total carbon content of today’s terrestrial biomass is ;2 3 10 18 g. Nevertheless, relatively small regions of the deep ocean could contain such amounts of dissolved methane; e.g., the Black Sea alone (volume ;0.4 3 1023 of the ocean total; maximum depth only 2.2 km) could hold, at saturation, ;0.5 3 10 18 g. A similar region of the deep ocean could contain much more (the amount grows quadratically with depth 3 ). Released in a geological instant (weeks, perhaps), 10 18 to 10 19 g of methane could destroy the terrestrial life almost entirely. Combustion and explosion of 0.75 3 10 19 g of methane would liberate energy equivalent to 10 8 Mt of TNT, ;10,000 times greater than the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons, implicated in the nuclearwinter scenario (Turco et al., 1991).

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (6/7)**

**Even without accidents, current drilling practices will destabilize the seabed --- it will lead to tsunamis**

**Harris 11** – MS at Florida State University – William Harris, “How Frozen Fuel Works,” http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/green-tech/energy-production/frozen-fuel1.htm

The potential rewards of releasing methane from gas hydrate fields must be balanced with the risks. And the risks are significant. Let's start first with challenges facing mining companies and their workers. Most methane hydrate deposits are located in seafloor sediments. That means drilling rigs must be able to reach down through more than 1,600 feet (500 meters) of water and then, because hydrates are generally located far underground, another several thousand feet before they can begin extraction. Hydrates also tend to form along the lower margins of continental slopes, where the seabed falls away from the relatively shallow shelf toward the abyss. The roughly sloping seafloor makes it difficult to run pipeline.¶ Even if you can situate a rig safely, methane hydrate is unstable once it's removed from the high pressures and low temperatures of the deep sea. Methane begins to escape even as it's being transported to the surface. Unless there's a way to prevent this leakage of natural gas, extraction won't be efficient. It will be a bit like hauling up well water using a pail riddled with holes.¶ Believe it or not, this leakage may be the least of the worries. Many geologists suspect that gas hydrates play an important role in stabilizing the seafloor. Drilling in these oceanic deposits could destabilize the seabed, causing vast swaths of sediment to slide for miles down the continental slope. Evidence suggests that such underwater landslides have occurred in the past (see sidebar), with devastating consequences. The movement of so much sediment would certainly trigger massive tsunamis similar to those seen in the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004.¶ But perhaps the biggest concern is how methane hydrate mining could affect global warming. Scientists already know that hydrate deposits naturally release small amounts of methane. The gas works itself skyward -- either bubbling up through permafrost or ocean water -- until it's released into the atmosphere. Once methane is in the atmosphere, it becomes a greenhouse gas even more efficient than carbon dioxide at trapping solar radiation. Some experts fear that drilling in hydrate deposits could cause catastrophic releases of methane that would greatly accelerate global warming.

**1AC – Methane Regulation Adv (7/7)**

**These submarine landslides will result in megatsunamis**

**Britt 4** – Live Science Environmental Science writer

Roy, “The Megatsunami: Possible Modern Threat,” Live Science, http://www.livescience.com/3753-megatsunami-modern-threat.html

Scientists agree that submarine landslides caused by the collapse of island volcanoes -- think of the destruction of Mount St. Helens -- could generate these megatsunamis. Evidence for such landslides can be found in topography scans of seafloors around various island volcanoes, McMurtry points out.¶ "These giant landslides seem to occur during periods of higher than normal sea level -- like we have now," he said.¶ High sea levels tend to correspond with wetter climates, he said. What this has to do with landslides is not known. But perhaps, McMurtry figures, excess rainfall can serve as a trigger for the cleaving of a volcano-in-waiting.¶ That might all sound like a lot of logic leaps, and McMurtry is the first to admit there isn't enough data to figure out whether global warming and tsunamis are correlated. But there is some independent thinking that supports the notion.¶ Peter Cervelli, of the Alaska Volcano Observatory, has studied the Hawaiian volcanoes and is not involved in McMurtry's work. Cervelli said it's possible that water during extended wet periods seeps down into natural faults on the flanks of a volcano -- volcanoes are known to be more porous than other land areas -- precipitating a collapse by "bringing it closer to failure."¶ And in other work, Emily Brodsky of the University of California, Los Angeles has modeled the friction involved in huge volcanic landslides. She agrees that it's possible that higher rainfall amounts could make a precarious situation more slippery.¶ So should we worry? "Maybe," says McMurtry. He thinks that a tsunami, which can race across an entire ocean in a matter of hours, is a real threat to urbanized coastlines. Other experts agree that a large tsunami would be bad news for, say, Los Angeles or New York City. And tsunamis are not parochial. One originating in Alaska in 1964 killed people in California and generated damaging surges clear down in Chile.¶ McMurtry believes the threat is greater than from an asteroid impact, but asteroid research has managed to lure more funding. More money should be spent to monitor the stability of oceanic volcanoes, McMurtry argues.

**Devastates the global population**

**Turchin 8** - expert in Global Risks and wrote the book “Structure of the Global Catastrophe: Risks of Human Extinction in the XXI Century,” as well as several articles on the topic, Research Fellow in Foundation “Science for longer life.” – SEX EDITED

Alexei, “Structure of the Global Catastrophe: Risks of human extinction in the XXI century” translated from Russia, p 162-163, http://www.scribd.com/doc/6250354/STRUCTURE-OF-THE-GLOBAL-CATASTROPHE-Risks-of-human-extinction-in-the-XXI-century-?autodown=pdf

So, it is very improbable, that the huge tsunami will destroy all people - as the submarines, many ships and planes will escape. However the huge tsunami can destroy a considerable part of the population of the Earth, having translated [hu]mankind in a postapocalyptic stage, for some reasons: 1. Energy of a tsunami as a superficial wave, decreases proportionally 1/R if the tsunami is caused by a dot source, and does not decrease almost, if a source linear (as at Earthquake on a break). 2. Losses on the transmission of energy in the wave are small. 3. The considerable share of the population of the Earth and a huge share of its scientific and industrial and agricultural potential is directly at coast. 4. All oceans and the seas are connected. 5. To idea to use a tsunami as the weapon already arose in the USSR in connection with idea of creations gigaton bombs. Good side here is that the most dangerous tsunami are generated by linear natural sources - movements of geological faults, and the most accessible for artificial generation sources of a tsunami are dots: explosions of bombs, falling of asteroids, collapses of mountain.

**1AC – Solvency (1/3)**

**The US federal goernment is key to solvency**

**Jones et al 7** – Professor @ UVA, Ph.D. in computer science from Carnegie-Mellon University, member of the Defense Science Board, the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Corporation, the National Research Council Advisory Council for Policy and Global Affairs, and the MIT Corporation

Anita, First author for the Polar Research Board in the National Research Council, “POLAR ICEBREAKERS IN A CHANGING WORLD,” Google Book

The committee was asked to consider alternative ship ownership options. Considering the McMurdo break-in mission alone, the committee found that only a U.S.-flagged, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-operated ship provides sufficiently reliable control. While that ship might be leased commercially through a long-term lease-build arrangement, from a total fleet perspective it may be more cost-effective if science missions users only pay incremental costs—as has been the case in the past—and if U.S. Coast Guard provides McMurdo resupply support from the multimission icebreaker fleet. Also, the sovereign presence of the United States is not well served by a “leased ship.” Commercially or internationally leased ships may not provide a practical backup for a uniformed service ship that is not owned by the United States government. Such commercial or international arrangements do not ensure that the United States could assert its foreign policy at times and places of its choosing. Increasing world demand for polar icebreakers to support Arctic oil and gas exploration and development has significantly reduced the number of available ships, making long-term lease of an existing ship difficult. The U.S. Coast Guard has a legacy of almost 140 years of supporting the nation’s icebreaking needs in the polar regions. The U.S. Coast Guard has the overarching missions to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests throughout the maritime environment, including ice-covered waters. The committee finds that the U.S. Coast Guard is the best federal agency to operate polar icebreakers in continued support of vital national interests in the rapidly changing polar regions. In this, the committee agrees with the PIRS 84 study that concluded, “An icebreaker fleet is essential to the national interest” and “should be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.”

**So is the Coast Guard –only the Coast Guard can send a sufficient signal and respond effectively**

**Troedsson 13** - USCG, Military Fellow, U.S. Coast Guard (Captain Peter, 5/31/13, “A Coast Guard for the Emerging Arctic,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/coast-guard-emerging-arctic/p30820)

The new National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which aspires to deal with transportation, oil and gas exploration, tourism, environmental stewardship, scientific research, climate change, and tribal concerns, as well as national security, requires the robust capabilities of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard provides law enforcement and emergency management services, while regulating commercial shipping and various uses of the maritime environment along U.S. coasts and on the high seas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This capability will also be needed along the U.S. Arctic coast, where the United States must be able to ensure its sovereignty and protect the resources of its Exclusive Economic Zone (waters up to two hundred miles offshore). As the ice cap retreats, EEZs of Arctic nations will be more accessible to transiting ships, fishing vessels, adventure tourism, and research

**1AC – Solvency (2/3)**

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expeditions, in addition to potential oil and gas exploration. However, the Coast Guard faces resource constraints that will challenge its ability to provide the steady U.S. presence a warming Arctic demands. "The emerging maritime frontier of the Arctic is significantly expanding our operating area," noted Commandant Admiral Robert Papp in the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy. Indeed, numerous studies have cited Coast Guard shortfalls in the Arctic. In recent years, the Coast Guard, which is a branch of the Armed Forces but is in the Department of Homeland Security, has operated on an annual budget of roughly $10 billion, compared to $155 billion for the Navy. Both of the Coast Guard's heavy icebreakers have exceeded their original thirty-year service lives--while the Polar Star returned to duty this April after a major overhaul, the Polar Sea has been sidelined since suffering engine troubles in 2010. And with only one operable medium icebreaker, the Healy, the Coast Guard is currently forced to divert one of its National Security Cutters to service in the Arctic. These new Coast Guard flagships, all home ported in California, are three of a planned fleet of eight that were designed to patrol the high seas of the Atlantic and Pacific in support of homeland security and defense missions. While they can function in the Arctic, they are not optimized for the region's extreme climate. The 2010 Coast Guard High Latitude Study (PDF) noted: "The common and dominant contributor to these significant [Arctic region] mission impacts is the gap in polar icebreaking capability. The increasing obsolescence of the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet will further exacerbate mission performance gaps in the coming years." Additionally, the report found that "the Coast Guard requires three heavy and three medium icebreakers to fulfill its statutory missions." While the Coast Guard is currently exploring the development of a new icebreaker, most Arctic nations are looking to expand or modernize their icebreaker fleets. Canada currently operates six, while Russia operates more than thirty and is the only nation to build nuclear-powered icebreakers. In addition to pursuing investments in capability and infrastructure, the Coast Guard will also need to work closely with other federal agencies, the state of Alaska, private industry, and the other nations of the Arctic Council. The Council was established in 1996 "as a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States." The Arctic, perhaps more than any other region of the world, holds great promise for cooperative and collaborative governance. This does not mean shared sovereignty, but rather that neighbor nations along the Arctic Ocean have shown a willingness and ability to work together in areas such as oil spill preparedness and response, search and rescue, scientific monitoring, wildlife conservation and environmental protection, and sustainable development. The Coast Guard has a long history of support for international efforts to build and improve maritime governance institutions of developing nations. The Coast Guard's participation in several multilateral forums--the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, and the International Maritime Organization--has been so successful that an Arctic Coast Guard Forum is now envisioned. This international experience, along with it its extensive operational and regulatory skill sets, make the Coast Guard well suited for its Arctic leadership role as the Arctic Council addresses governance issues. Yet the United States, scheduled to preside over the Arctic Council in 2015, is disadvantaged by not having signed the UN Law of the Sea Convention. UNCLOS establishes clear rights, duties, and jurisdictions of maritime states, and is particularly important for the Arctic as EEZs open up and nations make claims to the seabed beyond these zones. "To exercise leadership, improve our ability to influence outcomes, and effectively interact with other Arctic Nations, we urgently need the Senate to approve U.S. accession to the treaty," said Admiral Papp at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in May 2013. To exercise sovereignty and operationalize the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, a federal maritime law enforcement presence is a pressing need. Currently, the Coast Guard must, out of necessity, work within its existing limited resource base, on a seasonal basis, to make this happen. But to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity, the Coast Guard will need an effective capability in the Arctic to provide the same services it offers throughout the rest of the U.S. coasts and EEZ.

**1AC – Solvency (3/3)**

**Only the plan can solve --- uncertainty and delays hamstring solvency**

**Strom 10**—citing Commandant Thad Allen

(Strom, Chris, February 12, 2010, “Coast Guard commandant cites urgent need for icebreakers”, Government Executive, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2010/02/coast-guard-commandant-cites-urgent-need-for-icebreakers/30855/

Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen on Friday said the United States faces a "looming crisis" when it comes to operating in the Arctic Circle, adding that a discussion within the government on how to proceed "cannot happen soon enough." The U.S. government should rapidly determine its policy toward the Arctic Circle, which will guide decisions on what the Coast Guard should do about aging polar icebreakers, Allen said during a National Press Club speech on the state of his agency. It was Allen's last major address, as he is scheduled to retire in May. Allen said a decision needs to be made on the Coast Guard's three icebreakers, two of which are over 30 years old. He said buying new ones will cost about $1 billion each. But the Coast Guard is not seeking any funding for icebreakers in its fiscal 2011 budget request to Congress because the nation's policy toward the Arctic has not yet been determined, Allen told reporters after his speech. "What we have to have is a discussion about what to do because the service life of these vessels is less than eight years. It takes almost that long to build a new ship," he said. "So we're at a tipping point as far as making a decision. That's got to be preceded by a policy discussion which can't happen fast enough."

**2AC – Arctic War – Icebreakers Key (1/2)**

**Icebreakers are key --- absent the plan, tensions escalate and there’s no check on the militarization of the Arctic**

**Aerandir 12** (Mate Wesley Aerandir, Lieutenant United States Navy B.A., “BREAKING THE ICE: POTENTIAL U.S.-RUSSIAN MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC” December 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573497.pdf)

There is ample reason and precedent suggesting that countries will resort to armed conflict to secure their interests, especially when those interests are regarded as vital to their national security. While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis has analyzed why an escalation of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and including the use of force cannot and should not be ruled out. The potential for U.S.- Russian maritime conflict in the region is genuine. A. SUMMARY OF THE THREAT Opportunity, capability, and perceived intent on their own do not cause conflict, but they do serve to increase anxiety about an apparent threat to national interests. It is when these three factors combine that the potential for conflict emerges. All that remains for an otherwise benign event to quickly escalate into a militarized interstate dispute is a sufficient motive or misunderstanding. In the fog before war, an ostensibly banal event could quickly escalate into a political power play between navies in the presence of historical mistrust, a perception of vulnerability, and nationalist sentiment. In the Arctic, such motives include Russia’s critical reliance on hydrocarbon resources to maintain its political and economic stability, and therefore its national security. For the United States and its NATO allies, the need to maintain and credibly defend their sovereignty and their own economic interests provides ample incentive to act decisively, if necessary. When national security is challenged or threatened by another power, the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an actual conflict. Despite the sub-zero physical climate, the Arctic is a hotbed of competing interests. Receding ice cover in the northern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential “treasure trove” of natural resources or simply to capitalize on time- and money-saving transportation routes, political leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or otherwise insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to their constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a “wild west” (or, in this case, a no-law north) of uncertainty as to the legal standing of enterprises and exposes countries and companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possible prosecution by rival interests. Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in the region, creating an environment for potential conflict. Economic expansion is triggering an associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to protect, defend, and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not enough to cause anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the Arctic has also caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to conventional military pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front. At present, only Russia is capable of defending its claims in the Arctic militarily. Given Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic promises to offer in abundance—Moscow’s economic claims in excess of its recognized EEZ are likely to encroach on, or overlap with, the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it stands alone. Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain may eventually make “right” in its favor if NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those to which the Russian Coast Guard continually subjects

**2AC – Arctic War – Icebreakers Key (2/2)**

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Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in this regard would be much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its current inaction. Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 93 agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is perhaps even more salient today. Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in military technology, force dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the military stability of the region, Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO unity were an unbalanced American hegemony in the region and increased political conflict among allied members over contested economic interests in the region.207 Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their dispute over Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could undermine decades of Alliance cohesion. Meanwhile, Russia’s actions and rhetoric in the Arctic leave no room to deduce anything but a firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership to secure its claims. There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the Putin and Medvedev administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for diplomatic resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing international agreements and mechanisms” have only been operationalized through agreements to cooperate on search and rescue efforts and on (competitive) scientific exploration and research for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. All the while, however, Russia’s ambitious militarization of the Arctic has been clearly reinforced with explicit rhetoric proclaiming its intent to defend its national security interests. For Russia, the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of strategic importance. Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic. Though its rhetoric is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia, it is nevertheless increasingly nationalistic. Actions, in this case, speak for themselves. The Canadians have expressed an intention to build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to defend their sovereignty. If Prime Minister Stephen Harper had his way, this build-up would be happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic capabilities more rapidly. The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and broader security interests is real. The capabilities, while in some cases only planned or very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has never been greater and will only increase in the future. The threat of a militarized conflict in the Arctic is therefore real as well.

**2AC – Arctic War – AT: Russia Peaceful**

**Recent actions disprove the rhetoric of their impact defense --- Russia threat is increasing now**

**Lyons 12** - commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations

James, Russia’s shot across the bow: Sneaky submarine bad sign for U.S. readiness, Lexis

A Russian Akula-class cruise-missile attack submarine recently transited the North Atlantic and operated undetected in the Gulf of Mexico for an undeclared period of time. The United States did not find out until after it left. This should not have come as a surprise.¶ The naval resources we once had that implemented the Navy’s Maritime Strategy, a major factor in winning the Cold War, have been decimated. President Reagan’s 600-ship Navy has been allowed to atrophy to about 285 ships. To put that number in perspective, that is approximately the number of ships I had under my command of the Pacific Fleet. With the current anemic shipbuilding plan forced on the Navy by the Obama administration’s drastic budget cuts, we are headed for the smallest Navy since World War I.¶ The argument that our ships are so much more capable today that we don’t need as many is pure nonsense. The world hasn’t shrunk. If an objective look is taken at the realigned geographic boundaries assigned our combat commanders (COCOMs) as a result of Sept. 11, 2001, it should become clear how a Russian Akula submarine can transit the North Atlantic and operate in the Gulf of Mexico undetected.¶ The Atlantic Ocean is divided up into four sectors, with responsibility shared by four COCOMs — U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. African Command. Previously, the Atlantic was under a single U.S. Atlantic Command, with the commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet as both the operational commander and the NATO Striking Fleet commander. That command has been disbanded. Today, the U.S. Northern Command, with headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colo., carries that responsibility with U.S. Fleet Forces Command as its naval component commander based in Norfolk, Va.¶ While it is quite possible that two-thirds of the Akula’s transit took place in the European Command’s area of supervision, that should give no comfort because that command lacks the naval resources to carry out its responsibility. In a recent conversation with me, a former commander of the Northern Command expressed the same sentiments. He never had the naval resources to carry out his duties.¶ The undetected Akula cruise-missile submarine deployment is compounded by the fact that Iran already has established missile bases in Venezuela that can reach a number of American cities. In his best appeasement rhetoric, President Obama has stated that he does not think “what Hugo Chavez has done in the last several years has had a serious national security impact on us.” I doubt the American cities that are within range of those Iranian missiles would share that view, particularly if they understood the seriousness of our vulnerability.¶ What Iran is doing in Venezuela today is what the Soviet Union tried to do in Cuba in 1962. The principles of the Monroe Doctrine prevailed then under the leadership of President Kennedy, backed up by a massive deployment of naval ships to impose a quarantine around Cuba. Our national security was preserved by having the Soviets withdraw their missiles from Cuba. Nothing less is acceptable today. When the 4th Fleet, the naval component for the U.S. Southern Command, states that its most pressing security issue is crime, we have a problem. If there is no implementation of the Monroe Doctrine to force the removal of the Iranian missiles from Venezuela, rest assured that longer-range Iranian missiles will find their way there, putting more American cities at risk.¶ With the current impasse over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, a U.S. or Israeli military strike becomes a real possibility to eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In such a scenario, Iranian missiles remaining in Venezuela clearly are unacceptable. If the Monroe Doctrine is not invoked to remove them, they must be destroyed. Furthermore, we must expedite plans to provide defensive coverage of our exposed southern flank on an expedited basis with an Aegis anti-ballistic-missile system, which can be a combination of land- and sea-based systems.¶ Russia’s assertive Akula deployment follows a June exercise of its strategic bombers and support aircraft in the Arctic, simulating strikes against Alaska. Then in July, a Russian Bear H strategic bomber most likely simulated strikes against California from the Gulf of Alaska. It was intercepted before, hopefully, it was able reach its simulated missile-launch position. The questionable new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia requires 14-day advance notification when such bomber exercises are conducted. No notification was given. This requirement creates a false sense of security because it certainly could be used for deceptive purposes. As a commander, you always want to retain the initiative and thereby keep your potential enemies off balance. You want to remain unpredictable. In that way, you raise the level of deterrence.¶ So much for the Obama administration’s “reset” with Russia. That nation clearly has been given new marching orders by its recently inaugurated President Vladimir Putin at a time when our national leadership is perceived to be weak. Social engineering imposed on our military by the administration has not enhanced our military capabilities. Our military has been involved in two wars over the past decade and has been run hard and put away wet.¶ These factors, when combined with looming, draconian budget cuts, will weaken our military capabilities and our ability to deter aggression. Our potential enemies see these growing weaknesses as opportunities to be exploited. There is no question that we are being challenged.

**2AC – Arctic War – AT: Russia War Defense**

**Their defense is wrong --- most recent evidence proves both the propensity for conflict and that US-Russia war causes extinction**

**Helfand 14**– Ira Helfand has an M.D and is the past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility. He is the co-president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. (“Another View: Ukraine crisis puts focus on danger of nuclear war”, <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/2014/05/04/another-view-ukraine-crisis-danger-nuclear-war/8665185/>, May 3, 2014)

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has made it clear that the danger of nuclear war is still with us and may be greater than at any time since the height of the Cold War. What does that mean for United States nuclear policy? There are today more than 15,000 nuclear warheads in the world. The vast majority, more than 95 percent, are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Some 3,000 of these warheads are on "hair-trigger" alert. They are mounted on missiles that can be fired in 15 minutes and destroy their targets around the world less than 30 minutes later. During the Cold War, there was a widespread understanding of what nuclear weapons could do. That is not true today. Those who lived through the Cold War have put this painful information out of mind, and a generation has come of age that never learned about the terrible effects of nuclear war. This must change if we are to make rational decisions about nuclear policy. Over the last few years, new information has emerged that underlines the danger posed by even the limited use of nuclear weapons. Studies published in 2006 by Rutgers University's Alan Robock and his colleagues examined the effects of a "limited" nuclear war involving just 100 small nuclear weapons, the size of the Hiroshima bomb, less than 0.5 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals. The specific scenario they examined involved a war between India and Pakistan. The two nations have fought three wars in the last 70 years, have come close to war on two other occasions, engage in daily skirmishes across their contested border in Kashmir, and have more than 200 nuclear weapons in their arsenals, many much larger than the weapons used in the study. The effects in India and Pakistan are horrific. In the first week more than 20 million people are killed by blast, fire and radiation as the great cities of South Asia are destroyed. But the global impact is far worse. As the cities burn, the fires loft 5 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere, blocking out sunlight. Across the globe, temperatures fall an average of 1.3 degrees Celsius, and precipitation declines as less water evaporates into the cooler atmosphere to fall back as rain. This climate disruption has a catastrophic impact on food production around the world. In Iowa, as across the entire U.S. Corn Belt, soy production declines an average of 7 percent for a full decade, and corn production declines an average of 12 percent. In China, rice production declines an average of 17 percent and the equally important wheat crop declines a staggering 31 percent. "Nuclear Famine," a report issued last year by Physicians for Social Responsibility, explored the impact this decline in food production would have on human health. The world is not prepared to withstand a fall in food production of this magnitude. World grain reserves amount to only some 70 days of consumption and would quickly be exhausted. There are already 870 million people in the developing world who are malnourished today. They get just enough food to maintain their body mass and do a little work to gather or grow food. There are also 300 million people who get adequate nutrition today but live in countries that depend on imported food. All of these people, more than 1 billion, many far removed from the actual conflict, would be at risk of starvation in the event of even this very "limited" use of nuclear weapons. Another 1.3 billion people in China might also starve given the enormous shortfalls in Chinese grain production. And no one has yet studied the effects of climate disruption on other food crops in other countries. Will U.S., Canadian and European wheat production fall as dramatically as in China? A famine of this magnitude is unprecedented in human history. Never have we faced the possible death of 15 percent to 30 percent of the human race in the course of a single decade. Such a catastrophe would not mean the extinction of our species, but it would almost certainly bring about the end of modern civilization as we know it. These data make clear that even the smaller nuclear weapons states, countries that might well go to war, and over whose nuclear arsenals the U.S. has no direct control, pose a threat to all mankind. But the danger posed by the U.S. and Russian arsenals is even greater. A single U.S. Trident submarine carries 96 warheads, each 10 to 30 times larger than the bombs used in the South Asia scenario. That means that each Trident can cause the nuclear famine scenario many times over. We have 14 of them, and that is only one-third of our nuclear arsenal, which also includes land-based missiles and long-range bombers. The Russians have the same incomprehensible level of overkill capacity. What would happen if there were a large nuclear war? A 2002 report by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the 1,500 warheads in the Russian arsenal got through to targets in the United States, up to 100 million people would die in the first 30 minutes. The entire economic infrastructure on which we depend — the public health system, banking system, communications network, food distribution system — would be destroyed. In the months following this attack, most of the rest of the population would also die, from starvation, exposure to cold, epidemic disease and radiation poisoning. The global climate disruption would be even more catastrophic. Limited war in South Asia would drop global temperatures 1.3 degrees Celsius. A war between the United States and Russia, using only those weapons they will still possess when the New START treaty is fully implemented in 2017, drops temperatures an average of 8 degrees Celsius. In the interior of Eurasia, North America and in Iowa, temperatures drop 20 to 30 degrees Celsius to a level not seen in 18,000 years — since the coldest time of the last Ice Age. Agriculture stops, ecosystems collapse, the vast majority of the human race starves and many species, perhaps including our own, become extinct. As events in Ukraine have made clear,there is still a very real possibility that the United States and Russia may find themselves on opposite sides of an armed conflict, and that means that these vast nuclear arsenals might be used. Even if there is not a deliberate use of nuclear weapons, there is the danger of an accidental nuclear war.

**2AC – Arctic War – AT: Russia Econ Turn**

**No internal link --- Arctic investment doesn’t lead to Russian economic growth**

**WSJ 11** (“Russian Oil Frontier: Nowhere Land”, December 6, 2011, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203764804577060200073674124.html)

Russia's other prospective areas are even more remote and even more expensive to develop: according to one estimate, $500 billion will be needed to open up vast oil and gas fields in the offshore Arctic. The costs of producing oil in Eastern Siberia and other far-flung areas are high—between $6 and $10 a barrel, compared with $4-$8 a barrel in Russia's older oil provinces, according to the IEA. Although crude from Eastern Siberia sells for over $100 a barrel, capital and transport costs take a big chunk out of profits. And under Russia's current tax system there is little incentive to invest. For example, the Russian government's take from one of its new fields in the Arctic—the total effect of the country's fiscal system on cash flow from the fields—is 72%, compared with 53% for one of Brazil's massive offshore oil fields, according to Morgan Stanley. "For these projects to be successful...there needs to be some significant changes to the fiscal regime," Glen Waller, head of Russia for Exxon Mobil Corp., XOM +0.12%told a recent conference in Moscow.

**No terminal impact to Russian economic decline anyways**

**Blackwill 09** – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)

Now on to Russia. Again, five years from today. Did the global recession and Russia’s present serious economic problems substantially modify Russian foreign policy? No. (President Obama is beginning his early July visit to Moscow as this paper goes to press; nothing fundamental will result from that visit). Did it produce a serious weakening of Vladimir Putin’s power and authority in Russia? No, as recent polls in Russia make clear. Did it reduce Russian worries and capacities to oppose NATO enlargement and defense measures eastward? No. Did it affect Russia’s willingness to accept much tougher sanctions against Iran? No. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has said there is no evidence that Iran intends to make a nuclear weapon.25 In sum, Russian foreign policy is today on a steady, consistent path that can be characterized as follows: to resurrect Russia’s standing as a great power; to reestablish Russian primary influence over the space of the former Soviet Union; to resist Western eff orts to encroach on the space of the former Soviet Union; to revive Russia’s military might and power projection; to extend the reach of Russian diplomacy in Europe, Asia, and beyond; and to oppose American global primacy. For Moscow, these foreign policy first principles are here to stay, as they have existed in Russia for centuries. 26 None of these enduring objectives of Russian foreign policy are likely to be changed in any serious way by the economic crisis.

**2AC – Methane – Icebreakers Key**

**Icebreakers are the lynchpin of an effective regulation strategy --- key to command and control and effectiveness of other response vessels**

**NRC 07** (United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11753&page=R1>)

Protecting the Arctic marine environment begins with ensuring the safety of vessels operating in these challenging conditions, including the availability of icebreaking assistance and comprehensive monitoring of vessel movements. Prevention might also include a regulatory regime, limiting vessels to geographic areas and seasonal periods appropriate to their ice capabilities. The Canadian Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR) would serve as an obvious example. Increases in traffic, especially from Russian or Canadian waters, may create U.S. interest in establishing regulations; enforcement and deterrence would necessitate an on-scene presence capable of operating in ice. The U.S. Coast Guard would clearly have regulatory responsibility for this type of waterways management. Responding to a major oil spill in the Arctic is challenging, as cleanup activities for an onshore spill near Prudhoe Bay in early 2006 attest. Oil cleanup offshore would be even more difficult due to the dearth of infrastructure and the possibility of ice. Where depth of water permits access, an icebreaker could offer command-and-control capabilities, communications, berthing, helicopters, boats, cargo space, heavyweight handling gear, tankage, and support services to smaller craft, all of which would be of great benefit to cleanup operations. Direct oil recovery could also be included as an icebreaker capability: POLAR SEA successfully tested a boommounted skimming system known as the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) (as well as other capabilities) while participating in an oil spill exercise off Sakhalin Island in 1998. The U.S. Coast Guard’s new fleet of coastal buoy tenders is equipped with VOSS, and thought should be given to the need for new polar icebreakers to be equipped with the latest technology for oil spill response.

**2AC – Methane – AT: Drilling Inevitable**

**Even if drilling might be inevitable, U.S. tech and leadership can ensure safe practices**

**Schneider 12** – Advocacy Director of the Clean Task Force (Michael Schneider, “Curb Methane Emissions”, National Journal, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments>)

For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development. Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. With Shell’s imminent entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from “if we drill in the Arctic,” to “how and where we drill in the Arctic.” The discussion to date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems. However, it is also critically important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of “associated” natural gas that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this “associated” natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this “stranded” gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. That’s about 25 percent of the US’s annual natural gas consumption. This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface. Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.

**2AC – Methane – AT: Drilling Defense**

**Unsafe drilling leads to immediate and widespread methane release – extinction**

**Gaskill 4** - president of Environmental Reference Materials Inc., a consulting firm in North Carolina

Alva, DoE Meeting Summary, http://www.physics.rutgers.edu/~karin/140/articles/MethaneHydrates.pdf

Another possibility is drilling and other activities related to exploration and ¶ recovery of methane hydrates as an energy resource. The hydrates tend to occur in ¶ the pores of sediment and help to bind it together. Attempting to remove the ¶ hydrates may cause the sediment to collapse and release the hydrates. So, it may not take thousands of years to warm the ocean and the sediments enough to cause ¶ massive releases, only lots of drilling rigs. ¶ ¶ Returning to the 4 GtC release scenario, assume such a release occurs over a oneyear period sometime in the next 50 years as result of slope failure. According to the ¶ Report of the Methane Hydrate Advisory Committee, “Catastrophic slope failure ¶ appears to be necessary to release a sufficiently large quantity of methane rapidly ¶ enough to be transported to the atmosphere without significant oxidation or ¶ dissolution.” ¶ ¶ In this event, methane will enter the atmosphere as methane gas. It will have a ¶ residence time of several decades and a global warming potential of 62 times that of ¶ carbon dioxide over a 20-year period. ¶ ¶ This would be the equivalent of 248 GtC as carbon dioxide or 31 times the annual ¶ man-made GHG emissions of today. Put another way, this would have the impact of ¶ nearly 30 years worth of GHG warming all at once. The result would almost ¶ certainly be a rapid rise in the average air temperature, perhaps as much as 3°F ¶ immediately. This might be tolerable if that’s as far as things go. But, just like ¶ 15,000 years ago, if the feedback mechanisms kick in, we can expect rapid melting of ¶ Greenland and Antarctic ice and an overall temperature increase of 30°F. ¶ For point of reference, the average temperature of the Earth (atmosphere, land and ¶ top layer of the ocean) in 2004 is around 60°F. The methane hydrate release ¶ projected here would raise the temperature to around 90°F or more. Such high ¶ temperatures would undoubtedly destabilize all of the other methane hydrates in ¶ the ocean and arctic permafrost, some 10,000 GtC or 620,000 GtC equivalent as ¶ carbon dioxide. This would have the impact of 78,000 years worth of GHG warming ¶ over a few decades. The temperatures reached and sustained would most likely ¶ cause a rapid die off in ocean phytoplankton and other sea life as well as most land ¶ plants and animals, including humans. The result would be a mass extinction and ¶ mark a major transition point in the Earth’s geological history.

**2AC – Methane – AT: Environment DA (1/3)**

**Non-unique --- icebreaking by other countries now including**

**a) South Korea**

**Maritime Connector 12 (**“First Korean icebreaker to explore Arctic Ocean,” http://maritime-connector.com/news/environment-and-technology/first-korean-icebreaker-to-explore-arctic-ocean/)

Korean government reported on Thuesday that their first icebreaker will explore Canada's Arctic Ocean to check offshore permafrost regions and the sea-floor for gas hydrate reserves. The Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs said it reached an understanding with Canada to conduct joint research in the Beaufort Sea within the North American country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The sea is a marginal body of water in the Arctic Ocean that lies north of the Northwest Territories and west of Canada's Arctic Islands. The Araon, a 7,487-ton icebreaker, will check the region for gas hydrates found deep at sea or in offshore permafrost layers. It will also examine the effects of the release of methane gas on the environment. Gas hydrates are a semisolid mixture of methane gas and water molecules created through a combination of water pressure and cold temperatures. "Exact details have to be worked out with Canada, but the Araon should begin exploration in the summer of 2013," a official said. Past studies indicated the Arctic Ocean area may hold 25 percent of the world's untapped crude oil and natural gas deposits. The official said by South Korea taking part in the joint research, it could allow local companies to play a role in development if Ottawa opts to develop the fossil fuel resources within its EEZ. Sources said Seoul has been pushing for a joint study of the region since 2008, but had not previously made any headway.

**b) China and other high North countries**

**Lindberg 12**

Martin, “China: Icebreaking in the Arctic,” http://isnblog.ethz.ch/arctic/china-icebreaking-in-the-arctic

In 2009 the Chinese Cabinet decided that Snow Dragon would also need ‘brothers and sisters’ to meet the country’s expanding polar interest. The maiden-trip of the new ice-breaker is scheduled to 2014. With two icebreakers, China will have one more than the US, but still two dozen or so less than most other high north countries.

**Icebreaking is good for regional biodiversity**

**Richardson et al 98** - Ph.D. , Senior Vice-President of LGL, is a specialist in bird migration and hazards to aircraft; noise disturbance to marine mammals and other wildlife; and the design, conduct and interpretation of field studies in support of environmental assessments. His academic training was in animal behaviour. Much of Dr. Richardson's research, since the mid-1960s, has concerned bird hazards to aircraft and bird movements over many parts of Canada, the U.S.A., and Puerto RicoW John, “Marine Mammals and Noise,” Google Book

In areas of stable landfast ice, ambient sound levels are some¬times low (Section 5.2.2), so icebreaking could increase the noise level dramatically. Ringed seals occupy arctic fast ice, maintaining breath¬ing holes through the winter. Their mobility is severely limited by the need for access to breathing holes. Alliston (1980, 1981) determined the numbers and distributions of seals during spring at study sites in the Beaufort Sea and Labrador where icebreakers had traveled through the landfast ice the previous winter. There was no indication of reduced seal numbers in areas that had been subject to icebreaking. Indeed, ringed seals may have preferentially established breathing holes in ship tracks.

**2AC – Methane – AT: Environment DA (2/3)**

**Methane release turns the DA --- it accesses a global environmental catastrophe --- biodiversity loss is compartmentalized which means only the advantage accesses a global impact**

**There’s no terminal impact to biodiversity loss**

**Sagoff**- Sr researcher, U Maryland - **’97** (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs @ U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N)

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [\*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [\*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an

**2AC – Methane – AT: Environment DA (3/3)**

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area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet.

**2AC – Shipbuilding Add-On (1/3)**

**Increasing icebreaking operations breathes new life into the US ship-building industry**

**Borgerson 8** – PhD @ Tufts, assistant professor and founding director of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Institute for Leadership

Scott, “Arctic Meltdown,” Foreign Affairs, Lexis

But even as it pushes for a multilateral diplomatic solution, the United States should undertake a unilateral effort to shore up U.S. interests in the Arctic. The few in the United States who still stubbornly oppose U.S. accession to UNCLOS claim that by ratifying the treaty Washington would cede too much U.S. sovereignty and that customary international law and a powerful navy already allow the United States to protect its Arctic interests. But these are not enough. The United States is the only major country that has failed to ratify UNCLOS, and Washington is therefore left on the outside looking in as a nonmember to various legal and technical bodies. In addition to becoming a party to the convention, the United States must publish an updated Arctic policy, invest in ice-mapping programs, and breathe new life into its inefficient, uncompetitive shipyards, thus enabling it to update the country's geriatric icebreaker fleet, as soon as possible.

**The certainty of the plan is key to the overall industry**

**Cropsey 12** – PhD, Senior Fellow @ Hudson (Seth Cropsey, “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” Dr. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf)

Knowledge of shipbuilding remains part of American manufacturing. But accelerating cost, an ageing workforce, reduced orders for warships, and an uncertain future risk the nation’s ability to turn out sufficient numbers of vessels at affordable prices and profitably enough to keep shipbuilding companies alive. The destabilization of the American shipbuilding industrial base is one reason that the cost of warships is outpacing the rate of inflation. The Navy’s reduced procurement of ships over the past twenty years has caused the industry to contract, lay off workers, and in general to become less reliable. This has driven up the cost of labor and the cost of construction materials. The fewer ships the Navy buys, the less lucrative the industry is for skilled workers. As the cost of labor rises shipbuilders are increasingly pressed to attract and train qualified personnel. The negative trends reinforce each other. As younger workers are dissuaded from seeking employment or remaining in the industry by the prospects of sporadic employment those who remain—the existing workers—age. The cycle is self-defeating. Paying older workers increases overhead costs and makes it increasingly expensive to invest in the training and education of a younger workforce. The destabilization of the industrial base also causes costs to rise since many of the materials and products that go into building Navy ships are not useful for other purposes. Since the Navy is buying far fewer ships now than it did in the 1980s, many shipyards rely on a single source for necessary materials. With a virtual monopoly on these products, the suppliers have in large part the ability to name their price. The inefficient manner in which the shipyards acquire these materials drives up labor and overhead costs. The solution lies in stabilizing the American shipbuilding industry. This means that the Navy must either increase its orders of ships and/or improve its business practices, for example disciplining the changes it requires of shipbuilders once orders have been placed and vessels are under construction. Buying and stockpiling spare parts for ships that are already in service and whose need for regular maintenance and repair is well known would also help provide stability for the American shipbuilding industry. In a study conducted on the subject in 2006, the RAND Corporation concluded that the rising costs of building ships is the result of a combination of unsteady U.S. Government procurement rates and a “monopsony relationship” between the government and the shipbuilders. In a monopsony a single purchaser is faced with a host of sellers. Because there is so little

**2AC – Shipbuilding Add-On (2/3)**

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American shipbuilding outside of what the Navy purchases, U.S. firms are at the commercial mercy of the 9 percent of the Navy budget devoted to buying ships. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report attributed cost increases in shipbuilding to instability in the entire industry, the difficulty in recruiting and training qualified personnel, high rates of skilled personnel turnover and the shipbuilders’ dependence on a rapidly shrinking supplier base.

**Shipbuilding industry key to US growth**

**LECG 02** (LECG Corporation, global consulting firm, “The Economic Contribution of the U.S. Commercial Shipbuilding Industry”, April 2002, http://www.shipbuilders.org/Portals/Shipbuilders/documents/econcontr\_shipbuilding.pdf)

U.S. commercial shipbuilders’ activities make a substantial contribution to U.S. economy by increasing U.S. output (GDP), increasing the number of jobs, increasing personal income, and increasing tax revenues. As a result of the commercial shipbuilding activities in 2001: • Total U.S. output was increased by $11.0 billion 1 ; • 147,230 total jobs in the U.S. economy were created; • U.S. personal income was increased by $9.4 billion ; and • Federal, state, and local government tax revenues were increased by $3.4 billion. These economic contributions are not due just to the U.S. commercial shipbuilders’ activities at their shipyards, but also to the activities in the companies that supply these shipyards. There are active commercial shipyards in at least 29 states, and these shipyards purchase materials, services, and capital equipment that is produced in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry, which grew at an average annual rate of 6.8% between 1992 and 2001, outperformed the U.S. economy which grew at an average annual rate of 3.4% over the same period. The estimated total value of shipments (gross revenues) of the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry in 2001 was $3.9 billion , and these shipyards directly employed 31,283 people. Of the $3.9 billion of gross revenues, about 47%, or $1.8 billion, goes to pay companies throughout the U.S. that supply the shipyards. The remaining 53% of the $3.9 billion of gross revenues is disbursed or stays at the shipyard in the form of employee compensation ($1.7 billion), gross profits of the company ($0.3 billion), and indirect business tax payments such as sales/excise taxes and property taxes ($0.02 billion). In turn, the owners and employees pay taxes on the income they receive.

**2AC – Shipbuilding Add-On (3/3)**

**Slow US growth leads to war and lash-out**

**Goldstein 7** - Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania (Avery Goldstein, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” [Journal of Strategic Studies](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713636064), Volume [30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713636064%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=30#v30), Issue [4 & 5](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g780703608) August 2007, pages 639 – 682)

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance**.** The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the **power gap narrows**, the dominant state becomes **increasingly desperate**. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a **dominant state may react** to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650

**\*\*\*ICEBREAKERS NEGATIVE\*\*\***

**1NC – Arctic War Frontline (1/4)**

**No Arctic war --- even Russia is cooperating**

**Jones et al. 12** (Bruce Jones, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative, David Steven, Senior Fellow, New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project, Andrew Hart, doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, “Chill Out – Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Managing Global Order, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2012, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones\_arctic.pdf)

As growing multilateral momentum demonstrates, the Arctic is a zone neither of pure competition or cooperation, but is instead a mix of both. On balance, however, nationalistic pressures are being contained more effectively than has been assumed in many popular accounts. As climate change has multiplied stakes in the region, Arctic nations have tended to show increased willingness to work together, actively seeking to quell fears about territory annexation, unilateral resources grabs, and domination of key maritime chokepoints.

**It won’t escalate --- militaries can’t get drawn in because it’s too cold and equipment freezes**

**Military Hub 11** (Military News organization, “U.S. Navy Challenged by Climate Change,” http://www.militaryhub.com/article.cfm?id=314)

In 2007, as a result of global warming, the melting Arctic pack ice allowed marine ships to traverse the Northwest Passage for the first time. It is estimated that the Northwest Passage along Canada and Alaska will become navigable as soon as 2030. Navigating the Northwest Passage opens up a trade route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans for shipping, tourism, and natural resource exploitation. Territorial claims are in dispute as nations compete for access to untouched natural resources. U.S. MILITARY LEFT OUT IN THE ARCTIC COLD The Arctic territories have been ignored by the U.S. military, largely due to their inhospitable climate. As a result, military equipment is not built to withstand Arctic cold. The range of navy satellites in geosynchronous orbit falls short of the north Arctic circle, breaking down communication signals in those previously unreachable zones.

**1NC – Arctic War Frontline (2/4)**

**Russia’s hinging its geo-economic influence on the Arctic now but the plan leads to US territorial control**

**Cohen 08** (Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Heritage, PhD at Tufts University, “The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic”, http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf\_media/2008/pdf/bg2202.pdf)

The Arctic is quickly reemerging as a strategic area where vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Arctic region is rising rapidly, and its mineral wealth will likely transform the region into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century. The Arctic coasts and continental shelf are esti- mated to hold large deposits of oil, natural gas, methane hydrate (natural gas) clusters, and large quantities of valuable minerals. With the shrinking of the polar ice cap, extended navigation through the Northwest Passage along the northern coast of North America may soon become possible with the help of icebreakers. Similarly, Rus- sia is seeking to make the Northern Sea Route along the northern coast of Eurasia navigable for consid- erably longer periods of the year. Opening these shorter routes will significantly cut the time and costs of shipping. Despite the Arctic’s strategic location and vast resources, the U.S. has largely ignored this region. The United States needs to develop a comprehen- sive policy for the Arctic, including diplomatic, naval, military, and economic policy components. This should include swiftly mapping U.S. territorial claims to determine their extent and to defend against claims by other countries. With oil and gas prices recently at historic highs in a tight supply and demand environment, the rich hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic may bring some relief to consumers. These resources, especially the hydrocarbons, also have the potential to significantly enhance the economy and the energy security of North America and the world. Russian Ambitions. Russia recognizes the mul- tifaceted potential of the Arctic and is moving rapidly to assert its national interests. Moscow has submitted a claim to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to an area of 460,000 square miles— the size of Germany, France, and Italy combined. The Kremlin is pursuing its interests by projecting military power into the region and by using diplo- matic instruments such as the Law of the Sea Treaty. Russia made a show of planting its flag on the Arctic seabed in August 2007 and has resumed strategic bomber flights over the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War. While paying lip service to international law, Russia’s ambitious actions hearken back to 19th- century statecraft rather than the 21st-century law- based policy and appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes that credible displays of power will settle conflicting territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture toward the Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate. This needs to change. Reestablishing the U.S. Arctic Presence. The United States should not rely on the findings of other nations that are mapping the Arctic floor. **Timely mapping results are necessary to defending and asserting U.S. rights in** bilateral and **multilateral fora.** The U.S. needs to increase its efforts to map the floor of the Arctic Ocean to determine the extent of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and **ascertain** the extent of legitimate **U.S. claims to territory** beyond its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. To accomplish this, the U.S. needs to upgrade its icebreaker fleet. The U.S. should also continue to cooperate and advance its interests with other Arctic nations through venues such as the recent Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland. Specifically, the United States should: • Create an interagency task force on the Arctic bringing together the Departments of Defense, State, Interior, and Energy to develop the overall U.S. policy toward the region. The U.S. should use diplomatic, military, and economic means to maintain its sovereignty in the Arctic, including establishing a Joint Task Force–Arctic Region Command, headed by a Coast Guard flag officer. The U.S. should also establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum modeled after the successful Northern Pacific Coast Guard Forum. • Accelerate the acquisition of icebreakers to support the timely mapping of the Arctic OCS and the Arctic in general to advance U.S. national interests. The U.S. needs to swiftly map U.S. claims on the OCS and areas adjacent to Alaska to preserve its sovereign territorial rights. Timely mapping will be important as the other Arctic nations submit their claims within the 10-year window. The U.S. should not rely on mapping from other countries to advance its claims or to defend against the claims of other countries.

**1NC – Arctic War Frontline (3/4)**

**This collapses Russia’s territory grab**

**Cohen 10** (Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, PhD, “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/from-russian-competition-to-natural-resources-access-recasting-us-arctic-policy)

The United States needs to elevate the Arctic to a higher geopolitical priority and fully commit to implementing the Arctic Region Policy. The Arctic Interagency Policy Committee (AIPC) should have full responsibility for Arctic policy coordination, although it should not allow environmental and climate change issues to dominate the agenda. To advance U.S. sovereign territorial rights in the High North, the area inside the Arctic Circle, Congress should allocate funding to acquire additional icebreakers and to increase the number of Coast Guard forward operating locations (FOLs) on the North Slope and in western Alaska. In the international realm, the U.S. should expand dialogue with members of the Arctic Council, including Russia, on cooperating in the High North through the Arctic Policy Group (APG). However, the U.S. should **oppose Russia’s territory grab** without joining the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST). The U.S. should raise the Arctic as a priority on NATO’s agenda and explore an agreement with Canada on joint management of navigation, security, and commercial exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Northwest Passage. Finally, Congress should authorize expanded oil exploration and production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and other promising Arctic areas to increase the national energy supply.

**This collapses Russia’s economy --- Gazprom is key**

**Fin 12** (Al writer for oilprice, an energy news site that contributes energy analysis to Business Insider and Forbes. “http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Gazproms-Future-Dependent-on-Arctic-Energy-Riches.html”)

The continued existence of Russia as a transcontinental power depends on its ability to leverage vast energy wealth into political stability and power. Without energy wealth, Russia begins to disintegrate. A giant new gas field north of the Arctic Circle provides some hope for Russia's future. Gazprom’s mammoth tax payments bolster the Russian economy, allowing the Kremlin to dole out subsidies and keep a lid on popular discontent. At the same time, **Gazprom faces challenges that threaten** not just its dominance of the world’s natural gas market, but also **the stability of Russia itself.**, the emergence of U.S. shale gas and the rise of liquefied natural gas super tankers are transforming the global gas market, providing alternatives to Russian supply. The company’s close association with the Kremlin, historically an asset and a hindrance, may invite greater scrutiny as domestic opposition to Putin’s rule grows. European clients and parliaments are contesting Gazprom’s continental influence with greater solidarity than ever before. A recent Morgan Stanley (MS) report determined that these tests may “leave Gazprom running a very different business,” diminished in scale and profitability and less favoured at home. That’s why so much is riding on Bovanenkovo. Beneath two feet of permafrost on the distant Yamal Peninsula, 1,500 miles northeast of Moscow, Bovanenkovo holds nearly five trillion cubic meters of gas. The field will begin delivering gas in July and for the next 35 years could on its own produce enough to meet 25 percent of European demand. Bovanenkovo affords the Kremlin peace of mind, although the price tag for its development—upward of $100 billion—allows Gazprom little margin for error. \_BW The emergence of abundant tight gas reserves in North America, South America, China, the Levant, parts of Europe, and Southeast Asia suggests that in the not-too-distant future, reduced demand is likely to shake global gas markets even further. Russia will be forced to move to gas to liquids (GTL) production in order to convert its less valued gas into more valued liquids. Gazprom performs many functions traditionally reserved for the state, including funding public works projects directly from its budget. It’s the only Russian company that is compelled to pay its tax bill monthly, since this revenue makes up the single largest portion of Russian gross domestic product (10 percent) and is critical to the basic workings of government. Gazprom is less a company than a public trust, one that enjoys special advantages in exchange for fulfilling official wishes. ...Europe’s dependence on Gazprom for natural gas gives the Kremlin power to leave millions in the cold should it choose to do so (as it did to Ukraine after pricing disputes in 2006 and 2009). A deep freeze in Russia this winter has increased domestic demand for fuel, producing a shortfall in natural gas supply to Europe. Over the last year, as European customers have been squeezed by surging gas prices (generating Gazprom’s record earnings), some of Gazprom’s Western clients have demanded arbitration. European Union antitrust investigators stormed Gazprom offices in Germany and the Czech Republic, seizing contracts. (Gazprom insists its contracts adhere to international law.) And officials in Brussels are

**1NC – Arctic War Frontline (4/4)**

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debating the Third Energy Package, anti-monopoly legislation focused squarely on Gazprom’s ability both to transport and sell gas in the territory of the EU. ...Czarist-era geologists discovered gas on the Yamal Peninsula just before the 1917 Russian Revolution, though they didn’t possess the wherewithal to extract it. Through the years, the litany of upheaval that is Russia’s burden prevented the exploitation of such an asset. Engineers discovered the Bovanenkovo field in 1971, three years after the death of Vadim Bovanenko, a geophysicist who had served as the head of Yamal Oil and Gas Exploration, an arm of the gas ministry. But it was only under Putin that workers were finally able to begin building infrastructure at Bovanenkovo in 2007. The date for initial gas delivery was postponed on several occasions, causing observers to wonder if the project would ever be realized. The start-up date was then pushed up to July 2012, sparking a new round of questions. Did Gazprom foresee a spike in European demand? Were Nadym’s gas fields in far worse shape than anyone had imagined? It’s hard to know why Gazprom behaves the way it does. Company executives aren’t known for sharing information. Several Gazprom officials replied politely to my interview requests but provided little revelatory insight. Sharing profits, however, is part of being a national champion. In the last year, Gazprom has slashed investments and more than doubled dividends, increasing the yield of the Russian stock market and padding state coffers. As Putin prepares to reassume the presidency for what could be another 12 years, his ruling United Russia party increasingly turns to Gazprom, less to wield power abroad than to shore up support at home. In October, Gazprom absorbed a selective doubling of the tax levied for the extraction of mineral resources, which will result in $10 billion of lost profits this year. This money will help balance the Russian budget and pay for popular social programs. **Gazprom is a central pillar of Putin's power.** But globally, the gas industry is changing, moving on to new technologies and new sources of natural gas. If Russia is unable to keep up, it will be left behind once again. That would be dangerous for the wounded bear, currently struggling with low morale, capital flight, and demographic collapse. The potential conflict between China and Russia over the mineral wealth of Eastern Siberia looms larger in the distance with every weakening that Moscow experiences.

**Nuclear war**

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

**2NC – XT: No Russian Arctic Threat**

**Their impact is all hype --- no Arctic and no Russian aggression**

**The Economist 13** (The Economist, “The Roar of Ice Cracking,” February 2, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571127-will-asian-countries-consolidate-or-disrupt-arctic-stability-roar-ice-cracking?fsrc=rss%7Cint)

Yet notions of a Wild North are hugely exaggerated. Haakon Bruun Hanssen, a Norwegian admiral, says the Arctic is “probably the most stable area in the world”. All countries play by the rules. **Legal norms are well established.** The United Nations Law of the Sea, for example, has put almost all unprospected oil, gas and minerals under national jurisdictions, narrowing the scope for dispute (America has not ratified it, but says it will abide by it). **Despite** some swagger and **stunts in past years, Russia is playing a constructive role,** especially on shipping: it wants the “northern route” to be a success. In 2010 it settled a territorial dispute with Norway. The Arctic Council epitomises this spirit of increasing co-operation. It began in 1996, mainly as a research project and talking-shop, but is fast becoming a decision-making body. In 2011 its members signed their first treaty, on joint search-and-rescue missions, which are too expensive for countries to undertake on their own. A second treaty—on cleaning up oil spills—will be signed shortly. On January 21st the members set up the first permanent secretariat, at Tromso in northern Norway.

**2NC – XT: No Arctic War**

**No Arctic war --- peaceful resolution and institutions encourage cooperation rather than conflict**

**Walter 12** (Engisn Joseph P. Walter, US Navy, US Naval Academy, “On Thin Ice: U.S. Capability Lacking in the Race for the Arctic,” GCaptain, August 8, 2012, http://gcaptain.com/thin-ice-u-s-capability-lacking/)

Fortunately, competition in the Arctic has encouraged cooperation among Arctic nations and conflict between the A5 nations is unlikely. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States are NATO allies, and Russia no longer expects to fight a war against NATO. This is a marked change from how the Arctic was viewed through strategic lenses during the Cold War. All of the Arctic nations are committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and the Arctic Council and UNCLOS provide the mechanisms by which differences can be settled through diplomacy.

**1NC – Methane Frontline (1/3)**

**Methane and tsunamis are inevitable because of warming --- regulations can’t solve**

**Moeller 12** (Holly Moeller, Ecology and Evolution, Stanford University, Chemistry and Biology, Rutgers University, “Blowing Hot Air: The Methane Hydrate Delusion,” Science 2.0, May 10, 2012, http://www.science20.com/seeing\_green/blowing\_hot\_air\_methane\_hydrate\_delusion-89822)

As an added bonus, methane extraction traps CO2. The latest technology pumps the most notorious greenhouse gas into the ground, where it replaces methane in the ice matrix. The displaced methane is then pumped to the surface and – in the DoE’s (and, undoubtedly, ConocoPhillips’) vision – down pipelines to heat homes in the Lower 48. Plus, argue supporters, climate change projections indicate that rising temperatures may release much of that methane anyway. If the permafrost thaws or the ocean warms, vast tracts of icy clathrates could melt, outgassing methane – which has 20 times the warming potential of CO2 – into the atmosphere, further accelerating climate change. This is one of the most feared positive feedback loops known to climate scientists.

**There’s no impact --- international scientific consensus indicates methane bursts won’t cause extinction**

**Page, 12** — B.A. in engineering from Cambridge University, former correspondent for Prospect magazine, and former Royal Navy officer (Lewis, “DON'T PANIC: Arctic methane emissions have been going on for ages”, The Register, 9/25/12, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/25/dont\_panic\_arctic\_mission\_finds\_methane\_emissions\_old\_news/)

Scientists returning from a seaborne expedition to the Arctic say that the ongoing panic in some quarters regarding runaway emissions of methane from the chilly polar seas - and associated imminent global-warming disaster - appears to be unjustified. For those unacquainted with this particular panic, the idea is that rising Arctic sea temperatures caused by humans in recent times are causing methane locked up as hydrates on the chilly seabed to be emitted into the atmosphere as gas – as methane hydrates are only stable at very low temperatures and high pressures. Methane, as any fule kno, is a hugely more powerful greenhouse gas than CO2, so this would cause more warming which would then release more methane from the seabed until once again planet Earth becomes a baking lifeless hell. As ever with scenarios leading to baking lifeless hell, the hippies\* at Greenpeace and similar activists are very keen on this idea. Various scientists have detected methane emissions from Arctic waters by various means, too. Anyway, this seemed worth looking into, so an international team of scientists set out this past summer aboard a German research vessel for the freezing seas off Spitzbergen, to look into Arctic seabed methane emissions and try to figure out what might be causing them. In short, whatever it is, it doesn't seem to be anything human beings have done. **The Arctic** seems to **have been emitting methane for a very long time**. The Helmholtz-Zentrum für Ozeanforschung (Centre for Ocean Research, aka GEOMAR) in Kiel tells us so, in an announcement revealing the "surprising result" that methane emissions from the Arctic seabed are "no new thing".

**1NC – Methane Frontline (2/3)**

**The plan causes noise interference which disrupts Arctic species**

**AMSA 09** (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, “Environmental Considerations and Impacts,” US Arctic Research Commission, 2009, http://www.arctic.gov/publications/AMSA/environmental.pdf)

Icebreakers and Disturbance All icebreaking operations, whether by independent commercial icebreaking ships or government icebreaker escort, can potentially cause disturbances to wildlife and local communities both through the noise they create and the trail of open water left astern. Compared to other vessels, icebreakers produce louder and more variable sounds. This is because of the episodic nature of the icebreaking, which involves ramming forward into the ice and then reversing to begin the process again. Some icebreakers are equipped with bubbler systems to aid in clearing ice from the vessel’s path and these can create an additional noise source. Noise from bubbler systems and propeller cavitation associated with icebreaker movement has the potential to **alter animal behavior** and to **disrupt** the **hearing** ability **and vocalization of marine mammals.**

**This uniquely collapses the Arctic ecosystem and critical species**

**AMSA 09** (Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, “Environmental Considerations and Impacts,” US Arctic Research Commission, 2009, http://www.arctic.gov/publications/AMSA/environmental.pdf)

For most marine vertebrates, making, hearing and processing sounds serve critical biological functions. These include communication, foraging, reproduction, navigation and predator-avoidance. In particular, toothed whales have developed sophisticated biosonar capabilities to help them feed and navigate; large baleen whales have developed long-range communication systems using sound in reproductive and social interaction; and pinnipeds (i.e., seals, sea lion, walrus, etc.) make and listen to sounds for critical communicative functions. Many fish utilize sounds in mating and other social interactions. The **introduction of noise** into the environment **can adversely affect** the ability of **marine life** to use sound in various ways **and** can **induce** alteration of behavior; **reduction of communication** ranges for social interactions, foraging, and predator avoidance; **and** temporary or **permanent compromise of** the auditory or other **systems.** In extreme cases, too much **noise can lead to** habitat avoidance or even **death.** Noise can also affect physiological functions and cause more generalized stress. Determining when impacts of noise exposure from any source become biologically significant to a species is often difficult. Nevertheless, this is an area where additional research is ongoing and needed in key areas.

**1NC – Methane Frontline (3/3)**

**Extinction**

**WWF 10** (World Wildlife Fund, “Drilling for Oil in the Arctic: Too Soon, Too Risky,” Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC, December 1, 2010, http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/393/files/original/Drilling\_for\_Oil\_in\_the\_Arctic\_Too\_Soon\_Too\_Risky.pdf?1345753131)

Planetary Keystone The Arctic and the subarctic regions surrounding it are important for many reasons. One is their enormous biological diversity: a kaleidoscopic array of land and seascapes supporting millions of migrating birds and charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals and sea otters. Economics is another: Alaskan fisheries are among the richest in the world. Their $2.2 billion in annual catch fills the frozen food sections and seafood counters of supermarkets across the nation. However, there is another reason why the Arctic is not just important, but among the most important places on the face of the Earth. A keystone species is generally defined as one whose removal from an ecosystem triggers a cascade of changes affecting other species in that ecosystem. The same can be said of the Arctic in relation to the rest of the world. With feedback mechanisms that affect ocean currents and influence climate patterns, the Arctic functions like a global thermostat. Heat balance, ocean circulation patterns and the carbon cycle are all related to its regulatory and carbon storage functions. Disrupt these functions and we effect far-reaching changes in the conditions **under which life has existed** on Earth for thousands of years. In the context of climate change, **the Arctic is a keystone ecosystem for the entire planet.**

**2NC – AT: Add-On – AT: Shipbuilding (1/2)**

**Shipbuilding is resilient**

**Daily Press, 12** [Virginia Daily Press News, <http://www.dailypress.com/business/peninsula-businesses/dp-nws-shipyard-sequestration-20120625,0,7092747.story>]

Shipbuilding has several years worth of work under contract, a buffer against the deep defense cuts that some defense contractors are bracing for in January, according to a company executive. But in the long run sequestration would take a toll on the yard. "I'm not in a hair-on-fire scenario today," shipyard president Matt Mulherin said in an interview with the Daily Press. [Daily Press Eyewitness: Submit photos and videos from your mobile device. Your picture could be featured on Page 2 of the Daily Press.](http://dailypress.com/eyewitness?track=online-inline)  "I have about five years of pretty steady work until the impacts of sequestration manifest themselves," he said.

**No offense --- decline solves its own impact --- no escalation**

**Nordstrom 2k** – department of political science at Penn State (D Scott Bennett and Timothy Nordstrom, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44:1, “Foreign policy substitutability and internal economic problems in enduring rivalries”, ProQuest, WEA)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

**2NC – AT: Add-On – AT: Shipbuilding (2/2)**

**No conflict – no causation and cooperation solves**

**Barnett 09** – senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

# \*\*\*SPENDING DA\*\*\*

**1NC – Spending DA (1/4)**

**Economy recovering under shift towards fiscal conservatism – Continued austerity key to maintain growth – not too late for spending to tank progress**

**Moore 5/15**

{Stephen, Chief Economist for Heritage, syndicated journalist and editor for newspapers like the Wall Street Journal, M.A. economics (George Mason), “The Budget Deficit is Falling,” 2014, [http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/5/the-budget-deficit-is-falling](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/5/the-budget-deficit-is-falling#THUR)}

The Congressional Budget Office reported this week that the budget deficit is falling rapidly from its trillion-dollar-plus Rocky Mountain highs during Barack Obama’s first term. I estimate that the deficit will likely be $400 billion or lower this fiscal year, and that is a near $1 trillion improvement over four years. As a share of GDP, federal deficits have tumbled from nearly 10 percent to just under 3 percent. The question is, Why the progress? The main factor has been falling government spending, which is a positive force for the economy. And the reason government spending is falling is that the budget caps and the automatic cuts called “sequester,” which were part of the under-appreciated 2011 budget deal between Republicans in Congress and President Obama, are working to force down outlays on non-entitlement programs. According to the Congressional Budget Office, annual outlays peaked at $3.598 trillion in fiscal 2011. At the beginning of 2011, the CBO projected that the total outlays would be just shy of $4 trillion by 2014. But the Tea Party movement revolted in the 2010 midterm elections and helped sweep into the House scores of fiscally conservative Republicans, and the GOP seized the majority. This pivotal election radically changed the direction of our fiscal deterioration. Instead of staying on a path to $4 trillion in federal spending, outlays dropped to $3.546 trillion in fiscal 2012, and to $3.45 trillion in fiscal 2013. This was a 4 percent decline in spending in nominal terms and closer to 7 percent in real terms. This year, expenditures will rise less than 2 percent. The bad news is that expenditures are expected to jump a whopping 7 percent and will be closer to nearly $3.87 trillion, thanks to a bad budget deal last year that suspended the spending caps for a year and raised the ceilings to accommodate a bipartisan resumption of spending. But even with this setback, the path of spending has improved remarkably from Obama’s reckless first term. The sequester saved about $80 billion in 2013. Those across-the-board cuts in defense programs were tough, but the domestic cuts were easily absorbed, notwithstanding the moans from government officials and attempts by the White House to scare the public. (Remember the shutdown of the air-traffic-control towers and the threats to food-safety inspections?) Yes, the red ink is still flowing way too fast, and the more than $6 trillion added to the debt in Mr. Obama’s first five years in office shatters all records for fiscal deviancy. Mr. Obama will clearly go down in history as the most financially irresponsible president in history, and it’s ironic that Democrats used to say that of George W. Bush, who borrowed at half of the Obama pace. The budget numbers are sugarcoated a bit by the accounting gimmick of the payback bailout money doled out to housing giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and banks’ being counted as “negative outlays.” Still, discretionary spending is way down, thanks to caps. From a peak of 9.4 percent of GDP in fiscal 2010, these outlays collapsed to 7.6 percent last year and may slide to under 7 percent in Mr. Obama’s final year in office. The caps and sequester have squeezed green-energy programs, the Legal Services Corporation, federal land-acquisition programs, and the EPA. Liberals have come to hate sequester because it pinches the programs they care so much about. The worry is Republicans may flinch and suspend the hard-fought caps yet again next year so they can continue spending. Already some Republican appropriators are joining with Democrats to call for suspending the budget reforms that ended earmarks for Bridge to Nowhere–type projects. And Mr. Obama would love another $100 billion spending spree on infrastructure and other public-works projects to fund his union pals. On the revenue side, receipts are up because growth has been slow but steady and the stock market is on a tear. Revenues are up more than 8 percent this year, but the pace of tax collections could and should be double that if we achieve 4 percent growth. With 4 percent growth, enforcement of spending caps, and even minimal entitlement reforms, the budget could be balanced by 2017.

**1NC – Spending DA (2/4)**

**Plan is a gigantic expenditure – U.S. injection balloons costs because allies are seeking new financiers**

**Yan 14**

{Holly, “With No Hard Evidence, Hunt for MH370 to get Deeper, Broader and Pricier,” CNN World, 5/7, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/07/world/asia/malaysia-missing-plane/}

After 61 days and no tangible evidence, officials from Malaysia, China and Australia will hunker down Wednesday to plot the next steps in the hunt for MH370. Their tasks: Review all the information gathered so far and figure out what tools will be needed in the next stage of the search -- a deeper, broader probe of the Indian Ocean. Two things are certain: This new phase will be expensive and even more difficult. Australia estimates it will cost $60 million, with the breakdown of who's going to pay for what yet to be determined. Search for Flight 370 to expand New phase launched in hunt for missing plane Is the MH370 search back at 'square one'? Photos: The search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 Photos: The search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 But perhaps the greatest challenge now will be scouring unchartered territory. A key element of the new phase will be a detailed mapping of the ocean floor. "We know that the water is very deep," Australian Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss said this week. "And for the next stage involving sonar and other autonomous vehicles, potentially at very great depths, we need to have an understanding of the ocean floor to be able to undertake that kind of search effectively and safely." The next phase will focus on 60,000 square kilometers of the ocean floor, a process that could take six to eight months. Truss said he's not sure how deep the ocean is in the expanded search area because "it's never been mapped." Search enters new, 'more difficult' $60 million phase The tools Searchers plan to use more highly specialized technology, including towed side-scan sonar and more autonomous underwater vehicles. Truss said most of the new equipment will likely have to come from the private sector. "You can count on one hand the number of devices that can do this work, when you talk about towed sonar devices," said Angus Houston, chief coordinator of the joint search effort, said Monday. Truss said he's optimistic that the new devices will be in the water within a month or two. In the meantime, he said, the Bluefin-21 drone will continue underwater missions. The Bluefin-21 has already scanned 400 square kilometers of the Indian Ocean floor, but with no luck. The United States has authorized the use of the drone for another month. The cost? About $40,000 a day. While the Bluefin-21 provides greater resolution than deep-towed sonar devices, the drone can only go about 4.5 kilometers deep.

**1NC – Spending DA (3/4)**

**High debt and fast spending crushes the economy – tanks growth**

**Boccia 13**

{Romina, Research Coordinator in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, “How the United States’ High Debt Will Weaken the Economy and Hurt Americans,” Backgrounder #2768 on Budget and Spending, 2/12, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/how-the-united-states-high-debt-will-weaken-the-economy-and-hurt-americans>}

The authors’ results should serve as a sobering wake-up call for policymakers. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff discovered that the average growth rate in countries experiencing public debt overhang is 1.2 percentage points lower than in periods with debt below 90 percent of GDP.[13] These public debt overhang episodes last an average of about 23 years. Thus, the cumulative effect of lower growth by one percentage point or more means that national income at the end of the period would be lower by roughly one-fourth. The growth rate of countries with exceptionally high levels of debt—more than 120 percent of the economy—drops even lower, by an average of 2.3 percentage points, which is roughly two-thirds. These figures indicate just how dire the U.S. situation could become: According to the Congressional Budget Office baseline economic forecast, U.S. GDP is projected to be $25.9 trillion in fiscal year 2023. U.S. publicly held debt is projected to reach nearly 90 percent of GDP that year. Assuming a 2.2 percent growth rate over 23 years, U.S. GDP would reach $42.7 trillion in 2046 if there was no impact from the debt overhang. Applying the crude assumption that GDP would be reduced by 1.2 percentage points, in each year of the assumed 23-year debt overhang period, U.S. GDP growth would be slashed by more than half to a mere 1 percent. This would reduce U.S. GDP by more than $10 trillion, to only $32.6 trillion in 2046. The cumulative effect from the debt overhang would result in a level of GDP lower by nearly one-quarter at the end of the period.

**1NC – Spending DA (4/4)**

**Economic decline causes global war**

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods ofeconomic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and theoften bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such aseconomic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power(see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,increasing the risk of miscalculation **(**Feaver, 1995). Alternatively,even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflictas a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'**future expectation of trade' is asignificant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**.** He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,if the expectations of future trade decline**,** particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources,the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises couldpotentially be thetriggerfor decreased trade expectationseither on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess(2002)find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly duringperiods ofeconomic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, thepresence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other**. (**Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)Economic decline hasalsobeen linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism **(**Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government."Diversionary theory" suggests **that,** when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sittinggovernments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'effect**.** Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest thatthe tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic statesthan autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office dueto lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing thatperiods of weak economic performance in the UnitedStates, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

**2NC – Econ High Now (1/4)**

**Econ booming – treasury drops, employment gains, rising payrolls, stable credit rating, governmental security yields, average wages, participation rate**

**Kruger 6/6**

{Daniel, syndicated economics reporter, “Treasuries in Biggest Weekly Drop Since March after Jobs,” Bloomberg, 2014, [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/treasuries-advance-as-u-s-employment-growth-slows-in-may.html](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-06/treasuries-advance-as-u-s-employment-growth-slows-in-may.html#THUR)}

Treasuries posted the biggest weekly drop in three months as employment gains in May pushed U.S. payrolls past their pre-recession peak and the jobless rate held at an almost six-year low. The U.S.’s AA+ credit rating was affirmed by Standard & Poor’s, which cited the resiliency and diversity of the economy, almost three years after downgrading the nation for the first time. Yields on government securities in the euro-area fell to record lows a day after the European Central Bank cut interest rates, sparking a global rush for bonds. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen said May 7 labor-market conditions “are still far from satisfactory.” “The overall economy from a job perspective is finally trending in a good way,” Jason Rogan, managing director of U.S. government trading at Guggenheim Securities, a New York-based brokerage for institutional investors. “From the Fed’s perspective, you’re starting to see very good job growth.” Benchmark 10-year yields rose less than one basis point to 2.59 percent as of 5 p.m. in New York after earlier dropping five basis points, based on Bloomberg Bond Trader prices. The price of the 2.5 percent security due in May 2024 dropped 1/32, or 31 cents per $1,000 face value, to 99 7/32. Yields on the securities climbed 11 basis points this week, the most since the five days ended March 7, and rose as high as 2.64 percent yesterday, the most since May 13. Two-year note yields added two basis points to 0.40 percent, the highest level since May 13, gained three basis points this week for a second five-day gain. Credit Rating New York-based S&P said today in a statement that there is a less than one-in-three probability that the U.S.’s credit ranking will change in the next two years. The outlook on the rating is stable. Since the August 2011 downgrade from AAA, record budget deficits have shrunk, economic growth accelerated, the dollar rallied, stocks climbed to all-time highs and Treasuries strengthened their hold as the world’s preferred haven from turmoil. Still, S&P said a polarized policy-making environment and high general government debt and budget deficits constrain the ratings. “After the rating of the U.S. came under pressure because of the debt ceiling and government shut down, we actually saw a better cost of funding for the government,” David Coard, head of fixed-income trading in New York at Williams Capital Group, a brokerage for institutional investors. “We’re still the safe haven everybody seeks when there’s uncertainty in the world. I don’t think that’s changed.” ‘Continued Growth’ Two-year notes dropped as employers added 217,000 jobs last month, according to the Labor Department, after a revised 282,000 increase in April. That compared with the median forecast in a Bloomberg survey for a 215,000 employment increase. Estimates ranged from increases of 110,000 to 350,000. The unemployment rate was unchanged at 6.3 percent. May marked the fourth-straight month payrolls have increased at least 200,000, the first time that’s happened since September 1999 to January 2000. “We’ve seen continued growth within the labor market,” Sean Simko, who oversees $8 billion at SEI Investments Co. in Oaks, Pennsylvania. “The sub-components continue to improve, but not to an extent that’s enough to shake up the bond market.” The participation rate, which indicates the share of working-age people in the labor force, held at 62.8 percent, matching the lowest since March 1978. Average hourly earnings rose 0.2 percent to $24.38 in May from $24.33 the prior month. They were up 2.1 percent over the past 12 months.

**2NC – Econ High Now (2/4)**

**Econ improving – Fed study**

**Crutsinger 6/4**

{Martin, syndicated economics columnist, “Fed Survey: US Economy is Improving across the Country, Helped by Warmer Weather,” US News and World Report, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2014/06/04/fed-survey-economy-showing-improvement-across-us}

A Federal Reserve survey shows the U.S. economy strengthening over the past two months in areas from manufacturing and construction to retail sales and bank lending. Seven of the Fed's 12 regions — Boston, New York, Richmond, Chicago, Minneapolis, Dallas and San Francisco — reported "moderate" growth during the early spring, while the remaining five described growth as "modest," according to the Beige Book survey released Wednesday. Retail sales were reviving, helped by pent-up demand for new cars after the harsh winter, the survey found. Manufacturing was expanding in all regions, along with lending. One weakness was home sales, held back in large part by a tight supply of available homes. The Beige Book is based on anecdotal reports from businesses and will be considered along with other data when Fed policymakers meet June 17-18. Nothing in the report is likely to alter the widespread view that the Fed thinks the economy is reviving after a winter slowdown. "The picture painted by the collective anecdotes in today's Beige Book may not illustrate robust growth, but it suggests the economy is at least moving in the right direction," said Dana Saporta, an economist at Credit Suisse. Jennifer Lee, senior economist at BMO Capital Markets, said it marked the 24th time out of 28 reports going back to early 2011 that the Fed has used "modest," ''moderate" or often both words to describe the economy. Economists generally believe the Fed in June will pare its pace of monthly bond purchases by another $10 billion and pledge to keep its key short-term interest rate at a record low near zero for a "considerable" period after its bond purchases end. Beginning in December, the Fed has been reducing its bond purchases, which were designed to keep long-term rates low to spur spending and economic growth. The purchases, now at $45 billion a month, will likely be phased out entirely this fall. The Beige Book suggests that despite the spring rebound in activity, inflation remains contained and wage pressures subdued. Low inflation has given the Fed the leeway to keep interest rates exceptionally low to try to boost growth and lower unemployment. The Fed survey said the job market in much of the country has improved since its last Beige Book. Cleveland and Chicago reported increased demand for temporary workers. Several districts reported that employers were having trouble finding skilled workers. Manufacturing activity expanded in all 12 districts, with robust gains reported in the Boston, New York, Atlanta and Kansas City districts. Growth was especially strong at factories connected to the auto, aerospace and metal industries. Two-thirds of the Fed's districts reported rising demand for bank loans. Particular strength was seen in New York and San Francisco. Demand for auto loans was strong, coinciding with reports of robust new-car sales. But the Boston, New York and Kansas City regions reported that home sales were being held back by low or dwindling supplies of available homes. Other regions also described availability as low. Fed Chair Janet Yellen has said that the Fed is monitoring conditions for any signs that the housing recovery is faltering.

**2NC – Econ High Now (3/4)**

**Econ rising – demand for HSWs with increased consumer spending – reject their evidence, it’s a snapshot of “cabin fever”**

**Portlock 6/4**

{Sarah, US Economy reporter for the WSJ and Dow Jones Newswire, “Demand for Skilled Workers Beginning to Percolate, Fed Survey Says,” Wall Street Journal, 2014, [http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-economic-activity-expanded-in-all-regions-fed-survey-says-1401904831](http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-economic-activity-expanded-in-all-regions-fed-survey-says-1401904831#THUR)}

Rising demand for skilled workers could push up salaries across more sectors of the U.S. economy, according to the Federal Reserve's latest survey of regional economic conditions. Hiring activity in general was "steady to stronger" across the U.S. from April through late May, according to the Fed's "beige book," based on anecdotal information about economic activity throughout the central bank's 12 districts. Overall, the report pointed to an economy that was improving from its weak performance earlier this year, boosted largely by stronger consumer spending and job growth. The report comes two weeks ahead of the Fed's June 17-18 policy meeting. Companies in several regions reported difficulty filling jobs for highly skilled and upper-management positions. Firms in the Philadelphia area reported some new hiring had occurred, but they "remain cautious," the report said. The Labor Department will release its monthly employment report on Friday. Economists surveyed by The Wall Street Journal expect employers added 210,000 jobs in May and the unemployment rate edged up to 6.4%. Despite years of steady job gains, overall wage growth remains relatively subdued across the U.S. But signs of rising wage pressures are emerging in certain high-skilled fields. The Fed banks in Minneapolis, Kansas City and San Francisco reported pay increases were concentrated among workers in information technology, engineering, professional services and some skilled trades, according to the report. Outside of those jobs, few workers are seeing salary bumps. In the Cleveland region, "skilled trade workers are very difficult to find and are driving up wages," according to the report. In the Dallas region, a staffing firm said employers are paying higher relocation bonuses for talented employees, "particularly engineers." A New York-area employment agency said many candidates are getting multiple offers and that could put upward pressure on salaries going forward. A Maryland staffing agency echoed that sentiment. The report highlighted steady improvement across other parts of the economy after a harsh winter. More than half the Fed districts pointed to strong auto sales, with other regions seeing "steady" sales. In the Philadelphia region, dealers reported "phenomenal" sales in April and have a bullish outlook for the rest of the year. The long winter may have also contributed more to "cabin fever," the report noted, and driven people outdoors this spring. Tourism along the East Coast was strong, particularly in Boston for its marathon in April and on North Carolina's Outer Banks for Memorial Day. Still, the prolonged snowy weather also helped drive traffic to ski resorts, several regions said.

**2NC – Econ High Now (4/4)**

**Econ up – all indicators – stock market, manufacturing rebound, consumer confidence, financial strength**

**Columbus Dispatch 5/28**

{“With Economic Indicators Up, Market Follows Suit,” 2014, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2014/05/28/with-economic-indicators-up-market-follows-suit.html}

NEW YORK (AP) — More promising signs that the economy is strengthening after its winter slowdown pushed stocks higher yesterday. The Standard & Poor’s 500 index rose for the fourth straight day and ended at another all-time high. It closed above 1,900 for the first time on Friday. Small-company stocks and other riskier parts of the market, such as Internet and biotechnology companies, also gained after being beaten down over the past few months. The government reported that orders to U.S. factories for long-lasting manufactured goods rose unexpectedly in April, powered by a surge in demand for military aircraft. Also, the Conference Board’s consumer-confidence index rose in May to the second-highest level since January 2008, just after the start of the Great Recession. The Standard & Poor’s 500 index rose 11.38 points, to 1,911.91. The Dow Jones industrial average gained 69.23 points, to 16,675.50. The Nasdaq composite climbed 51.26 points, or 1.2 percent, to 4,237.07. Nine of the 10 sectors that make up the S&P 500 rose, led by financial and industrial companies.

**2NC – Econ High Now – AT: Oil Prices**

**Rising oil prices prove econ up – show growing demand**

**Reuters 6/7**

{“US Oil Lifted by Solid Jobs Report,” Business Recorder, 2014, [http://www.brecorder.com/fuel-a-energy/193/1190287/](http://www.brecorder.com/fuel-a-energy/193/1190287/#THUR)}

US crude oil futures inched higher on Friday after a solid jobs report in the United States pointed to economic strength and growing oil demand in the world's largest oil consumer. A US Labour Department report showed a fourth straight month of job gains in May, bringing US employment back to pre-recession levels and confirming that the economy has snapped back from a winter lull. "There was a little bit of a rally after the report came out and the market was stronger this morning. The market is now finding a balance where it's comfortable," said Joseph Posillico, senior vice president of energy derivatives at Jefferies Bache in New York. US crude gained 18 cents to settle at $102.66 a barrel after hitting a high of $103.07 shortly after the release of the jobs report. Brent crude oil futures, however, lost 18 cents to settle at $108.61 a barrel.

**2NC – Econ High Now – AT: Housing**

**Housing sufficiently improving – momentum goes neg**

**Soni 5/27**

{Phalguni, retail analyst, CFA, degree in Commerce (University of Calcutta), “Why the Housing Market Rebound Dominates Economic Data Releases,” Market Realist, 2014, http://marketrealist.com/2014/05/why-housing-market-rebound-dominates-economic-data-releases/}

Consumption, housing, and manufacturing indicators dominated the economic releases last week. Although the prognosis for economic growth was mixed, the S&P 500 Index (SPY) reached an all-time record high of 1900.53 on Friday, based on the favorable housing market data. Part 1.1 Enlarge Graph Housing market upswing Major housing market releases last week, included existing and new home sales data for the month of April, which released on Thursday and Friday, respectively. Both existing and new home sales were up in April—suggesting the housing market might be coming out of hibernation after an unusually severe winter. We’ve covered the key takeaways of these housing releases in the fourth and fifth articles of this series. Positive sales trends in the housing market are likely to benefit homebuilders like D.R. Horton (DHI) and Toll Brothers (TOL). Investors can invest in DHI and TOL through the iShares U.S. Home Construction ETF (ITB), which tracks the performance of the Dow Jones U.S. Select Home Construction Index. ITB invests in homebuilders and provides a good representation of the home construction sector of the U.S. equity market.

**Housing improving – prefer our future-predictive evidence to their snapshots**

**Chokshi 6/2**

{Niraj, freelance economics and public policy columnist, “Just 10 States have a ‘Stable’ Housing Market, Report Finds,” Washington Post, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/06/02/just-10-states-have-a-stable-housing-market-report-finds/}

The national housing market is also weak overall, according to the assessment by the mortgage giant Freddie Mac, but there are positive signs, too. Thirteen states and 20 metro areas had housing markets in March that were trending positively over a three-month period, according to the report from the quasi-governmental firm. The firm assesses the housing markets using its Multi-Indicator Market Index — MiMi — score, which is based on four indicators. Freddie Mac considers home purchase applications; home purchasing power based on house prices, mortgage rates and household income; the rate of on-time mortgage payments in each market; and local employment. The score is used to compare each market’s current conditions to its long-term stable range. The overall picture of the market is neither grim nor prosperous, Freddie Mac Chief Economist Frank Nothaft said in a statement. “Less than half of the housing markets MiMi covers are showing an improving trend, whereas at this same time last year more than 90 percent of these same markets were headed in the right direction,” he said. “We’re hopeful that many of these markets that have stalled will start moving again now that mortgage rates have eased over the past month and the spring home buying season is upon us.” The 10 states on stable ground as of March are North Dakota, Wyoming, Louisiana, Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, West Virginia, Texas, Vermont and South Dakota. Three four stable metro housing markets — San Antonio, Austin and Houston — are in Texas. The fourth is New Orleans. Washington, D.C., is also in its long-term stable range.

**2NC – Econ High Now – AT: Unemployment**

**Unemployment shrinking – all jobs from recession recouped and payrolls up**

**Lazarowitz 6/7**

{Elizabeth, Business news editor and columnist, “U.S. Economy Recoups Jobs Lost during the Recession after Five Years,” NY Daily News, 2014, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/u-s-economy-recoups-jobs-lost-recession-article-1.1820636#ixzz33yusWPKA>}

After a five-year struggle, the U.S. economy has finally recouped the jobs lost during the recession.

Hiring grew steadily in May, with employers bringing on 217,000 workers, the Labor Department reported on Friday. The gain hoisted total U.S. employment past the previous peak reached in 2008, when the worst recession since the Great Depression was just beginning. The unemployment rate remained pinned at a near-six-year low of 6.3% in May as more jobless Americans began looking for work again, Friday’s report also showed. While April’s job increase was slightly smaller than previously thought, payrolls have expanded by more than 200,000 jobs for four months in a row. That’s the first time that has happened since 2000.

**2NC – AT: Debt High Now**

**Debt declining but crisis still possible – three reasons**

**Stone 5/9**

{Chad, Chief Economist at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities specializing in the economic analysis of budget and policy issues, former executive director of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, former economics professor (Swarthmore), Ph.D. in economics (Yale), “The Budget Picture Is Getting Better. Seriously.” US News and World Report, 2014, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2014/05/09/4-takeaways-from-the-improving-budget-deficit-and-debt-outlook}

My colleagues at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities have issued updated long-term budget projections that might change how you think about government spending, deficits and debt – because they show that while policymakers still have work to do, the long-term budget outlook has improved significantly in recent years. Specifically, the center’s projections show that under current budget policies: 1. Deficits are not spiraling out of control. Federal deficits (the annual gap between spending and revenues) have fallen sharply in relation to the economy since peaking at 10 percent of gross domestic product in 2009, at the height of the Great Recession. The center projects – based on data and projections from the Congressional Budget Office and the latest reports of the Social Security and Medicare Trustees – that deficits will be below 3 percent of GDP through 2018 but begin rising thereafter. Even in 2040, however, the deficit will be half its 2009 level. 2. No debt crisis looms. Federal debt (total borrowing to finance all past deficits minus surpluses) will be virtually flat as a share of GDP for the next several years and rise only slowly thereafter. Debt in 2040 will about equal that year’s GDP – which is less than half of what the center projected for the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2010 (see Figure 1). 3. Spending is not out of control. The Great Recession and the measures taken to address it produced a sharp spike in spending in 2009. Since then, however, spending has fallen sharply in relation to the economy (see Figure 2). Going forward, spending will rise from 20.4 percent of GDP in 2014 to 24.1 percent of GDP in 2040. About four-fifths of that increase, however, will stem from interest payments on the public debt, not from programs that pay benefits to ordinary Americans and perform government functions. As Figure 2 shows, “primary” (non-interest) spending rises very little between now and 2040, when it’s just 1 percentage point of GDP higher than revenues.

**2NC – AT: Ocean Exploration Spending Now**

**No spending on exploration now, none coming**

**Helvarg 14**

{David, founder and president of the Blue Frontier Campaign, bachelor's degree in history (Goddard College), “It's No Surprise we Can't Find Flight 370,” LA Times, 4/1, [http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-helvarg-flight-370-ocean-exploration-20140401-story.html](http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-helvarg-flight-370-ocean-exploration-20140401-story.html#THUR)}

The 29% of our planet that is land is inhabited by more than 7 billion of our species, at least a few of whom would have reported a crash or hijacked aircraft. By contrast, the ocean that covers 71% of the Earth's surface and 97% of its living habitat rarely has more than a few million people on or about its surface. These include commercial mariners, fishermen, cruise ship passengers, sailors aboard the world's military fleets, offshore oil and gas workers, research scientists and the odd sea gypsy. One reason we've not colonized the ocean, as science-fiction writers (and at least one senator, the late Claiborne Pell, of Rhode Island) once imagined, is that the ocean is a far rougher and more difficult wilderness than any encountered by terrestrial explorers, or even astronauts traveling in the consistent vacuum of space, with its occasional meteorites and space junk to avoid. The sea pummels us with an unbreathable and corrosive liquid medium; altered visual and acoustic characteristics; changing temperatures, depths and pressures; upwellings; tides; currents; gyres; obscuring marine layers; sudden storms and giant rouge waves; and life forms than can sting, poison or bite. Even accounting for more than 70 years of classified military hydrographic surveys, we've still mapped less than 10% of the ocean with the resolution we've used to map all of the moon, Mars or even several moons of Jupiter. Obviously, our ability to search for a missing aircraft at sea has come a long way since Amelia Earhart disappeared while trying to cross the Pacific in 1937. But the patched-together satellite data and electronic-signals processing that has so far pointed the Flight 370 search to an area 1,800 miles from Perth, Australia, is no more than a crisis-mode, jury-rigged, extraordinary effort. Consider this: If you're a drug smuggler and you enter U.S. coastal waters in a speedboat at night, and then go dead in the water during the day, with a blue tarp thrown over your vessel, odds are that you'll successfully deliver your contraband. Our investment in ocean exploration, monitoring and law enforcement efforts is at a 20-year low in the United States and not much better elsewhere. Our chances of quickly finding the missing Malaysian flight would have been improved if we had invested more money and effort on our planet's last great commons, with observational tools such as in-situ labs and wired benthic observatories, remote and autonomous underwater vehicles and gliders, forward-looking infrared cameras and multi-beam shipboard, airborne (and space-deployed) scanning systems, and other smart but woefully underfunded sea technologies. The fact remains that while hundreds of people have gone into space, only three humans have ventured to the lowest point on our planet seven miles down in the Mariana Trench, and the latest of these — filmmaker explorer engineer James Cameron — had to self-fund his 2012 mission. Meanwhile, when it comes to exploring the cosmos, NASA — even in its diminished state — outspends NOAA's ocean exploration program roughly 1,000 to 1. Yet when we get to Mars, the first thing we seek as proof of life is water. Meanwhile, we have a whole water planet that remains a challenge we've once again discovered to be far greater than we thought. Whatever the final resolution of the Flight 370 tragedy, that challenge is bound to become greater as our food and coastal security, marine transportation systems, even our basic ecosystem processes such as the oxygen generated by ocean plankton, are increasingly stressed through overfishing, pollution, loss of coastal habitat and ocean impacts from climate change. Investing in the exploration and understanding of our planet's largest habitat should be a given. Perhaps that will be a lesson learned from our latest human disaster. Unfortunately, while the sea is still vast, our ability to act wisely in our own interests is often limited.

**Current funding tiny and it’s “boring” nature means none is coming – it’s .62% of NASA funding**

**Conathan 13**

{Michael, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, “Space Exploration Dollars Dwarf Ocean Spending,” 6/20, National Geographic, [http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2013/06/20/space-exploration-dollars-dwarf-ocean-spending/](http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2013/06/20/space-exploration-dollars-dwarf-ocean-spending/#THUR)}

“Star Trek” would have us believe that space is the final frontier, but with apologies to the armies of Trekkies, their oracle might be a tad off base. Though we know little about outer space, we still have plenty of frontiers to explore here on our home planet. And they’re losing the race of discovery. Hollywood giant James Cameron, director of mega-blockbusters such as “Titanic” and “Avatar,” brought this message to Capitol Hill last week, along with the single-seat submersible that he used to become the third human to journey to the deepest point of the world’s oceans—the Marianas Trench. By contrast, more than 500 people have journeyed into space—including Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL), who sits on the committee before which Cameron testified—and 12 people have actually set foot on the surface of the moon. All it takes is a quick comparison of the budgets for NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, to understand why space exploration is outpacing its ocean counterpart by such a wide margin. In fiscal year 2013 NASA’s annual exploration budget was roughly $3.8 billion. That same year, total funding for everything NOAA does—fishery management, weather and climate forecasting, ocean research and management, among many other programs—was about $5 billion, and NOAA’s Office of Exploration and Research received just $23.7 million. Something is wrong with this picture. Space travel is certainly expensive. But as Cameron proved with his dive that cost approximately $8 million, deep-sea exploration is pricey as well. And that’s not the only similarity between space and ocean travel: Both are dark, cold, and completely inhospitable to human life. Yet space travel excites Americans’ imaginations in a way ocean exploration never has. To put this in terms Cameron may be familiar with, just think of how stories are told on screens both big and small: Space dominates, with “Star Trek,” “Star Wars,” “Battlestar Galactica,” “Buck Rogers in the 25th Century,” and “2001 A Space Odyssey.” Then there are B-movies such as “Plan Nine From Outer Space” and everything ever mocked on “Mystery Science Theater 2000.” There are even parodies: “Spaceballs,” “Galaxy Quest,” and “Mars Attacks!” And let’s not forget Cameron’s own contributions: “Aliens” and “Avatar.” When it comes to the ocean, we have “20,000 Leagues Under the Sea,” “Sponge Bob Square Pants,” and Cameron’s somewhat lesser-known film “The Abyss.” And that’s about it. This imbalance in pop culture is illustrative of what plays out in real life. We rejoiced along with the NASA mission-control room when the Mars rover landed on the red planet late last year. One particularly exuberant scientist, known as “Mohawk Guy” for his audacious hairdo, became a minor celebrity and even fielded his share of spontaneous marriage proposals. But when Cameron bottomed out in the Challenger Deep more than 36,000 feet below the surface of the sea, it was met with resounding indifference from all but the dorkiest of ocean nerds such as myself. Part of this incongruity comes from access. No matter where we live, we can go outside on a clear night, look up into the sky, and wonder about what’s out there. We’re presented with a spectacular vista of stars, planets, meteorites, and even the occasional comet or aurora. We have all been wishing on stars since we were children. Only the lucky few can gaze out at the ocean from their doorstep, and even those who do cannot see all that lies beneath the waves. As a result, the facts about ocean exploration are pretty bleak. Humans have laid eyes on less than 5 percent of the ocean, and we have better maps of the surface of Mars than we do of America’s exclusive economic zone—the undersea territory reaching out 200 miles from our shores.

**2NC – Link – Ocean Exploration**

**No ocean exploration funding now – plan causes huge, new costs**

**Carlyle 13**

{Ryan, Subsea hydraulics engineer, B.S. in Chemical Engineering, “Why Don't We Spend More On Exploring The Oceans, Rather Than On Space Exploration?” Forbes, 1/31, [http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/01/31/why-dont-we-spend-more-on-exploring-the-oceans-rather-than-on-space-exploration/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/01/31/why-dont-we-spend-more-on-exploring-the-oceans-rather-than-on-space-exploration/#THUR)}

So as someone whose job deals with exploring the ocean deeps — see my answer to Careers: What kinds of problems does a subsea hydraulics engineer solve? — I can tell you that the ocean is excruciatingly boring. The vast majority of the seafloor once you get >50 miles offshore is barren, featureless mud. On face, this is pretty similar to the empty expanses of outer space, but in space you can see all the way through the nothing, letting you identify targets for probes or telescopes. The goals of space exploration are visible from the Earth, so we can dream and imagine reaching into the heavens. But in the deep oceans, visibility is less than 100 feet and travel speed is measured in single-digit knots. A simple seafloor survey to run a 100 mile pipeline costs a cool $50 million. The oceans are vast, boring, and difficult/expensive to explore — so why bother? Sure, there are beautiful and interesting features like geothermal vents and coral reefs. But throughout most of the ocean these are few and far between. This is a pretty normal view from a subsea robot: Despite the difficulty, there is actually a lot of scientific exploration going on in the oceans. Here’s a pretty good public website for a science ROV mission offshore Oregon: 2009 Pacific Northwest Expedition To reinforce my point about it being boring, here’s a blog entry from that team where they talk about how boring the sea floor is: 2009 Pacific Northwest Expedition What IS really interesting in the deep ocean is the exotic life. You see some crazy animals that are often not well-known to science. Something floats by the camera 5000 ft down, and you say “what the hell was that?” and no one knows. Usually it’s just some variety of jellyfish, but occasionally we find giant\* isopods: Source: Giant isopod \*This is a moderately small specimen. They have been recorded at 2.5 ft long. Or giant alien squid monsters: Unfortunately, deep-sea creatures rarely survive the trip to surface. Their bodies are acclimated to the high pressures (hundreds of atmospheres), and the decompression is usually fatal. Our ability to understand these animals is very limited, and their only connection to the surface biosphere is through a few food chain connections (like sperm whales) that can survive diving to these depths. We’re fundamentally quite disconnected from deep ocean life. Also, there is no hope of ever establishing human habitation more than about 1000 ft deep. The pressures are too great, and no engineering or materials conceivable today would allow us to build livable-sized spaces on the deep sea floor. The two times humans have reached the deepest part of the ocean, it required a foot-thick flawless metal sphere with barely enough internal space to sit down. As far as I can tell, seafloor living is all but impossible — a habitable moon base would be vastly easier to engineer than a seafloor colony. See my answer to International Space Station: Given the actual space station ISS, would it be cheaper to build the equivalent at 3-4-5 miles deep underwater? Why? To recap: we don’t spend more time/money exploring the ocean because it’s expensive, difficult, and uninspiring. We stare up at the stars and dream of reaching them, but few people look off the side of a boat and wish they could go down there.

**2NC – AT: Debt Good (1/2)**

**Federal debt spurs sudden fiscal crisis – empirics and most recent academic research**

**Boccia 13**

{Romina, Research Coordinator in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, “How the United States’ High Debt Will Weaken the Economy and Hurt Americans,” Backgrounder #2768 on Budget and Spending, 2/12, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/how-the-united-states-high-debt-will-weaken-the-economy-and-hurt-americans>}

America is on a dangerous budget path. Current spending and debt are dangerously high, and future spending and debt are on track to rise even higher in large part due to increasing entitlement spending. Academic research shows that advanced economies like the United States are at risk of significant and prolonged reductions in economic growth when public debt reaches levels of 90 percent of GDP. High public debt threatens to drive interest rates up, to crowd out private investment, and to raise price inflation. The implications would be severe and pronounced for all Americans, but most especially for the poor, the elderly, and the middle class. U.S. policymakers should learn from Greece and Japan and avoid a fiscal crisis and economic stagnation brought about by public debt overhang. Growing federal debt also would increase the probability of a sudden fiscal crisis, during which investors would lose confidence in the government’s ability to manage the budget and the government would thereby lose its ability to borrow at affordable rates. Such a crisis would…probably have a very significant negative impact on the country.

**2NC – AT: Debt Good (2/2)**

**Debt rise decrease growth, hiders responses and spurs collapse**

**Boccia 13**

{Romina, Research Coordinator in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, “How the United States’ High Debt Will Weaken the Economy and Hurt Americans,” Backgrounder #2768 on Budget and Spending, 2/12, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/how-the-united-states-high-debt-will-weaken-the-economy-and-hurt-americans>}

U.S. federal spending in 2013, combined with depressed receipts from a weak economy, is on track to result in a deficit of $850 billion. Publicly held debt in the United States will exceed 76 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, and chronic deficits are projected to push U.S. debt to 87 percent of the economy in 10 years.[1] Debt is projected to grow even more rapidly after 2023. Recent economic research, especially the work of Carmen Reinhart, Vincent Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff, confirms that federal debt at such high levels puts the United States at risk for a number of harmful economic consequences, including slower economic growth, a weakened ability to respond to unexpected challenges, and quite possibly a debt-driven financial crisis.[2]

**2NC – AT: Debt Good - Inflation**

**Debt spurs inflation – tanks economy, collapses dollar, trashes biz con and spikes poverty**

**Boccia 13**

{Romina, Research Coordinator in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, “How the United States’ High Debt Will Weaken the Economy and Hurt Americans,” Backgrounder #2768 on Budget and Spending, 2/12, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/how-the-united-states-high-debt-will-weaken-the-economy-and-hurt-americans>}

Higher Inflation. The United States has, as do other countries with independent currencies, an additional option to monetize its debts: replacing a substantial portion of outstanding debt with another form of federal liability—currency. The government could, through the Federal Reserve, inflate the money supply. The resulting increase in the rate of price inflation would devalue the principal of the remaining public debt. The resulting inflation would also destabilize the private economy, increase uncertainty, increase real interest rates, and slow economic growth markedly. Inflation is particularly harmful for those Americans on fixed incomes, such as the elderly who rely on Social Security checks, pensions, and their own savings in retirement. By raising the cost of essential goods and services, like food and medical care, inflation can push seniors into poverty. Inflation and longer life expectancies can mean that some seniors run out of their savings sooner than anticipated, then becoming completely dependent on Social Security. Inflation inflicts the most pain on the poor and middle class by reducing the purchasing power of the cash savings of American families. Inflation also means that everyone has to pay more for goods and services, including essentials like food and clothing. Moreover, severe inflation could dethrone the U.S. dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency. Thus far, a major saving grace for the U.S. government has been that, in comparison with other advanced nations with major currencies, such as Europe and China, the U.S. dollar has retained its status as the best currency option for finance and commerce.[16] If Washington policies continue on their current path of ever-higher sovereign debt and a risky Federal Reserve policy, both of which lack a credible crisis coping strategy, confidence in the U.S. economy and monetary policy regime could erode. Such a development would be unprecedented in size and magnitude and the impact on Americans and the economy would be massive and severe.

**2NC – AT: Debt Good**

**Overhang causes higher interest rates – tanks growth**

**Boccia 13**

{Romina, Research Coordinator in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at Heritage, “How the United States’ High Debt Will Weaken the Economy and Hurt Americans,” Backgrounder #2768 on Budget and Spending, 2/12, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/02/how-the-united-states-high-debt-will-weaken-the-economy-and-hurt-americans>}

Debt overhang reduces economic growth significantly and for a prolonged period of time in three main ways. 1. Higher Interest Rates. Creditors may lose confidence in the country’s ability to service its debt and demand higher interest rates to offset the additional risk. Or, interest rates may rise simply because the government is attempting to sell more debt than private bondholders are willing to buy at current prices. Either way, higher interest rates raise the cost of the debt, and the government must then either tax its citizens more, which would reduce economic activity; reduce government spending in other areas; or take on even more debt, which could cause a debt spiral. Higher interest rates on government bonds also lead to higher rates for other domestic investments, including mortgages, credit cards, consumer loans, and business loans. Higher interest rates on mortgages, car loans, and other loans would make it more costly for families to borrow money. Families may then have to delay purchasing their first home and other means of building financial security. For many Americans, the dream of starting a business would no longer be in reach. Higher interest rates have a real and pronounced impact on the lives of ordinary citizens and translate into less investment and thus slow growth in the rest of the economy. A weaker economy in turn would provide fewer career opportunities and lower wages and salaries for workers. However, higher interest rates do not always materialize in countries suffering a debt overhang. According to Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff, in 11 of the 26 cases where public debt was above 90 percent of GDP, real interest rates were either lower, or about the same, as during years of lower debt ratios. Soaring debt matters for economic growth even when market actors are willing to absorb it at low interest.[14] Interpreted another way, in more than half of debt overhang cases, interest rates rose. In the case of the U.S., the Federal Reserve’s policy of repeated quantitative easing has contributed to interest rates dropping to historical lows. Interest rates will likely rise at some point over the next several years. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that interest costs on the debt will more than double before the end of the decade, rising from 1.4 percent of GDP in 2013 to 2.9 percent as early as 2020.[15] High levels of U.S. public debt could push interest rates even higher with severe impacts for the American economy.

**2NC – Keynes is Wrong (1/2)**

**Keynesianism empirically denied – sequester and stock market predictions**

**Wesbury 13**

{Brian S, Economist for The American Spectator, syndicated economics columnist, Member of the Academic Advisory Council of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, former adjunct professor of economics (Wheaton), MBA (Northwestern), “Keynesian Model Blew it Again,” First Trust, 6/17, [http://www.realclearmarkets.com/docs/2013/06/keynesian-model-blew-it-again.pdf](http://www.realclearmarkets.com/docs/2013/06/keynesian-model-blew-it-again.pdf#THUR)}

If there’s one economic conclusion we can make from recent data, it’s that the Keynesian model has failed - again. Remember that “fiscal cliff clock” on cable TV? Well, the year-end deal included an end to the payroll tax cut and then two months later, on March 1, the dreaded federal spending sequester went into effect. In other words, the Keynesian clock struck midnight, the economy was supposed to slow sharply, and a recession was possible. The theory was – still is in some quarters – that higher payroll taxes and less federal spending would reduce spendable incomes (especially for government workers and contractors) and hit consumer spending. This drop in spending would set off a multiplier effect that would drag down economic growth. One widely-followed Keynesian forecasting unit predicted an uptick in the unemployment rate in the second quarter and a decline in nonfarm payroll growth to 100,000 per month. And when March payrolls rose a tepid 88,000, Keynesians blamed it on the fiscal cliff and said “here we go, it’s started.” But the unemployment rate is lower in Q2 than in Q1 and nonfarm payrolls have risen an average of 155,000 since the sequester went into effect. Payroll growth during the same three months in 2012 was 147,000. Even the tepid March number was revised from 88,000 to 142,000. The Keynesians, expecting doom and gloom anytime the government cuts spending, have pounced on any signal of soft economic growth. They jumped on the initial report of weakness in retail sales in March and blamed it on the sequester, even though the last three times Easter had been in March, like this year, sales have been unusually weak compared to other indicators (2002, 2005 and 2008). But we found out this past week that core retail sales – which take out the monthly volatility caused by autos, gas, and building materials – have been up eleven months in a row and didn’t miss a beat after the sequester went into effect. Assuming consumer prices rose 0.1% in May (see our forecast table, below), "real" (inflation-adjusted) retail sales are up about 3% from a year ago. Total consumption, adjusted for inflation, is up 2.1% during the year-ended April 2013 versus the 1.8% growth during the year-ended April 2012 Meanwhile, equity investments, held by US households, are up about S800 billion in value since March 1. Taken at face value, it seems like the effect of the sequester has been positive, not negative. Keynesians haven't even been right about the stock market. We're not going to call anyone out by name, but we're thinking of a famous Keynesian economist who is widely known for having made a prescient call about 2008-09, whose name starts with an "R" and sounds a lot like Houdini [Roubini]. It's true that he called the collapse in 2008-09, but he originally went bearish in 2005, especially after Hurricane Katrina. Reports say that he recently turned bullish. So what if you sold in mid-2005 and waited until now to buy back in? Since mid-2005, the annualized total return on the S&P 500, including reinvested dividends, has been 6.2%. That's nothing compared to the late 1990s — but, hey, it ain't shabby either. In other words, completely ignoring the dire Keynesian advice, even when it was right, would have been profitable. In mid-2005, you could have bought a 10-year Treasury Note that yielded 4%. Less drama for sure, but no clear advantage. Gold, on the other hand, was trading at about $430/oz. back in mid-2005, so that would have been a great buy, but not an option normal Keynesians would have recommended. The bottom line is that all this focus on government actions through the lens of a Keynesian model has been basically worthless. Investors are better served when they follow free-market economic theories that focus on production, not demand-side models that focus on spending and debt. And this appears true in both the long, and the short, run.

**2NC – Keynes is Wrong (2/2)**

**Even if it generally works, economy is over-stimulated now and austerity is key**

**Barrington 6/6**

{Richard, Senior Financial Analyst, syndicated economics columnist, “The Over-Caffeinated Economy,” Forbes, 2014, [http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2014/06/06/the-over-caffeinated-economy/](http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2014/06/06/the-over-caffeinated-economy/#THUR)}

The U.S. economy seems sluggish today, but ironically, it may also be over-stimulated. Like someone who has had too much caffeine but is on the last reserves of strength, the economy is showing some effects of fatigue that more stimulus might just make worse in the long run. A growing addiction In recent years, the standard for being literally over-caffeinated has been raised. It used to be that a second cup of coffee or a couple cans of Coke was considered enough to put someone on the edge between alert and jittery. Now, with people carrying around pocket-sized shots of concentrated caffeine juice, people routinely sail well past jittery to a land of palpitations and hallucinations. Similarly, it used to be that a little borrowing and some interest rate cuts were considered enough stimulus for a weak economy. Recently though, the standard for stimulus has been raised to include a variety of extraordinary measures. Unfortunately though, there are signs that the economy has been addicted to these fiscal and monetary energy drinks for so long that they no longer have the desired effects. Here are some signs that the economy may be over-caffeinated: Debt keeps rising. The U.S. government ran a budget surplus in 21 of the first 30 years of the 20th century. It has run only eight budget surpluses in the more than 80 years since, the last one in the year 2000. As much as people complain about government spending, many households are in no better shape, as consumer debt continues to grow. The fiscal stimulus of borrowing is no longer seen as a temporary measure, but as a permanent necessity. Housing seems dependent on near-record low mortgage rates. There has been some hand-wringing lately about the fact that the recovery in home prices has slowed down. That’s not to say prices are falling, but in an over-caffeinated economy, nothing short of double-digit annual increases will do. The Cleveland branch of the Federal Reserve recently noted that the slowdown is likely due to higher mortgage rates, and that conditions will get worse if rates rise to 5.5 percent. Prior to 2009, 30-year mortgage rates had rarely been as low as 5.5 percent. Now, apparently, the housing market is dependent on rates staying lower than that. Stocks care more about interest rates than earnings. The stock market keeps rising despite some spotty earnings announcements, but if there is a hint that the Fed might raise rates much above zero, the market reacts like an over-tired child. The Fed seems to miss inflation. Recent writings by the Fed express concern about inflation being too low, almost as if they are laying the groundwork for additional stimulus measures to pump up inflation. This is a bit like missing the headache that sometimes comes with too much caffeine, and taking more caffeine to try to bring on that headache. Whether it is spending, interest rates or inflation, everybody seems touchy about something these days — and that is a sure sign of being over-caffeinated. When people resort to too much caffeine to keep themselves going, it often comes from a “there’s no tomorrow” philosophy. That’s never the case though: There is always a tomorrow, and the longer people try to deny it, the uglier the morning after will be.

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (1/6)**

**Global institutions can’t check – too weak and regional regimes block**

Ngaire **Woods** 9/6/**13** (Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, project syndicate, “global institutions after the crisis” <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-empty-promise-of-global-institutions-after-the-crisis-by-ngaire-woods>)

When Lehman Brothers collapsed and the global financial crisis erupted five years ago, many glimpsed a silver lining: the promise of more effective global economic governance. But, despite a flurry of early initiatives, the world remains as far from that goal as ever. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), established after the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, has no legal mandate or enforcement powers, nor formal processes for including all countries. The International Monetary Fund still awaits the doubling of its capital (another early vow), while its existing resources are heavily tied up in Europe and its governance reforms are stalled. The World Bank has received a modest increase in resources, but it has yet to build capacity to lend rapidly and globally beyond existing borrowers and loan arrangements, and its income trajectory is diminishing. Yet the need for effective global economic governance remains more urgent than ever. Banks and other financial firms roam internationally, greatly assisted by market-opening rules embedded in trade and investment treaties, but with no legally enforceable responsibility to provision adequately for their own losses when things go wrong. Instead, massive risks have supposedly been held at bay by voluntary standards promulgated by a patchwork of public and private “standard-setting” organizations. The crisis proved that this was inadequate. The titans of Wall Street and the City of London were exposed as hugely over-leveraged. Extraordinary profits when their bets paid off increased their financial and political power – which they still enjoy – with taxpayers left to bail them out when their bets turned bad. The G-20 promised stronger global institutions to prevent this from recurring. But the FSB is not a treaty-based global regulator with enforcement powers. It continues to be a “standard setter” in a world with strong incentives to evade standards and negligible sanctions for doing so. Furthermore, although the FSB’s standards are ostensibly “universal,” it does not represent all countries or have formal mechanisms to inform and consult them. Regulators face a Sisyphean task, owing to the absence of strong and consistent political support for reining in the financial titans. A well-resourced financial sector intensively lobbies the most influential governments in global finance. The reforms of the IMF, another pillar of global financial management, cannot be implemented until the US Congress approves them – and there is no sign of that. Even the new Basel 3 banking standards have been diluted and postponed. For Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the delay in reforming the IMF is a serious annoyance. They became major contributors to the Fund’s emergency loan pool (the New Arrangements to Borrow) immediately after the crisis and now provide 15.5% of the NAB’s resources. But the greater voice and voting power that they were promised – commensurate with their status as four of the IMF’s top ten shareholders – has not been delivered. Even the selection of the organization’s managing director remains a European droit du seigneur. More seriously, an astounding 89.2% of the IMF’s General Resources Account is outstanding to European countries, with just three countries (Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) accounting for 68%. The IMF’s resources are neither adequate nor available to respond to a crisis elsewhere. Similarly, the G-20’s pledge in 2009 to protect the poorest and most fragile countries and communities from the effects of the crisis remains unfulfilled. The World Bank is at the heart of these efforts, because it can pool risks globally and offset the capriciousness of official and private-sector aid flows, which create “donor darlings” (like Rwanda) and “donor orphans.” But, while the Bank has more than doubled its lending relative to the four years prior to 2008, this was achieved mostly by front-loading existing loans. Crisis-hit countries that were not already borrowers were largely left out. The Bank’s failure to lend to new clients partly reflects its slowness. Even after its loan cycle had been speeded up, the Bank took an average of 13.5 months to approve credits – a long time for a country to await “emergency” help. But the Bank is also hampered by worsening resource constraints, as the biggest post-crisis capital infusions went to regional development banks. The African Development Bank’s capital was increased by 200%, as was the Asian Development Bank’s. The Inter-American Development Bank got a 70% increase. Meanwhile, the World Bank received an increase of 30%, while its lending arm for the poorest countries, the International Development Association, received an increase of only 18%. Crucially, it is not obvious that the Bank has “buy-in” from emerging economies, with Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which pledged significant resources to the IMF, pledging only about 1% of IDA funding. Further exacerbating the Bank’s financial woes, its powerful creditors have opted to “pull back” its lending in order to protect its resources. As a result, compared to the regional development banks, the Bank will be lending less to fee-paying clients, who provide income, and engaging in more “concessional lending,” which does not. The 2008 crisis highlighted the need for international cooperation to regulate finance and mitigate the effects of a crisis. Yet the global resources and instruments needed to manage (if not avert) the next crisis have not been secured. Instead, regions and countries are quietly finding their own ways to manage finance, create pooled emergency funds, and strengthen development finance – an outcome that heralds a more fragmented and decentralized set of regulatory regimes and a modest de-globalization of finance and aid.

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (2/6)**

**Institutions fail – lack of trust**

Harold **James** 8/2/**13** (Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence, project syndicate, “the snowden time bomb” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/edward-snowden-and-the-end-of-economic-summitry-by-harold-james)

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, world leaders repeated a soothing mantra. There could be no repeat of the Great Depression, not only because monetary policy was much better (it was), but also because international cooperation was better institutionalized. And yet one man, the American former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, has shown how far removed from reality that claim remains. Prolonged periods of strain tend to weaken the fabric of institutional cooperation. The two institutions that seemed most dynamic and effective in 2008-2009 were the International Monetary Fund and the G-20; the credibility of both has been steadily eroded over the long course of the crisis. Because the major industrial economies seem to be on the path to recovery – albeit a feeble one – no one seems to care very much that the mechanisms of cooperation are worn out. They should. There are likely to be many more financial fires in various locations, and the world needs a fire brigade to put them out. The IMF’s resources were extended in 2009, and the organization was supposed to be reformed in order to give emerging markets more voice. But little progress has been made. The Fund was the centerpiece of the post-1945 global economic system. It subsequently played a central role in the management of the 1980’s debt crisis and in the post-communist economic transition after 1989. But every major international crisis since then has chipped away at its authority. The 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis undermined its legitimacy in Asia, as many governments in the region believed that the crisis was being exploited by the United States and US financial institutions. The post-2007 Great Recession discredited the IMF further for three reasons. First, the initial phase of the crisis looked like an American phenomenon. Second, the IMF’s heavy involvement in the prolonged euro crisis looked like preferential treatment of Europe and Europeans. In particular, the demand that, because the world was focused on Europe, another European (and another French national) should succeed the IMF’s then-managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was incomprehensible to the large emerging-market countries. Eventually, as in the Asian crisis, European governments and the European Commission fell out with the Fund and began to blame its analysis for having confused and unsettled markets. On the big issues underlying the global financial crisis – the problem of current-account imbalances and deciding which countries should adjust, and reconciling financial reform with a pro-growth agenda – the IMF cannot say much more, or say it more effectively, than it could before the crisis. The G-20 was the great winner of the financial crisis. The older summits (the G-7 or, with the addition of Russia, the G-8), as well as the G-7 finance ministers’ meetings, were no longer legitimate. They consisted of countries that had actually caused the problems; they were dominated by the US; and they suffered from heavy over-representation of mid-sized European countries. The G-20, by contrast, brought in the big emerging markets, and its initial promise was to provide a way to control and direct the IMF. The new mood of global economic regime change was captured in the official photograph that was widely used in coverage of the most successful of the G-20 summits, held in London in April 2009. In the short term, the London summit mitigated financial contagion emanating from southern Europe; gave the World Bank additional resources to deal with the problem of trade finance for emerging-market exports; appeared to give the IMF more firepower and legitimacy; and seemed to catalyze coordinated fiscal stimulus to restore confidence. But only the more technical of these four achievements – the first two – stood the test of time. Everything else that was agreed at the London summit turned sour. The follow-up summits were lame. The idea of coordinated fiscal stimulus became problematic when it became obvious that many European governments could not take on more debt without unsettling markets and pushing themselves into an unsustainable cycle of increasingly expensive borrowing. And yet, however limited the London summit’s achievements proved to be, the summit process itself was not fully discredited until Snowden’s intelligence revelations. It may be that leaders and their staffs were naive in believing that their communications were really secure. But Snowden’s revelations that the London summit’s British hosts allegedly monitored the participants’ communications make it difficult to imagine that the genuine intimacy of earlier summits can ever be recreated. And, with the espionage apparently directed mostly at representatives of emerging economies, the gulf between the advanced countries and those on the rise has widened further. World leaders appear partly ignorant and partly deceptive in responding to the allegations. They are probably right to emphasize how little they really know about surveillance. It is in the nature of complex data-gathering programs that no one really has an overview. But the lack of transparency surrounding data surveillance and mining means that, when a whistleblower leaks information, everyone can subsequently use it to build their own version of how and why policy is made. The revelations thus encourage wild conspiracy theories. The substantive aftermath of the London summit has already caused widespread disenchantment with the G-20 process. The Snowden affair has blown up any illusion about trust between leaders – and also about leaders’ competence. By granting Snowden asylum for one year, Russian President Vladimir Putin, will have the bomber in his midst when he hosts this year’s summit in Saint Petersburg.

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (3/6)**

**Wars following economic collapse causes extinction**

**Auslin 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (4/6)**

**Yes conflict escalates to nuclear war**

**Merlini 11** – Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (5/6)**

**Perception alone causes global instability**

Harold **James** 7/3/**13** (Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University and Professor of History at the European University Institute, Florence, project syndicate, “financial crisis and war” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/financial-crisis-and-war-by-harold-james#6ObpMZcq3uXv7puL.99)

The approach of the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 has jolted politicians and commentators worried by the fragility of current global political and economic arrangements. Indeed, Luxembourg’s prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, recently argued that Europe’s growing north-south polarization has set the continent back by a century. The lessons of 1914 are about more than simply the dangers of national animosities. The origins of the Great War include a fascinating precedent concerning how financial globalization can become the equivalent of a national arms race, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the international order. In 1907, a major financial crisis emanating from the United States affected the rest of the world and demonstrated the fragility of the entire international financial system. The response to the current financial crisis is replaying a similar dynamic. Walter Bagehot’s 1873 classic Lombard Street described the City of London as “the greatest combination of economic power and economic delicacy that the world has ever seen.” In one influential interpretation, popularized by the novelist, Labour Party MP, and future Nobel Peace Prize laureate Norman Angell in 1910, the interdependency of the increasingly complex global economy made war impossible. But the opposite conclusion was equally plausible: Given the extent of fragility, a clever twist to the control levers might facilitate a military victory by the economic hegemon. The aftermath of the 1907 crash drove the hegemonic power of the time – Great Britain – to reflect on how it could use its financial clout to enhance its overall strategic capacity. That is the conclusion of an important recent book, Nicholas Lambert’s study of British economic planning and the First World War, entitled Planning Armageddon. Lambert demonstrates how, in a grand strategic gamble, Britain began to marry its military – and especially naval – predominance and its global financial leadership. Between 1905 and 1908, the British Admiralty developed the broad outlines of a plan for financial and economic warfare against Europe’s rising power, Germany. Economic warfare, if implemented in full, would wreck Germany’s financial system and force it out of any military conflict. When Britain’s naval visionaries confronted a rival in the form of the Kaiser’s Germany, they understood how power could thrive on financial fragility. Pre-1914 Britain anticipated the private-public partnership that today links technology giants such as Google, Apple, or Verizon to US intelligence agencies. London banks underwrote most of the world’s trade; Lloyds provided insurance for the world’s shipping. These financial networks provided the information that enabled the British government to discover the sensitive strategic vulnerabilities of the opposing alliance. For Britain’s rivals, the financial panic of 1907 demonstrated the necessity of mobilizing financial power themselves. The US, for its part, recognized that it needed a central bank analogous to the Bank of England. American financiers were persuaded that New York needed to develop its own commercial trading system to handle bills of exchange in the same way as the London market and arrange their monetization (or “acceptance”). The central figure in pushing for the development of an American acceptance market was Paul Warburg, the immigrant younger brother of a great Hamburg banker who was the personal adviser to Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Warburg brothers, Max and Paul, were a transatlantic tandem, energetically pushing for German-American institutions that would offer an alternative to British industrial and financial monopoly. They were convinced that Germany and the US were growing stronger year by year, while British power would erode. Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now reemerging. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions appear both as dangerous weapons of mass economic destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. In managing the 2008 crisis, foreign banks’ dependence on US-dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. Addressing that flaw requires renationalization of banking, and breaking up the activities of large financial institutions. For European bankers, and some governments, current efforts by the US to revise its approach to the operation of foreign bank subsidiaries within its territory highlight that imperative. They view the US move as a new sort of financial protectionism and are threatening retaliation. Geopolitics is intruding into banking practice elsewhere as well. Russian banks are trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European banks are playing a much-reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. Many countries have begun to look at financial protectionism as a way to increase their political leverage. The next step in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to national advantage in the case of a diplomatic conflict. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue states like Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the global economy. In 1907, in the wake of an epochal financial crisis that almost brought a complete global collapse, several countries started to think of finance primarily as an instrument of raw power that could and should be turned to national advantage. That kind of thinking brought war in 1914. A century later, in 2007-2008, the world experienced an even greater financial shock, and nationalistic passions have flared up in its wake. Destructive strategies may not be far behind.

**2NC – Econ Impact Extensions (6/6)**

**Decline causes escalatory wars in multiple regions**

**Kemp 10** (Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs – Nixon Center and Former Director of the Middle East Arms Control Project – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-234)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with **dire consequences for** two-thirds of **the planet’s population**

**2NC – AT: Econ Resilient (1/3)**

**Not resilient – Economy improving but extremely fragile**

**Cook 5/12**

{Charlie, syndicated political analyst, Resident Fellow at the Harvard Institute of Politics, 2010 recipient of the Carey McWilliams award from the American Political Science Association, Georgetown grad, “Our Fragile Economy Still Needs Time to Gather Its Strength,” National Journal, 2014, [http://www.nationaljournal.com/off-to-the-races/our-fragile-economy-still-needs-time-to-gather-its-strength-20140512](http://www.nationaljournal.com/off-to-the-races/our-fragile-economy-still-needs-time-to-gather-its-strength-20140512#THUR)}

Americans remain pretty pessimistic about the economy. The National Bureau of Economic Research calculates that the most recent recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. But that is certainly news to most Americans. In a March NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, 57 percent of respondents said they believe we are still in a recession, while 41 percent said we are not. Indeed, in the seven times that NBC/WSJ pollsters have asked the question since the latter half of 2001, a majority of Americans have felt that we were in a recession. While consumer confidence is on the rise and pretty close to the highest it has been since the last recession began, we are nowhere near the levels of optimism and comfort that Americans felt during the period of 1992 until this latest recession began in late 2007. We feel better, but nowhere near good. The recent economic reports that we only had a one-tenth of a percentage point increase in the real gross domestic product is attributed to an unusually harsh winter; but a vibrant economy doesn't sustain that kind of hit from a tough winter alone. As Mesirow Financial's Chief Economist Diane Swonk put it in a recent report to clients: "The economy came to a virtual standstill in the first quarter [of 2014], adding insult to injury to an economy still struggling to recover." She added that it was "reflective of a fundamental weakening in a recovery that was already compromised." This was and remains a very fragile economy. The monthly survey of top economists conducted by Blue Chip Economic Indicators projects that the economy, as measured by change in real GDP, will likely grow at a rate of 3.4 percent for the ongoing second quarter of this year, then 3.0 and 3.1 percent for the third and fourth quarters, respectively. And projections for 2015 remain basically at the 3.0 percent level. Obviously, this is far better growth than we have had during recessions; looking back over the last three-quarters of a century, mid-to-high single digits is more the norm, so the economy will likely be growing—but compared with the pain we have gone through, not at nearly the rate we need and would like to have. SHARE THIS STORY With projections calling for growth—but nothing like the impressive growth we have seen in previous eras—businesses are slow to risk huge investments in new plants and equipment. To paraphrase economist Michael Drury of McVean Trading and Investments, without a surge in capital spending—which is not happening—this economic cycle will remain lackluster, but last longer. Manufacturing and employment in that sector is picking up strongly, but caution remains. Cornerstone Macro, a New York-based firm that advises its Wall Street clients on economics, policy, and investment strategy, said in a recent report that the manufacturing workweek is near a record high, and manufacturing wages are now on the increase after a stomach-churning plunge during the 2008 recession. The manufacturing employment rate for April was 5.6 percent, the largest increase in almost 30 years. Citing figures from the payroll firm ADP, the employment rate for small businesses—organizations with fewer than 50 workers—is at a record high. Now almost 50 million people work for small businesses, almost double those working for large businesses of 500 or more employees. Hiring numbers for small, medium, and large firms are doing well, but not all of the unemployed have the skills for this new economy. The labor-participation rate (the percentage of the population working) is still languishing, and long-term unemployment remains a critical problem. Sadly, the longer people are unemployed, the more their skills and marketability atrophy, and the harder it is for them to find a new job. We were in a pretty deep hole during the recession, followed by an exceedingly sluggish recovery. Much of the good news in manufacturing is linked to the energy renaissance coming from the oil and gas sector. The International Energy Agency projects that the U.S. will surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia to become the world's top oil producer by 2015. Energy Information Administration figures show that U.S. crude-oil inventories are the highest since 1931, currently at almost 400 million barrels. This is roughly a third more than 10 years ago, and far greater than the 250 million during the energy crisis of the 1970's. U.S. oil production is now at double the amount of oil we import from OPEC, a huge plus for the United States for both economic and geopolitical reasons. Heading into the recession that began in December 2007, imports far outstripped production. The bottom line is that while there is considerable good news, the bad news was so bad for so long, we need much better news for a much longer period of time.

**2NC – AT: Econ Resilient (2/3)**

**Uneven recovery means extreme fragility – county surveys prove – also proves discipline key to recovery**

**Philipps 14**

{Jim, Manager at the National Association of Counties, “U.S. Economic Recovery Remains Uneven, Fragile across Counties,” NACO, 1/13, [http://www.naco.org/newsroom/Documents/Press%20Release%20Documents/county%20tracker.pdf](http://www.naco.org/newsroom/Documents/Press%20Release%20Documents/county%20tracker.pdf#THUR)}

U.S. economic growth continued last year for the 3,069 county economies, but the recovery remained uneven and fragile, according to an analysis of four economic performance indicators by the National Association of Counties (NACo). As a result of the fragile and uneven recovery, many counties are continuing to struggle with their budgets, meet financial obligations and provide essential public services. NACo’s new study, County Tracker 2013: On the Path to Recovery assesses the performance of the nation’s county economies by studying annual changes in four indicators – economic output (GDP), employment, the unemployment rate and home prices. The report also contains case studies to illustrate how specific county economies fared during the recession and recovery. The counties profiled include, Tarrant County, Texas (population 1.9 million), Los Angeles County, Calif. (10 million), Linn County, Iowa (215,000) and Mountrail County, N.D. (9,000). The economic indicators analyzed by NACo suggest that 2013 was a year of growth, but the recovery remained fragile. By 2013, the economic output (GDP) in about half of all county economies recovered or had no declines over the last decade. Home prices were in the same situation. But this is only part of the story. Jobs recovered in one quarter of county economies and in only 54 county economies unemployment is back to pre-recession levels. The low unemployment recovery rates show the fragility of the recovery. The recovery has been also uneven. All counties, large, mid-sized or small, have been affected by the recession but the patterns of recovery vary significantly. Large county economies were at the core of the recession and the recovery. Only 4 percent of the nation’s large county economies – in counties with more than 500,000 residents – delivered around 58 percent of the county economies’ output (GDP) growth and a similar share of the added jobs over the recovery. Large county economies in the South such as in Tarrant County, Texas bounced back quickly. “While blessed with an economic diversity that enabled us to withstand the national recession better than other areas of the country, we were most impressed with the resilience of Tarrant County’s manufacturing and housing sectors, which allowed them to respond quicker to developing opportunities,” said Roy Brooks, commissioner, Tarrant County, Texas, and chair of NACo's Large Urban County Caucus (LUCC). Employment in medium-size county economies was more stable during the recession, but had a mixed record in 2013. About half of the medium-sized county economies – in counties with populations between 50,000 and 500,000 residents – had shorter and/or shallower job recessions than the national average. “One of the factors that helped stabilize Linn County’s economy through the recession was the amount of post-flood construction and revitalization that took place,” said NACo President Linda Langston, supervisor, Linn County, Iowa. “Nearly $1 billion was reinvested throughout our community from federal, state, local and private sources in the five years since the flood. Linn County also has the benefit of the value-added agriculture industry and expanding new start-up businesses that helped to fully restore us to pre-recession levels.” The recovery in small county economies covered the entire scale of potential outcomes. Twenty-seven small county economies – in counties with fewer than 50,000 residents – had no recession or fully recovered across all four indicators by 2013. The housing market downturn was mild in small county economies, with more than half not going through home price declines or already returned to pre-recession home price levels by 2013. This fragile and uneven recovery across county economies adds to the challenges that counties face currently. Most counties survived through the recession because of their fiscally prudent approaches. “Los Angeles County would not have weathered the recession as strongly as we did without our focus on fiscal prudency, as well as the partnerships we have with our labor unions, who have foregone cost of living increases to avoid furloughs and layoffs,” said Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors Chairman Don Knabe, member of the NACo Large Urban County Caucus. “Our frugality has paid off through the rough economic times. Nevertheless, as we see improvements, we must remain disciplined and continue to operate within our means.” Counties with fast growing economies, such as Mountrail County, N.D. have a hard time to keep up with the necessary service delivery. “The fast growth that Mountrail County experienced for the last several years has been great with jobs, but tough on the county’s infrastructure and on the county’s residents on fixed incomes,” said Greg Boschee, commissioner, Mountrail County, N.D. Other counties, with challenged economies are finding new ways to maintain services and prepare their counties for the future. “Trying to run county government in a contracting economy and declining population base has its challenges. But similar to running a business, if you are successful at making your organization as efficient as possible in delivering quality goods or services in trying times, you prepare your organization for greater success during more favorable times” said Matthew McConnell, commissioner, Mercer County, Pa. In addition to the situation of their economy, all counties face a

**2NC – AT: Econ Resilient (3/3)**

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triple threat from the uncertainty around major federal policy changes, from tax reform, entitlement reform and appropriation cuts, not accompanied by cuts in unfunded mandates and federal regulations. “The national economic numbers mask the growth patterns on the ground,” said Emilia Istrate, NACo’s director of research and lead author of the report. “The dynamics within county economies affect the capacity of counties to deliver services and meet their financial obligations. The County Tracker offers a reminder that the U.S. economy happens on the ground, in the 3,069 county economies that provide the basis for county governments. As fiscal tightening continues to limit the scope of state and federal investment, it is becoming imperative for states and the federal government to work with counties to maintain the fundamentals of the U.S. economy – county economies.”

# \*\*\*SPENDING DA ANSWERS\*\*\*

**2AC – Econ Low**

**Econ low – housing, unemployment, commodities – prefer our evidence – it’s future predictive**

**Kohl 5/27**

{David, professor emeritus in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics (Virginia Tech), two-time recipient of the American Agricultural Economics Association’s Outstanding Teaching Award, “Economic Indicators and Confusing Signals,” Corn and Soybean Digest: Road Warrior, 2014, http://cornandsoybeandigest.com/blog/economic-indicators-and-confusing-signals}

The U.S. economy is showing mixed signals. The lead economic index (LEI) which foretells the future of the economy has been increasing in recent months, most recently up 0.4%, which is bullish for the economy. Sixty percent of the factors that make up the LEI are exhibiting positive signs. The purchasing manager index (PMI) also illustrates a positive growth oriented economy for the next few months. The readings have consistently been above 50, a metric that suggests an expanding economy. Another positive sign is 78.6% factory capacity utilization. For comparison, at the height of the great economic recession of 2009, this figure dropped to 68%, the lowest ever recorded. Confusing Signals Despite the forward-looking good news, housing, which is a pivotal part of the economy, is still struggling. With one in seven jobs in America tied to housing, this engine of the economy is improving at a modest pace. Ideally, housing starts range between 1.1 million and 1.5 million annually. In recent months, this metric has been in the 900,000 range, and it increased to 1.072 million in April. Reasons for the struggle include higher mortgage rates, students with over $1 trillion of student loan debt collectively, increased regulation of mortgage lenders, the desire to rent rather than own a home, and affordability of housing with flattening or reduced wage scales. Another area of the economy that is struggling is unemployment. While the rate has declined to 6.3%, the U-6 unemployment rate which includes the long-term unemployed, discouraged workers and people mismatched in the workforce is at 12.3%. While many jobs are available, the particular skill sets needed may not be available, creating a gap. This is particularly true in the agriculture industry with more use of technology and innovation, which requires a highly skilled agricultural workforce. Oil prices remain stubbornly high impacting consumer purchases. Copper prices, a bellwether of world economic growth and inflation, have declined by approximately 25% year-over-year. Yes, first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth was a paltry 0.1%. Everyone he is blaming the winter weather, but there may be other factors involved. Further tracking of economic indicators in the summer and fall may provide a clear path, but for now the economy is muddling along!

**1AR – Econ Low**

**Decline across the board – GDP, housing, inventories, consumption – only increased spending reverses that**

**Foley 5/30/14**

“Here’s Why the U.S. Economy Shrank After Three Years of Growth” MEGHAN FOLEY- Syndicated Reporter-Bachelor’s degree from the University of California at Berkeley and a Master’s degree from Boston University., MAY 30, 2014, <http://wallstcheatsheet.com/business/heres-why-the-u-s-economy-shrank-after-three-years-of-growth.html/#ixzz33zNmIWG6>

In the first-quarter of this year, the United States economy contracted for the first time in three years. At the end of April, the U.S. Department of Commerce calculated that gross domestic product — the broadest measure of economic activity — expanded at an anemic 0.1 percent rate in the first three months of 2013. That initial estimate of first-quarter growth was far lower than the 1.2 percent rate expected by economists and a significant decline from the 2.6 percent rate of growth recorded in the final three months of 2013. U.S. economic output clearly showed the extremely cold winter weather had stunted growth, but economists disagreed about the implications the quarter’s results. “Here’s why I’m not so worried about Q1 GDP: The components that are weak aren’t persistent, while those that are strong tend to persist,” Justin Wolfers, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, tweeted just ahead of the release. But Euler Hermes economist Dan North argued in an interview with The New York Times that even though “people have gotten used to [sub-3 percent growth] as the new normal,” economic growth is still very weak. Upon a second look, using “more complete source data” than was available when the advanced estimate was made earlier this year, government economists determined that GDP did not grow in the first-quarter, but rather contracted at a 1 percent annual rate. Comparatively, economists had expected growth to slow to a 0.6-percent decline. Consumers were big spenders in the first-quarter, propping up growth as they have for much of the recovery. But other sectors of the U.S. economy that have buoyed the recovery higher in recent quarters slumped in the early months of this year, dragging down growth. Much of the hurt was brought on by the winter weather. Frigid temperatures caused U.S. manufacturing output to record its biggest decrease in more than 4 and a half years in January; kept job creation weak in December and January; and blanketed construction projects with snow and ice, pushing housing starts to nearly a three-year low in January. That reality left personal consumption expenditures as the single biggest boost to economic output in the first three months of the year. But even consumer spending was impacted by the weather, which curtailed foot traffic at many retailers. Why a Contraction? The decrease in real GDP in the first-quarter primarily reflected negative contributions from nearly all major categories — business inventory investment, trade, both residential and nonresidential fixed investment, and state and local government spending — suggesting that economic malaise was widespread. Generally, the Commerce Department’s revision of first-quarter growth did little to change the overall economic narrative, but higher-than-expected imports — which are treated as a subtraction in GDP calculations — and business inventories that grew slower than originally estimated pushed first-quarter economic output into negative territory. U.S. exports declined at 6 percent rate, a slightly smaller drop than the 7.6 percent initially calculated, but imports ticked up 0.7 percent, completely reversing the 1.4 percent drop originally estimated. Nonresidential fixed investment — a measure of business spending on equipment, structures, and software — declined 1.6 percent, an improvement from the government’s previous estimate of a 2.1 percent decline. The housing market — which slowed early in the year due to the weather, higher mortgage rates, and ongoing consumer caution — remained a significant drag as well; residential fixed investment contracted at a 5 percent pace and subtracted 0.16 percentage point from GDP growth, after contributing 0.33 percentage point to U.S. economic output for all of last year. Further, slow growth in business inventories was the unfortunate — but expected — side effect of the big buildup in private inventories, which boosted economic growth in the third-quarter of 2013. With consumer spending too slow too bring down those inventories substantially, businesses were left with a hangover that weighed on first-quarter GDP. Inventories subtracted 1.62 percentage points from GDP growth, a massive jump from the initial estimate of 0.57 percentage points. An increase federal government spending, the first in a year and a half, and further growth in personal consumption expenditures only slightly offset those drags on economic growth. Plus, the positive contribution made by federal government spending was completely erased by decreases at the state and local government level. Overall, government spending subtracted 0.15 percentage points from GDP for the quarter, compared with an initial estimate of a 0.09 percentage-point subtraction.

**1AR – Econ Low – Housing (1/2)**

**Key industries show decline - Housing, retail, auto sales**

**Kranzler 6/2/14**

“The U.S. Economy: Deep Recession Coming” Dave Kranzler, Investment Research Dynamics -Seeking Alpha, Jun. 2, 2014, http://seekingalpha.com/article/2249803-the-u-s-economy-deep-recession-coming

A second key driver of GDP growth is the housing market. As I have detailed in previous articles on new and existing homes, there has been a definitive downtrend in month-to-month sequential sales volume that began in July 2013. I've also detailed how the big buy-to-rent institutional investment buyer, which has been the primary driver of home sales and price gains over the last 18 months, has largely withdrawn as a buyer of homes this year. To be sure, the individual "flipper" buyer is still active, although I suspect that segment of demand will begin to fade as new and existing home inventory continues to build and sales continue to decline. While April new and existing home sales showed seasonal gains from March to April, they both registered declines year over year, with existing home sales down 6.8% and new homes sales down 4.2%. The year-over-year declines have been persistent for several months now. In addition, it is likely that the May existing home sales report released later this month will show a continuing deterioration in the housing market based on the recent Pending Home Sales report the details of which I discussed in the linked article. The pending home sales metric reflects both declining demand despite rising home inventory. With the recent housing market data showing a probable continued slowdown in homes sales, I believe it confirms that the housing component of GDP will likely affect the GDP calculation negatively in Q2. While there are other factors which I believe will contribute to a further contraction in the GDP in Q2, the deterioration in retail sales and the housing market as I've outlined above are two of the most significant factors. I also believe that auto sales, which have been largely fueled by subprime auto lending (see my previous articles for details), will soon start to track negatively month to month on a consistent basis and contribute to further contraction in the U.S. economy.

**1AR – Econ Low – Housing (2/2)**

**Housing market is trash – hurts overall economy and investor confidence**

**Elboghdady 5/28**

{Dina, syndicated reporter covering consumer advocacy and the housing market, “Freddie Mac: Many of the Nation’s Housing Markets are Stalling,” 2014, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/05/28/freddie-mac-many-of-the-nations-housing-markets-are-stalling/}

The bad news keeps piling up on the housing front, this time with glum statistics from mortgage giant Freddie Mac, which declared Wednesday that many of the nation’s housing markets are stalling. The third installment of Freddie’s “Multi-Indicator Market Index” (or MiMi), which sizes up homebuying activity and other factors, found that only 10 states and the District of Columbia fall in the “stable” range, as do four of the 50 metro areas included in the index – San Antonio, New Orleans, Austin and Houston. The outlook for the rest of the housing market looks bleak. “Less than half of the housing markets MiMi covers are showing an improving trend, whereas at this time last year more than 90 percent of these same markets were headed in the right direction,” Frank Nothaft, Freddie’s chief economist, said in a statement. The index draws from various data sources, including Freddie’s own business with more than 2,000 mortgage lenders across the country, to assess the health of the single-family housing market. The company said it benchmarks a market’s performance against that market’s historical norm, taking into account home purchase applications, employment, mortgage delinquencies and other factors. It then averages the weighted indicators to pull together a composite value, with a score of zero indicating a stable market. Based on the index, Freddie labels a market “weak” when its value falls below a negative 2 or “elevated” when it ranks above 2. It does not factor in cash-only sales, which make up roughly 40 percent of home sales today, or loans that do not meet Freddie Mac criteria. The national value of the index stood at -3.06 points in March, with a three-month flat trend in housing activity. Freddie crunched numbers going back to 2001, and found that the all-time low was -4.49 in November 2010, during the depths of the housing crisis. North Dakota was the highest-ranked “stable” state, with Wyoming, the District of Columbia, Alaska and Louisiana among the top of the list of 10 states that are considered to be in balance. Even before the index came out, Freddie had revised its forecast for the housing market downward. Earlier this month, Nothaft said there are “various imbalances” holding it back, most notably the job market. “Housing needs stronger, and just as important, sustained levels of job creation to get the housing engine firing on all cylinders,” he said. Other industry gauges show that sales of existing homes were down nearly 7 percent from the same time a year ago, home prices are starting to moderate, and builders still lack confidence in the housing market.

**2AC – Ocean Spending Now**

**More ocean funding inevitable – Obama push**

**Woglom 14**

“Obama Pushes for Needed Boost in Ocean Funding” Emily Woglom- Vice President, Conservation Policy and Programs, for Ocean Conservancy, March 4, 2014, http://blog.oceanconservancy.org/2014/03/04/obama-pushes-for-needed-boost-in-ocean-funding/

The White House released President Obama’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2015 today. The proposal appears to be good news for the ocean and a great first step toward strong funding for ocean-health programs next year. Of course, the budget documents that the administration released today are only part of the picture. They detail the big-picture, top-level budget numbers with only a small number of details, and individual program budgets won’t be released until later. So what can we tell from what has been released so far? Last year, we focused on some key questions to help decide how the ocean is faring in the federal budget process. In particular, we asked whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) top-line budget number is sufficient, and whether there was appropriate balance between NOAA’s “wet” ocean and “dry” non-ocean missions. When it comes to NOAA’s overall budget numbers, things look pretty good. Regarding the balance between wet and dry missions, the single biggest increase goes to the satellite line office, but the National Ocean Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service both see healthy increases as well. We will not know details until additional numbers are released, but we do not see any red flags to suggest that things are way out of balance. Here are some key takeaways based on what we know today: Overall NOAA Funding Looks Strong: The White House demonstrated support for increased funding at NOAA. NOAA programs lead cutting-edge research on ocean health and support smart ocean management. NOAA is also the central agency tasked with ending overfishing. While NOAA’s FY 2014 funding level is an improvement over FY 2013’s abysmal sequestration level, the proposal from the White House shows how far we still have to go: It calls for a $174 million increase over FY 2014, recommending $5.5 billion in funding for NOAA in FY 2015.

**1AR – Ocean Spending Now**

**A Slew of programs just got new funding**

**Watters 6/6/14**

“Four Ways the Senate Supports Ocean Investments” June 6, 2014 by Jeff Watters- Acting Director of Government Relations for Ocean Conservancy, <http://blog.oceanconservancy.org/2014/06/06/four-ways-the-senate-supports-ocean-investments/#more-8450>

Just a week after the House of Representatives passed its proposed budget for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously approved its NOAA proposal, funding research and activities that influence the health and strength of our ocean economy and coastal communities. The Senate proposal takes a cue from President Obama’s request, and would invest in several key ocean programs. It would: Fund ocean acidification research at $11 million, recognizing our need to understand how acidification will impact businesses and ecoystems, as well as the need to develop tools to mitigate its impacts. Although this proposal is still $4 million less than the President’s request, the Senate level is a strong step towards protecting marine environments and the communities that depend on them. Provide at least $5 million for competitive Regional Coastal Resilience Grants, which will help communities prepare for changes to marine ecosystems, climate impacts, and economic shifts. These grants will bring together partners on a regional scale to promote resilience and address shared risks. Increase Climate Research funding by $2.19 million to support the Arctic Research Program. Temperatures in the Arctic are warming at twice the rate of the global average and seasonal sea ice is diminishing rapidly. Funding to expand and improve NOAA’s Arctic Observing Network is critical to track and understand these profound changes and provide products that support our ability to adapt. Provide the requested $6 million for NOAA’s Marine Debris program, which supports existing monitoring and research efforts to better understand accumulation rates of debris and debris sources. The program catalyzes scientific research efforts to quantify the direct and indirect economic impacts caused by marine debris on coastal communities and economies that rely on them.

**2AC – Debt Now**

**Current debt levels trigger the DA – interest rates**

**Giles and Harding 14**

“IMF warns on rising debt levels” Chris Giles and Robin Harding- Correspondents at the Financial Times, April 9, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e9bd67de-bfd6-11e3-b6e8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33y9PWWrG>

Rising levels of debt prompted by five years of ultra-low interest rates could exacerbate the dangers of bringing monetary policy back to normal, the International Monetary Fund warned on Wednesday. In its twice yearly Global Financial Stability Report, the fund noted that “the scaling back of certain extraordinary policy supports has not been accompanied by adequate preparations for a new environment of normalised, self-sustaining growth”. Although the IMF has warned about the potential dangers of the exit from US quantitative easing for at least a year, its new concern is that prolonged low interest rates will make any exit even more difficult. “The key message is that strong policy actions are needed to definitely turn the corner from the great financial crisis and engineer a successful shift from ‘liquidity-driven’ to ‘growth-driven’ markets,” said José Viñals, director of the IMF’s monetary and capital markets department. Saying the timing of an exit was “critical”, the IMF warned that there might be no easy way to normalise policy without significant financial turmoil. “Undue delay could lead to a further build-up of financial stability risks, and too rapid an exit could jeopardise the economic recovery and exacerbate still-elevated debt burdens in some segments of the economy,” the report warned.

**1AR – Debt Now**

**Any link to the DA is shot – debt quadrupling by 2024**

**Jeffrey 5/7/14**

“Fed Chair: ‘Deficits Will Rise to Unsustainable Levels’” Terence P. Jeffrey, May 7, 2014

http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/fed-chair-deficits-will-rise-unsustainable-levels

Federal Reserve Chairman Janet Yellen, referencing the Congressional Budget Office's long-term budget projections, told the Joint Economic Committee of Congress today that under current policies the federal government’s deficits “will rise to unsustainable levels.” In the 10-year budget projections it released in April, the CBO estimated that the federal government will run $7.618 trillion in deficits from 2015 through 2024. At the same time, the CBO projected that the federal government’s debt held by the public would rise from $11.983 trillion at the end of fiscal 2013 to $20.947 trillion by the end of 2024. The debt held by the public is the part of the U.S. government debt that is not held by the federal government itself. It primarily consists of marketable Treasury securities, including bills, notes and bonds. It does not include what the government calls “intragovernmental debt," which is the money the Treasury has borrowed out of the Social Security Trust Fund and other government trust funds to pay current expenses. The total debt of the federal government at the end of fiscal 2013--including both the debt held by the public and the intragovernmental debt--was $16.719 trillion. The CBO estimates that by 2024, the total debt of the federal government will be $27.159 trillion—of which $20.947 trillion will be debt held by the public. If that projection holds up, the federal debt held by the public in 2024 would be more than four times the $5.035 trillion federal debt held by the public at the end of 2007.

**2AC – Keynes Is Right**

**The problem is demand- reigning in the debt only exacerbates the problem – reject their authors – it’s politically charged and uses skewed data.**

**Krugman 5/1/14**

“Why Economics Failed” PAUL KRUGMAN- NY Times, PHD at MIT, Nobel Prize winner, best economist everrrrrr, MAY 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/opinion/krugman-why-economics-failed.html

In what sense did economics work well? Economists who took their own textbooks seriously quickly diagnosed the nature of our economic malaise: We were suffering from inadequate demand. The financial crisis and the housing bust created an environment in which everyone was trying to spend less, but my spending is your income and your spending is my income, so when everyone tries to cut spending at the same time the result is an overall decline in incomes and a depressed economy. And we know (or should know) that depressed economies behave quite differently from economies that are at or near full employment. For example, many seemingly knowledgeable people — bankers, business leaders, public officials — warned that budget deficits would lead to soaring interest rates and inflation. But economists knew that such warnings, which might have made sense under normal conditions, were way off base under the conditions we actually faced. Sure enough, interest and inflation rates stayed low. And the diagnosis of our troubles as stemming from inadequate demand had clear policy implications: as long as lack of demand was the problem, we would be living in a world in which the usual rules didn’t apply. In particular, this was no time to worry about budget deficits and cut spending, which would only deepen the depression. When John Boehner, then the House minority leader, declared in early 2009 that since American families were having to tighten their belts, the government should tighten its belt, too, people like me cringed; his remarks betrayed his economic ignorance. We needed more government spending, not less, to fill the hole left by inadequate private demand. But a few months later President Obama started saying exactly the same thing. In fact, it became a standard line in his speeches. Nor was it just rhetoric. Since 2010, we’ve seen a sharp decline in discretionary spending and an unprecedented decline in budget deficits, and the result has been anemic growth and long-term unemployment on a scale not seen since the 1930s. So why didn’t we use the economic knowledge we had? One answer is that most people find the logic of policy in a depressed economy counterintuitive. Instead, what resonates with the public are misleading analogies with the finances of an individual family, which is why Mr. Obama began echoing Mr. Boehner. Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story Advertisement And even supposedly well-informed people balk at the notion that simple lack of demand can wreak so much havoc. Surely, they insist, we must have deep structural problems, like a work force that lacks the right skills; that sounds serious and wise, even though all the evidence says that it’s completely untrue. Meanwhile, powerful political factions find that bad economic analysis serves their objectives. Most obviously, people whose real goal is dismantling the social safety net have found promoting deficit panic an effective way to push their agenda. And such people have been aided and abetted by what I’ve come to think of as the trahison des nerds — the willingness of some economists to come up with analyses that tell powerful people what they want to hear, whether it’s that slashing government spending is actually expansionary, because of confidence, or that government debt somehow has dire effects on economic growth even if interest rates stay low. Whatever the reasons basic economics got tossed aside, the result has been tragic. Most of the waste and suffering that have afflicted Western economies these past five years was unnecessary. We have, all along, had the knowledge and the tools to restore full employment. But policy makers just keep finding reasons not to do the right thing.

**1AR – Keynes Is Right (1/3)**

**Deficit spending key to growth – WWII proves**

**Amy 11**

[“The Deficit Scare: Myth vs. Reality” Douglas J. Amy, Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College, 2011, http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=30&p=3]

Conservatives are also wrong when they argue that deficit spending and a large national debt will inevitably undermine economic growth. To see why, we need to simply look back at times when we have run up large deficits and increased the national debt. The best example is World War II when the national debt soared to 120% of GDP – nearly twice the size of today’s debt. This spending not only got us out of the Great Depression but set the stage for a prolonged period of sustained economic growth in the 50s and 60s. Massive investments were made in science and technology, American workers were re-trained and re-employed, private investment was encouraged, and consumer purchasing power was increased. That 25-year post-war economic boom, with the most rapid increase in living standards in our history, would not have happened without the stimulus of all this deficit spending. History also shows that balancing the budget does not necessarily ensure a spurt of economic growth. In fact, in most periods when we have not had deficits, such as the 1990s, this was followed by an economic recession.6 So there is clearly little historical evidence to show that deficits and debt inevitably hurt economic growth.

**1AR – Keynes Is Right (2/3)**

**Deficit spending good – your authors cook the books and are epistemological trash**

-Fills in for weak private investment

-Resolves high unemployment

**Krugman 13**

“Dwindling Deficit Disorder” PAUL KRUGMAN- NY Times, PHD at MIT, Nobel Prize winner, best economist everrrrrr, March 10, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html?_r=1&>

For three years and more, policy debate in Washington has been dominated by warnings about the dangers of budget deficits. A few lonely economists have tried from the beginning to point out that this fixation is all wrong, that deficit spending is actually appropriate in a depressed economy. But even though the deficit scolds have been wrong about everything so far — where are the soaring interest rates we were promised? — protests that we are having the wrong conversation have consistently fallen on deaf ears. What’s really remarkable at this point, however, is the persistence of the deficit fixation in the face of rapidly changing facts. People still talk as if the deficit were exploding, as if the United States budget were on an unsustainable path; in fact, the deficit is falling more rapidly than it has for generations, it is already down to sustainable levels, and it is too small given the state of the economy. Start with the raw numbers. America’s budget deficit soared after the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that went with it, as revenue plunged and spending on unemployment benefits and other safety-net programs rose. And this rise in the deficit was a good thing! Federal spending helped sustain the economy at a time when the private sector was in panicked retreat; arguably, the stabilizing role of a large government was the main reason the Great Recession didn’t turn into a full replay of the Great Depression. But after peaking in 2009 at $1.4 trillion, the deficit began coming down. The Congressional Budget Office expects the deficit for fiscal 2013 (which began in October and is almost half over) to be $845 billion. That may still sound like a big number, but given the state of the economy it really isn’t. Bear in mind that the budget doesn’t have to be balanced to put us on a fiscally sustainable path; all we need is a deficit small enough that debt grows more slowly than the economy. To take the classic example, America never did pay off the debt from World War II — in fact, our debt doubled in the 30 years that followed the war. But debt as a percentage of G.D.P. fell by three-quarters over the same period. Right now, a sustainable deficit would be around $460 billion. The actual deficit is bigger than that. But according to new estimates by the budget office, half of our current deficit reflects the effects of a still-depressed economy. The “cyclically adjusted” deficit — what the deficit would be if we were near full employment — is only about $423 billion, which puts it in the sustainable range; next year the budget office expects that number to fall to just $172 billion. And that’s why budget office projections show the nation’s debt position more or less stable over the next decade. So we do not, repeat do not, face any kind of deficit crisis either now or for years to come. There are, of course, longer-term fiscal issues: rising health costs and an aging population will put the budget under growing pressure over the course of the 2020s. But I have yet to see any coherent explanation of why these longer-run concerns should determine budget policy right now. And as I said, given the needs of the economy, the deficit is currently too small. Put it this way: Smart fiscal policy involves having the government spend when the private sector won’t, supporting the economy when it is weak and reducing debt only when it is strong. Yet the cyclically adjusted deficit as a share of G.D.P. is currently about what it was in 2006, at the height of the housing boom — and it is headed down. Yes, we’ll want to reduce deficits once the economy recovers, and there are gratifying signs that a solid recovery is finally under way. But unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, is still unacceptably high. “The boom, not the slump, is the time for

**1AR – Keynes Is Right (3/3)**

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austerity,” John Maynard Keynes declared many years ago. He was right — all you have to do is look at Europe to see the disastrous effects of austerity on weak economies. And this is still nothing like a boom. Now, I’m aware that the facts about our dwindling deficit are unwelcome in many quarters. Fiscal fearmongering is a major industry inside the Beltway, especially among those looking for excuses to do what they really want, namely dismantle Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. People whose careers are heavily invested in the deficit-scold industry don’t want to let evidence undermine their scare tactics; as the deficit dwindles, we’re sure to encounter a blizzard of bogus numbers purporting to show that we’re still in some kind of fiscal crisis. But we aren’t. The deficit is indeed dwindling, and the case for making the deficit a central policy concern, which was never very strong given low borrowing costs and high unemployment, has now completely vanished.

message.

**2AC – No Impact to Econ**

**No impact to economic decline – prefer new data**

Daniel **Drezner 14**, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

**1AR – No Impact to Econ (1/2)**

**No econ decline war---best and most recent data**

**Drezner, 12** (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgove rnance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5\_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greaterinternal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level ofpeacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstateviolence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm thatthe Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

**1AR – No Impact to Econ (2/2)**

**No impact**

**Barnett 9** (Thomas, Senior Strategic Researcher – Naval War College, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”, Asset Protection Network, 8-25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had **virtually no impact** whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) **predates** the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process **wholly unrelated** to global economic trends. And with the **U**nited **S**tates effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite **modest**, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much **let it burn**, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); **Not a single state-on-state war directly caused** (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the **fantastic fear-mongering** to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

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